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ABSTRACT 
PhD Thesis 
Corporate Governance in the Nonprofit Sector: A Grounded Theory Approach to Studying 
the Trustee Board 
By George Dexter 
This thesis uses a constructivist grounded theory approach to investigate nonprofit corporate 
governance in the UK; using data obtained from participatory observations of board and 
associated meetings, workshops, and unstructured elite interviews. Open codes are generated 
and brought together as concepts, which are then iteratively compared and grouped in open 
categories. These categories are then reassembled using the paradigm model into five axial 
codes: the clash of orthodoxies; clash of motivations; regulator versus board power; clash of 
rationalities; and effective board duality. A dialectical approach is then used to create the core 
category of the ‘clash of neoliberal and public service world views which exists at every level 
of the nonprofit sector’. This core category is analysed in terms of the subordinate 
contradictions: at an environmental level - regulatory power versus sector power; at board 
level - accountability; the SMT; board practices and rituals (professionalism, actual and 
symbolic authority, boards meetings as theatre, and ethical standards); the concept of 
challenge as an expression of power relations; and rationality and decision making; and at the 
individual level - motivations of directors, moral duty and social purpose, social group 
membership, identification, credibility and trust. The substantive theory is then situated within 
psychology, governance, and corporate governance theories. The contribution made by the 
thesis are identified as the: use of ethnography to describe the inner workings of the board; 
creation of a model of nonprofit corporate governance; identification of the importance of 
political, ideological, regulatory, and ethical contexts; and concept of power, and the senior 
management team as a component of the board. Further research is suggested into: (i) a 
comparison of corporate governance in the for-profit and nonprofit sectors; (ii) challenge 
within the nonprofit culture; and (iii) the SMT as a major player in governance.  
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
This thesis considers the corporate governance of organisations in the regulated UK nonprofit 
sector. For the purposes of this thesis, the nonprofit sector is defined to comprise the: public; 
quasi-public; and charity sectors. Within this definition there are many sub-sectors, such as: 
the NHS; the state education system; and social housing. The term sub-sector is therefore used 
when specific reference is made to one of these.  
The nonprofit sector in the UK is of major significance. It is the state’s main deliverer of public 
services such as the NHS, the state education system, further and higher education and social 
housing. The cost to the UK state of funding the provision of services through the nonprofit: 
health; education; public order and safety; and housing and community amenities sub-sectors 
in 2016/17 was £262.9bn. This was 37% of its total expenditure on public services (Public 
Expenditure Statistical Analyses 2016, Table 4.2). In addition, services were provided through 
the voluntary sector at a cost of £45.5bn, of which £15.3bn came from local, national, and 
international governments (Keen and Audickas, 2017). 
The nonprofit sector is also a major employer. Of the total UK working population of 32.1m at 
the end of 2017, the public and quasi-public sub-sectors employed approximately 5.3 million 
people, with an additional 850 thousand being employed in the voluntary sector. In addition, 
about 14.2 million people formally volunteered at least once a month in the voluntary sector 
(Benard et al., 2017; ONS, 2017).  
Salamon and Anheier (1997) observe the following common features of such organisations.  
(i) They are institutionally separate from government, but do however, receive significant 
government financial support and are structurally not part of a government department. 
Page 2 
 
(ii) Any profits generated by the organisation are all reinvested in the organisation itself, to 
deliver its social purpose, rather than distributed to any third party. 
(iii) They are self-governing, with their own internal procedures for governance and are not 
controlled by outside entities. 
(iv) The organisations have voluntary input, even if only a volunteer board of directors, 
which suffices to qualify them as in some sense voluntary. 
The nonprofit sector can also be defined in terms of its particular ethos, motivations, social 
reasoning, and the kinds of people it attracts (Reed and Howe 1999). It also differs from the 
for-profit sector in ways which include: basic purpose, culture, values, motivations, and the 
‘markets’ within which it operates. The thesis investigates corporate governance in the 
nonprofit sector; and takes into account how these differences may cause nonprofit boards to 
operate in different ways to those in the private sector.  
 
1.2 Research Questions 
This research considers corporate governance in organisations in those parts of the nonprofit 
sector which provide services to people, principally on behalf of national and local government 
as commissioners. The objective of the research is to understand the way in which nonprofit 
boards operate within the general political, regulatory, and ethical environments which exist in 
the UK. This research is intended to improve the understanding of the theoretical and practical 
issues associated with nonprofit corporate governance by proposing a model for nonprofit 
corporate governance (see Figures 1 and 2) which addresses the following research issues. 
i) The effects which the regulatory, political and moral environments have on 
nonprofit governance. 
ii) The internal structure and boundaries of the black box of corporate governance, and 
how the black box interact with the external environment. 
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iii) The interaction of the trustee board with its senior management team. 
iv) The board as a social group. 
v) The effects which the motivations of the actors in the nonprofit sector have on 
corporate governance. 
vi) The aspects of power, emotions and ‘rationality’ on board practices, and strategic 
and other decision making. 
These questions are addressed by using a grounded theory methodology, with data obtained 
from participatory observations made inside the board ‘black box’, and theoretical sampling 
through interviews with chairs, chief executives and executive directors. The grounded theory 
methodology produces a substantive theory, which is then assessed against extant governance, 
corporate governance theories. 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis investigates the activities of boards as small elite social groups, motivated in ways 
which differ from those in the for-profit sector. To understand this dynamic, the literature on 
social groups is considered in Chapter 2 under the general themes of: human nature; the 
concepts of self and identity; and social groups. This lays the foundations for a review of 
governance and corporate governance theories in Chapter 3. The literature reviewed in 
Chapters 2 and 3 identify motivation, ethics, and rationality as important issues for corporate 
governance. These matters are then considered in Chapter 4 by consideration of theories 
concerned with: rationality; institutionalism; dialectics; and path dependency. The chapter 
considers the concepts of rationality, as a basis for morality and motivation; and challenges the 
motivations associated with the economic view of rational choice theory. It is argued that, 
particularly in the social context, emotions and beliefs play an important role in rational thought 
and action. Similarly, morality and ethics are argued to rationally impose an obligation to act 
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consistently according to values and beliefs. This is also linked to the consideration of the 
motivations assumed by various theories relating to: self-interest; utilitarian power-seeking; 
emotional; and morality. Dialectics, as a mode of thought, are argued to help to understand a 
world full of contradictions; they represent the driving force for change which is enacted 
through path dependency. The contradictions identified by this research are used as the basis 
of the development of the substantive theory. 
The research methodology is set out in Chapter 5, which: first provides an explanation of the 
philosophical perspective based upon reality, truth and knowledge; then describes the 
paradigms of inquiry and associated methodologies; selects and justifies the use of a 
constructivist grounded theory approach; and finally considers participatory observations and 
interviewing methods used in this research. This approach recognizes that corporate 
governance operates within the historical and social context and the generally accepted theories 
which shape the individual’s and society’s views of how people should act. It is socially 
constructed; a social process that places emphasis on the dynamic nature of social reality (Letza 
et al., 2004; Letza et al., 2008). 
Chapter 6 describes the iterative grounded theory processes used to collect and analyse data, 
and to develop a substantive theory. This chapter describes the ethnographic methods used in 
the data collection and coding; the generation of open codes, concepts and open categories and 
sub-categories. The inter-relationships between sub-categories are then considered and 
suggested propositions generated. Two related models of nonprofit corporate governance are 
then proposed, identifying five axial codes, which are analysed using the paradigm model. The 
core category is then identified, related to subordinate categories, and discussed. The key 
concepts and categories are then tested through theoretical sampling, which are consolidated 
and presented under the four issues of: political, regulatory and ethical environment; resulting 
nonprofit board structures; formal and informal power structures; and the enactment of 
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governance by the individual director. This consolidation is then used to provide the basis for 
the development of the substantive theory. 
These processes then lead, in Chapter 7, to the creation of a substantive theory of nonprofit 
corporate governance. The nature of theory is first discussed; and then the substantive theory 
is presented, which is based on the core category (and dialectical principal contradiction) of 
‘the clash of neoliberal and public service world views which exists at every level of the 
nonprofit sector’. The substantive theory is then discussed in terms of the three subordinate 
contradictions which flow from this at the: environmental; board; and individual levels. The 
substantive theory is then reviewed to determine its relationships to behavioural, governance 
and corporate governance theories.  
The contributions made by the thesis are then set out in terms of: methodology, through the 
application of a combination of ethnography and grounded theory; and the theoretical outcomes 





CHAPTER 2: Human Nature, Identity and Social Groups 
“Group affiliations are a universal feature of human social life and group memberships are 
basic determinants of our social relations with others” (Turner, 1984, p. 518).  
This chapter reviews the literature concerning the motivations of individuals and groups in 
order to apply it to the concepts of governance. 
Section One of this chapter considers the question of human nature in terms of: the social 
contract; and the motivational assumptions of; self-interest, altruism and egoism, trust, and 
conformity. These aspects of human nature enable humans to work together in groups, and 
implicitly or explicitly underlie governance theories. The importance of the concept of values 
is then considered along with their reflection into culture. Wrong (1961) observes that he “does 
not see how, at the level of theory, sociologists can fail to make assumptions about human 
nature” (p.192). 
Sections Two and Three consider the concepts of self, self-identity and social identity, which 
act to transmit human motivational qualities into the social world. Various constructions and 
purposes of identity are considered, including Mead’s (1934) concept of self as the relationship 
between an individual and a group. Section Three concludes by considering the implications 
of social identity theory and the idea of self-interest. 
Section Four considers the concepts and theories relating to the social group as a psychological 
reality, which is represented by a genuine psychological process with specific behavioural 
effects (Turner, 1984), and is more than just a collection of individuals.  
The chapter is then summarised, concluding with the view that since boards are social groups, 




2.1 Human Nature 
The concept of human nature is central to the understanding of humans as individuals, the ways 
in which they interact, and how stable organisations and states are formed. This section 
addresses this by a review of the literature concerning the following.  
(i) Ideas about human nature 
These ideas range through the innate, self-construction, psychoanalytic, and motivational. 
These ideas emphasise the conception of the plasticity of human nature.  
(ii) The concept of self-interest. 
The concept of self-interest is at the heart of much of corporate governance theory. The social 
contract is discussed, which emphasises the importance of rational self-interest. Smith (1776) 
argued that it is possible to achieve the best economic benefit for all, even when, and in fact 
because, individuals tend to act in their own self-interest.  
(iii) Altruism and Egoism 
The arguments concerning the existence and nature of altruism and egoism are considered as 
key elements of human nature, which are closely linked to the issue of motivation.  
(iv) Trust 
Trust is considered specifically for its importance in enabling society to exist and function. 
Thus, trust may be considered as something which is associated with the individual or as a 
property of social systems (Delhey and Newton, 2003). It lies at the heart of governance. 
(v) Conformity 
Conformity is an important motivation which provides the basis for the existence of stable 
groups and societies. It refers to a change in behaviour caused by another person or group, 





Values are “a person’s internalised belief about how he or she should or ought to behave” 
(Meglino and Ravlin, 1998, p. 354). They are important in the exploration of the nature of self 
and the individual’s relationship to society (Hitlin, 2003), and are the foundations used to 
“characterise societies and individuals to trace change over time, and to explain the 
motivational bases of attitudes and behaviour” (Schwartz, 2006, p. 2). These universal values 
include those associated with power and conformity. 
vii) Culture 
The concepts and meanings of culture viewed from the anthropological and sociological 
perspectives and the linkages with identity are considered. 
2.1.1 Ideas About Human Nature 
“All the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature and all in some measure are 
dependent upon the science of man” (Hume, 1739/2007, p. 5).  
Wilson (1978) sees human nature as the “full set of innate behavioural predispositions that 
characterise the human species, those predispositions that affect social behaviour” (p. 217). In 
contrast, there is the view that it is not biologically fixed, and man constructs his own nature 
by way of a social enterprise. This links together man’s specific humanity and his sociality. 
“Homo sapiens is always, and in the same measure, homo socius” (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966, p. 67). 
Assumptions about human nature underpin the arguments about social contract theory, which 
was described by Friend (2015) as the view that a person’s moral and / or political obligations 
are dependent upon a contract or agreement among them to form the society in which they live. 
Hobbes (1651/1999) argued that humans are exclusively self-interested, but that they are also 
reasonable, with a rational capacity to pursue their desires as efficiently and maximally as 
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possible. For Hobbes, the social contract comprises the agreement to establish society by 
collectively and reciprocally renouncing the rights individuals had against one another in the 
‘State of Nature’, and to imbue some one person or assembly of persons with the authority and 
power to enforce the initial contract. Locke (1689/1823) saw people as being free to form a 
society based on a voluntary morality rather than political agreement. Rousseau (1762/2010) 
stated that "man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains" (p. 1). That is, humans are 
essentially free, and were free in the ‘State of Nature’; but the ‘progress' of civilization has 
substituted subservience to others for that freedom, through dependence, economic and social 
inequalities, and the extent to which we judge ourselves through comparisons with others. 
Therefore, for Locke, the most basic covenant, the social pact, is the agreement to collectively 
renounce individual rights and freedoms and transfer them to the collective body, creating a 
new ‘person'. 
According to Hume (1739/2007), we are both selfish and humane. We possess greed, and 
‘limited generosity’, that is, we are fundamentally loving, parochial, but also selfish creatures. 
While Hobbes bases his argument on the individual benefit for each party to the contract, Kant 
(1797/1996) bases his on the freedom for all persons in general, not just for the individual 
benefit which the parties to the contract, obtain in their own particular freedom. To this extent 
Kant is influenced more by Rousseau's idea of the ‘General Will’. Kant (1784/1963) also argues 
that the highest purpose of ‘Nature’ is attainable only in a society with the greatest freedom. 
That is, a society with the most exact definition of freedom and with its limits fixed so that it 
may be consistent with the freedom of others. Rawls (1971) relies on a Kantian understanding 
of persons and their capacities: arguing that people have the capacity to reason from a universal 
point of view, which means that they have the moral capacity to judge principles from an 




These ideas represent explanations of the relationships between the individual and society 
based on assumptions about human nature. Freud developed psychoanalysis to study human 
nature at the individual subconscious level. He defined psychoanalysis as the study of the 
“vicissitudes of the instincts” (Freud, 1915/2010 p. 2955). In doing so he confirmed his views 
that the instincts have no fixed social goal and of the plasticity of human nature. Freud (1914, 
1921, 1923) proposed the psychological entities of the ‘id’: our animal selves; and the ‘ego’, 
our social selves. “The ego represents what may be called reason and common sense, in contrast 
to the id, which contains the passions.” (Freud, 1923/2010, p. 3959). “The super ego (Ego Ideal) 
exists as a differentiation within the ego (Freud 1914/2010, p. 3962) comprising the precepts 
of ‘You ought to be like this’ (like your father), and ‘You may not be like this’ (like your father)” 
(Freud, 1914/2010, p. 3968). Thus, for psychoanalysis, man is a social animal; his social nature 
is profoundly reflected in his bodily structure. Giddens shared the general emphasis of 
psychoanalytic theory, but without implying a commitment to the more detailed elements of 
Freud’s theoretical or therapeutic scheme, arguing that “human wants are hierarchically 
ordered, involving a core ‘basic security system’ which is largely inaccessible to the 
consciousness of the actor” (Giddens, 1993, p. 124). Wrong (1961) developed Freud’s line of 
thought, and argued that man was a social animal without being entirely socialised.   
Socialisation is used in the senses of the transmission of the particular culture of the society an 
individual enters at birth; and of the process of acquiring uniquely human attributes from 
interaction with others.  
Human nature then can also be seen in motivational terms, as important to social theory in three 
ways. Firstly, motivational elements may operate unconsciously and as unacknowledged 
causes of conduct. Secondly, motives generate courses of action which facilitate the 
achievement of ‘social interest’, where a response to others serves as a means to the pursuance 
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of particular interests. Thirdly, the theory of motivation is immediately relevant to that of the 
reproduction of structure (Giddens, 1993). 
Motive is a complex of subjective meaning which seems, to the actor or to the observer, an 
adequate ground for the conduct in question. However, what actors want to accomplish with 
their acts and what actually happens, are in many cases two very different things (Weber, 
1904/1958, 1922/1978). Mills (1940) argues that motives are the terms with which 
interpretation of conduct by social actors proceed. The “differing reasons men give for their 
actions are not themselves without reasons” (p. 904). Motives are accepted justifications for 
present, future, or past programmes or acts, so when an agent vocalises or imputes motives, he 
is influencing others, and not just describing personal experience or stating reasons. This may 
involve an appeal to a vocabulary of motives associated with a norm with which both members 
of the situation are in agreement. As such, it is an integrative factor in future phases of the 
original social action (ibid pp. 907-8). The motives used in justifying or criticizing an act link 
them to situations, integrate one man's action with another's, and line up conduct with norms. 
In this sense motives are "social instruments, by which the agent will be able to influence 
himself or others” (ibid p. 908). The motivational structures of individuals and the patterns of 
their purposes are relative to societal frames. Mills (1940) argues that “[m]otives vary in 
content and character with historical epochs and societal structures” (p. 913). 
The motivations of self-interest, egoism, altruism, trust, and conformity are now considered. 
2.1.2 Self Interest 
Adam Smith followed the social contractarian ideas of Hobbes and Locke, arguing that man is 
both a social animal and that reciprocal self-interest is a motivational driver: “man has almost 
constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their 
benevolence only …  It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker 
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that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.” (Smith, 1776/2005, pp. 
8-9). However, he also observes that “how selfish so ever man may be supposed, there are 
evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render 
their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of 
seeing it” (Smith, 1790/2006, p. 1).  
This apparent contradiction is reflected in the concepts of ‘homo economicus’ and ‘homo 
sociologicus’. Homo economicus is assumed to be logical, to pursue goals in a rational manner 
and to be honest only to the extent of having economic incentives for being so. In contrast, 
homo sociologicus emphasises the normative basis of behaviour, which are necessary for 
viability in fields where strictly economic incentives are absent and cannot be created 
(Johansen, 1977; Kangas, 1997). Thus, people may act in self-interest (homo economicus) or 
for the common good (homo sociologicus), depending upon the context (Laffont, 1975). For 
example, a person can act differently in a trustee on a nonprofit board role than as an executive 
director on a for-profit board. 
2.1.3 Altruism and Egoism 
“Altruism is not … an agreeable ornament to social life, but it will forever be its fundamental 
basis. How can we really dispense with it?” (Durkheim, 1984, p. 288). 
While the concepts of homo economicus and homo sociologicus give context an important role, 
they also imply the existence of underlying egoistic motivations in human nature. There is 
however a sharp distinction between egoism and self-interest. Self-interest, according to Locke 
(1689/1823), produces voluntary social cooperation, whereas the absolute egoist view, that a 
person can do what they want to anybody (Stirner, 1910), can be seen to differ fundamentally 
from self-interest. Spencer (1892) pointed out that we regard the rights of others in proportion 
to our regard for our own rights (ie our self-interest). 
Page 13 
 
Bateson (1991) suggests that “egoism can be viewed as a motivational state with the ultimate 
goal of increasing one’s own welfare” (pp. 6-7), and furthermore “looking out for ‘number one’ 
is not only prudent, it is inevitable ... we seek to serve our own ends” (ibid, p. 3). He also argued 
that altruism is similarly a motivational state, which has the ultimate goal of increasing 
another’s welfare, the motivation being directed towards some goal, which is an end in itself. 
Bar-Tal (1985/86) noted that “most of those who emphasise the motivational aspect of altruism 
agree that: altruism (a) must benefit another person, (b) must be performed voluntarily, (c) 
must be performed intentionally, and (d) the benefit must be the goal by itself, and it must be 
performed without expecting any external reward” (p. 5). 
This view is challenged by the ‘pseudo-altruistic’ approach, wherein the term altruism does not 
refer to a motivational state which has the ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare, rather 
it is viewed as a form of egoism; where for example altruism becomes prosocial behaviour 
which seeks self-rewards through a process of internalisation (Cialdini, et al., 1981). This view 
essentially accords with that of Gauthier (1986) who developed Hobbes’ social contract 
argument. He argued, using rational choice theory and game theory, that rationality alone 
convinces persons to agree to cooperate and to stick to their agreements. Thus, by acting to 
further the interests of the other, one serves one’s own interests as well. Piliavin and Charng 
(1990) disagree with this view, suggesting that there is now both theory and data which is 
compatible with the view that true altruism – acting with the goal of benefiting another – does 
exist, and is a part of human nature.  
Wilson (1975) defines altruism, without using the concept of motivation, as “self-destructive 
behaviour performed for the benefit of others” (p. 578). Similarly Margolis (1982) argues that 
“altruism lacks any normative content or group interest, but simply says that the actor (who is 
not necessarily the recipient) could not have done better for himself had he chosen to ignore 
the effect of his choice on others” (p. 15). An opposing view of Schwartz and Howards (1982) 
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provides that motivation is reflected through personal norms which are “situated, self-based 
standards for specific behaviour generated from internalised values during the process of 
behaviour decision making” (p. 234). That is, there are feelings of moral obligation to perform 
or refrain from certain actions, which manifest internal altruistic traits. 
Altruism and egoism therefore are argued as being important elements of human nature which 
provide the bindings for institutions and society: both resting on the issue of motivation. 
Egoism forms a foundation for Western philosophy and leads to the assumptions underlying 
much of economic and social theory. Bateson (1991) emphasises the importance of this by his 
comment; “imagine the changes in economic theory and models of social change if we drop 
the assumption that self-benefit alone defines utility and value” (p. 4). 
2.1.4 Trust 
“One of the most salient factors in the effectiveness of our present complex social organization 
is the willingness of one or more individuals in a social unit to trust others. The efficiency, 
adjustment, and even survival of any social group depends upon the presence or absence of 
such trust” (Rotter, 1967, p. 651). 
Rotter (1971) defines trust to be “an expectancy held by an individual or a group that the word, 
promise, verbal, or written statement of another individual or group can be relied on” (p. 443). 
Morgan and Hunt (1994) argued that trust existed when “one party has confidence in the 
exchange partner’s reliability and integrity” (p. 23). This however, does not include the 
behavioural intention of ‘willingness’ which is crucial because the belief that a partner is 
trustworthy without being willing to rely on that partner, shows that trust is limited (Moorman 
et al., 1992). 
The issue of collective trust concerned Hobbes (1651/1999). He asked: how can society exist 
when there are individual temptations to select short term hedonistic actions when all parties 
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would be better off if each party selected actions leading to higher group and individual returns? 
The Hobbesian solution is to impose external enforcement of agreements on communities, 
which requires a mechanism to coordinate strategies in some fashion, such that the parties 
receive a ‘co-operators dividend’ through the norm of reciprocity (Ostrom, 2003). Axelrod 
(1984) asks the question: under what conditions does cooperation emerge in a world of egoists 
without central authority? He uses the game theory to suggest that cooperation is not based on 
trust so much as the durability and stability of the relationship between actors.  
Gouldner (1960) argued that reciprocity connotes that each party has rights and duties and 
beyond that, there is a generalised norm of reciprocity which defines certain actions and 
obligations as payment for benefits received. Or as Becker (1990) puts it: “we should return 
good for good, in proportion to what we receive;…we should resist evil, but not do evil in 
return;…we should make reparation for the harm we do;... furthermore that obligations should 
be felt in retrospect” ( p.4). Which is the equivalent of the game theory strategy of ‘tit-for-tat’ 
(Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). 
In general, reciprocity norms have in common that individuals tend to react positively to the 
positive actions of others and negatively to the negative actions of others. The specific norms 
which individuals learn however, vary from culture to culture and across different types of 
situations (Ostrom, 2003).  
2.1.5 Conformity 
"The need for eliciting favourable responses from others is an almost constant component of 
[personality]. Indeed, it is not too much to say that there is very little organized human 
behaviour which is not directed toward its satisfaction in at least some degree" (Linton, 1945, 
p. 91).  
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It can however, be looked upon negatively. “No shepherd and one herd! Everybody wants the 
same, everybody is the same: whoever feels different goes voluntarily into a madhouse.” 
(Nietzsche, 1885/2010, p. 18). 
Conformity is a core human attribute, which can be exhibited through compliance. Compliance 
is a change in behaviour which is requested, and obedience is a change in behaviour which is 
ordered, caused by another person or group. Conformity encompasses both compliance and 
obedience because is it refers to any change in a person’s behaviour caused by another person 
or group. However, it does not refer to effects of other people on internal concepts such as 
attitudes or beliefs (Breckler et al., 2006). Psychological experiments (Sherif, 1935, 1936, 1937; 
Asch, 1951, 1952, 1956) demonstrated that if people around an individual do things which do 
not seem to make sense, then that individual will often conform, especially when the situation 
is ambiguous and there is uncertainty about the individual’s own judgement and experience. 
Eysenck (2004) observed that conformity can be seen as “yielding to group pressures, and by 
not being the odd one out” (p. 724). The reality of conformity and its persistence was 
demonstrated experimentally, implying that social norms can persist in social groups despite 
the complete changes in group membership (Jacobs and Campbell, 1961).  
Conformity can be viewed as an aspect of the interplay between an individual’s free will and 
societal structures over time, and importantly, an individual’s perceptions of these. This is 
reflected in the concept of ‘habitus’, which is created and reproduced unconsciously, “without 
any deliberate pursuit of coherence ... without any conscious concentration” (Bourdieu, 1984, 
p. 170). 
Informational and normative influences appear to support conforming behaviour (Deutsch and 
Gerard, 1955). Informational influence is motivated by a desire to be correct and obtain 
accurate information. People trust other’s judgements to be useful in a particular context. 
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Normative influence, on the other hand, occurs when people are influenced by others to gain 
rewards or avoid punishment. They might not necessarily think that other’s behaviours or 
judgements are correct they simply want to be liked or to avoid conflict. Both influences can 
occur together (Breckler, et al., 2006). 
2.1.6  Values  
Values are “those conceptions of desirable states of affairs that are used as criteria of evaluation” 
(Williams, 1967, p. 23), and are “important in the exploration of the nature of the self and the 
individual's relationship to society” (Hitlin, 2003, p. 119). Williams (1979) noted that “the term 
‘values’ has been used variously to refer to interests, pleasures, likes, preferences, duties, moral 
obligations, desires, wants, goals, needs, aversions and attractions, and many other kind of 
selective orientations” (p. 16). Further, values have been variously described as: enduring 
beliefs (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1994); an implicit or explicit conception of that which is 
desirable (Kluckhohn, 1951; Guth and Tagiuri, 1965); and as principles for action 
(Braithewaite and Blamey, 1998; Hutcheon, 1972). Cheng and Fleischman (2010) bring 
together these definitions of values to propose that “values serve as guiding principles of what 
people consider important in life” (p. 2). Values have also been described as concepts or beliefs, 
relating to desirable end states or behaviours, which transcend specific situations, and guide 
the selection or evaluation of behaviours and events (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz and Bilsky, 
1987). 
The functioning of social institutions requires some degree of status differentiation (Parsons, 
1951). Schwartz (2006) argues that to justify this fact of social life and to motivate group 
members to accept it, groups must treat power as a value. Power values such as authority and 
wealth, emphasise the attainment or preservation of a dominant position within the social 
system. Giddens (1993) links the notion of ‘action’ with that of power, arguing that “action 
intrinsically involves the application of ‘means’ to achieve outcomes … power represents the 
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capacity of the agent to mobilise resources to constitute those ‘means’. In this most general 
sense, ‘power’ refers to the transformative capacity of human action. ‘Power’ in the narrower 
relational sense is a property of interaction, which may be the capacity to secure outcomes 
where the realisation of these outcomes depends upon the agency of others. It is in this sense 
that some have power ‘over’ others: this is power as domination” (pp. 116-117). 
Shared values represent the extent to which partners have beliefs in common about what 
behaviours, goals, and policies are important or unimportant, appropriate or inappropriate, and 
right or wrong. They are a direct precursor of both relational commitment and trust (Dweyer, 
et al., 1987; Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Values also play a guiding and directing role in the 
functioning of the organisation and shared values are considered to be a primary component of 
an organisation’s culture (Enz, 1988). 
Baumeister and Muraven (1996) posited the existence of a ‘value gap’ in Western society. That 
is, a cultural deficit which presents individuals with a problem of how to find meaningful ways 
to endow their lives with value and make choices that are right and good. The most important 
cultural response to this value gap has been to elevate the self into a major value base. Thus, 
there is shared or common perception that the individual has a moral right, and even a duty, to 
do what is good for the self.  
Overall, values can be considered as ideas held by human individuals or groups about what is 
desirable, proper, good or bad. Differing values represent key aspects of variations in human 
culture. What individuals value is strongly influenced by the specific culture in which they 
happen to live (Giddens and Sutton, 2013).  
2.1.7 Culture 
Culture, in the context of this review, does not include considerations such as those of Arnold 
(1869, p. 34) as the “pursuit of perfection, or of the refinement of manners – urbanity and 
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civility, learning”. Although the observation of Eliot (1948), that “there is a hierarchy of culture, 
where that of the individual is nested within that of the group or class, which in turn is within 
the culture of the whole society” (p. 1) appears to be generally relevant.  
From an anthropological viewpoint, Malinowski (1944) observes that “man, as he is, is molded 
by his complex, partly rational, partly emotional cultural setting” (pp 5-6). In this 
anthropological sense, culture has been defined by Tylor, (1871) as "that complex whole which 
includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits 
acquired by man as a member of society" (p. 1). This accords with the view of the plasticity of 
human nature. Giddens and Sutton (2013) define culture as the values, norms, habits and ways 
of life characteristic of a coherent social group. “It is a system of ideas” (Allaire and Firsirotu, 
1984, p. 198).  
However the concept of culture itself, insofar as its implications of normality and uniformity 
are concerned, has been argued to be a quasi-statistical one. Wallace (1952) noted that the 
“probability of using any specific cultural quality will vary according to the systematic and 
random alternatives a culture affords for the solution of a problem” (p. 748). 
2.1.8 Concluding Remarks on Human Nature 
The literature demonstrates the importance and plasticity of human nature. Rieff (1983) noted 
that every social order produces a doctrine of human nature, and that no doctrine of human 
nature has yet indicated its independence from the social order in which it has appeared.   
While there is a wide range of human qualities, that is, those distinguishing features of a 
person’s character, only the ones relating to motivations considered to be relevant for social 
interaction were considered. The motivating qualities of altruism, egoism, and trust have been 
shown to be deeply rooted, but importantly not mutually exclusive, in that any individual can 
and does exhibit them all in varying circumstances. 
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Humans demonstrate the quality of conformity, which is a key factor of being social animals. 
In the sense reviewed, conformity can be taken as a proxy for all those qualities which produce 
and arise from our need to act in social groups.  
These qualities can be manifested through systems of value, which are supported by goals or 
motivations (Schwartz, 2006). They are culturally normative in that they “pertain to the realm 
of what ‘ought’ to be, desired states of being that constitute standards or criteria for making 
decisions and for justifying behaviour” (Gecas, 2008, p. 345). This led to a consideration of 
culture as a set of concepts, norms and ideas related to a coherent social group. Importantly, 
“culture makes it possible for both the individual performing an action and a spectator 
interpreting it to characterise the action for what it is, and to perform it as such” (Inglis, 2004, 
p. 7). 
Wilson (1978) observed that, modern man is sociobiologically equipped only for an earlier 
simpler existence, but must now fulfil a multitude of different roles, and under the modern day 
stressful conditions even the ‘true’ self cannot be precisely defined. Goffman (1974) similarly 
considered that the self “is not an entity half-concealed behind events, but a changeable formula 
for managing oneself during them. Just as the current situation prescribes the official guise 
behind which we will conceal ourselves, so it provides where and how we will show through, 
the culture itself prescribing what sort of entity we must believe ourselves to be in order to 
have something to through in this manner” (pp. 573-574). 
Human qualities, values and culture thus require a consideration of the self and of identity in 
order to be developed as tractable concepts applicable to social groups. 
2.2. The Concepts of Self and Social Self 
The previous section on human nature brought out the linkages between the individual, society 
and culture. Côté (1996) argued that culture and identity were linked through: social structure, 
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which include both political and economic systems; patterns of behaviour which characterise 
day-to-day contacts among people in socialising institutions such as the family and schools; 
and personality, which encompasses terms like character, self and psyche, including 
subcomponents such as ego identity. In order to develop this as a basis for individual and group 
action, the concepts of self, identity and social groups are considered. Mead (1934) argued that 
the self “is essentially a social structure, and it arises in social experience” (p. 140), and there 
is a reciprocal relationship between the self and society (Stryker,   1980). Stets and Burke (2003) 
expanded upon this, stating that “[t]he self influences society through the actions of individuals 
thereby creating groups and organisations, networks, and institutions, a society influences the 
self through its shared language” (p.132). Individuals through their social experiences, shape 
society, which in turn shapes individuals; thus, context is an essential feature of the self. This 
context influences identity formation through the shared values, ideologies, or norms that are 
socially constructed and communicated through signs, symbols, meanings, and expectations 
that are found in language, discourse or communication (Adams and Marshall, 1996).  
The self-concept is also a set of meanings we hold for ourselves when we look at ourselves 
(Gergen, 1971; Stets and Burke, 2003). However, individuals experience themselves only 
indirectly from the standpoint of the other individual members of the same group, or from the 
idealised standpoint of the social group as a whole to which the individual belongs at any given 
moment (Mead, 1934; Morse and Gergen, 1970; Stets and Burke, 2003). 
Turner (1984) developed the concept of the self into a structure which mediates between social 
situations and behaviour, using the concepts of personal and social identity. Burkley, et al. 
(2015) argue that there is variability in the degree to which internal, non-tangible constructs, 
such as: a person’s thoughts (Briñol et al., 2013); beliefs (Abelson, 1986); opinions (Smith et 
al., 1956); ownership of arguments (De Dreu and van Knippenberg, 2005); and attitudes 
(Abelson and Prentice, 1989), can be perceived as being fused within the self. Thus, the self 
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can be seen as a process, which is itself simply a phase of the whole social organisation of 
which the individual is a part (Mead, 1934). 
2.3 Identity Theory 
Identity is “a set of meaningful definitions that are ascribed or attached to the self, including 
social roles, reputation, a structure of values and priorities, and a conception of one’s 
potentiality” (Baumeister and Muraven, 1996, p. 406).  
Identity theory deals with the structure and function of people's identity as related to the 
behavioural roles they play in society (Hogg et al., 1995; Simon, 1992). Role-identities as self-
conceptions are based on enduring, normative, reciprocal ongoing relationships with other 
people. Roles are sets of behavioural expectations which are attached to positions in the social 
structure. Thus, identities based on positional roles should provide the individual with a sense 
of who they are and how they ought to behave. Role-identities thereby give individuals a sense 
of meaning and purpose in life and should provide behavioural guidance (Thoits, 1991). 
Social identity theory is a psychological analysis of the role of self-conception in group 
membership, group processes, and intergroup relations. The approach is explicitly framed by a 
conviction that collective phenomena cannot be adequately explained in terms of isolated 
individual processes or interpersonal alone (Hogg, 2006). This is the psychological equivalent 
to the question addressed by the assumptions on human nature and the formation of society. 
The literature on identity is therefore considered as it refers to: role; behaviour; social identity; 
and motivation.  
2.3.1 Role 
The social nature of self can be thought of as being “derived from the role positions that people 
occupy in the social world, and these role identities vary in regard to their salience” (Hogg et 
al., 1995, pp. 258-9).  
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The categorisation of the self as an occupant of a role, and the incorporation into the self of the 
meanings and expectations associated with that role and its performance, are the core of identity. 
These role identities include the learned meanings a person attributes to the self, appropriate to 
that particular role; and motivations, in the sense of defining situations which call for specific 
behaviours or responses based on shared behavioural expectations for action (Burke, 1980; 
Stets and Burke, 2000). Identity theory produces a self which is as differentiated as the society 
within which it exists (Stryker, 1987). Turner (2006) is however, sceptical as to the existence 
of a neat linear hierarchy of salience among identities. He summarised the relationship between 
what he sees as the key four identities: the core, as most general; followed successively by 
social, group, and role. He argued that because they are more general, social and core identities 
are carried into virtually all social situations, whereas role identities and group identities are 
more likely to be salient when actually in a role or responding to a group.  
2.3.2 Behaviour 
Burke (1980) proposed that identity and behaviour are linked through a common system of 
meanings within which a person learns the meanings of a role identity by interacting with others. 
Stets and Burke (2003) proposed an expansion of meaning between identity and behaviour to 
include the concept of a perceptual control system or cybernetic model of the identity process, 
which, instead of seeing behaviour as being strictly guided by the situation or by internal self-
meanings, is seen to be the result of the relationship between the two. 
2.3.3 Social Identity 
Reid and Deaux (1996) distinguish between collective selves, which reflect social identities 
and individual selves which reflect personal attributes rather than personal identities. 
According to Reicher et al. (2010), individual identity is not somehow more ‘real’ and more 
important to the subject than social identity. It is simultaneously individual and social, which 
explains how large numbers of people can act in coherent and meaningful ways, by reference 
Page 24 
 
to shared group norms, values and understandings. A person’s social identity is their sense of 
who they are, based on their group membership(s). A person derives a sense of self-worth and 
social belongingness from their memberships in groups, which also motivates them to draw 
favourable comparisons between their own and other groups (Tajfel and Turner, 2004). 
According to Cameron (2004), social identity has three separate but linked aspects: cognitive 
centrality, which relates to: the accessibility of the identity; the in-group affect, which is a self-
evaluating feeling derived from identity; and the sense of attachment and belonging to the 
group that defines the identity. The nonprofit sector has a distinctive social identity, unified, 
amongst other things, through common feelings of seeking to achieve social purposes, the 
community of empathy, and moral duty towards the clients of the sector. 
Group behaviour is “underpinned by social identity and while in the last analysis, ‘individuals’ 
deal with ‘individuals’, however they deal with each other, quite often, as members of well-
defined and clearly distinct social categories” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 27). This moves away from the 
traditional assumption that the self should only be understood as that which defines the 
individual in relation to other individuals, and acknowledges that, in some circumstances at 
least, we can define ourselves through the groups to which we belong (Reicher et al., 2010). 
However, Ellemers et al. (1999) argue that the key proposal of social identity theory is that it 
is the extent to which people identify with a particular social group which determines their 
inclination to behave in terms of their group membership. In this sense, social identification is 
an emotional component, primarily referring to a feeling of affective commitment to the group. 
Hogg et al. (1995) argue that the basic idea of social identity is that of a social category into 
which a person falls, and to which they feel they belong. This provides a definition of who they 
are in terms of the defining characteristics of the category. This self-definition is a part of the 
self-concept. Reicher et al. (2010) linked social identity theory to self-categorisation theory by 
noting their common concern with the processes which surround the way that people define 
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themselves as members of a social group, that is, their social identity. Social identity is a 
relational term, which defines who we are as a function of our similarities and differences with 
others. Since it is shared with others, it provides a basis for shared social action.  
2.3.4 Motivation 
Social identity should be viewed as something which shifts focus from self-interest to group 
interest as the basic motivation for behaviour. Since this transfer may require self-sacrifice in 
the interests of the group, a motivational explanation is required (Brewer and Picket, 2003).  
Perhaps one of the most important implications of social identity theory is that the ‘self’ of 
‘self-interest’ is presupposed to be the personal self. However, where social identities are 
salient and constitute the self then a utility to a fellow ingroup member can constitute a utility 
to the (collective) self (Reicher et al., 2010). This stands in contradiction to many of the ideas 
underlying the social contract and classical economic theory which assume that individuals act 
only in their own interest. In many situations individuals act in the interests of some entity 
larger than themselves. That is, there is “a prescriptive norm within a collectivity that one 
should forgo self-interest and act in the interests of the collectivity” (Coleman, 1988, p. 104). 
The way people act appears to depend on the frame or context (Brewer and Kramer, 1986). For 
example, whether people think of themselves as single autonomous individuals or regard 
themselves as sharing membership in and identification with a larger aggregate or social unit. 
This view has implications across the range of the governance theories, through the bridge of 
social groups and can be used to explain why the same person will act differently as an 
executive or non-executive in the for-profit sector than as a non-executive in a nonprofit 
organisation.   
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2.4 Social Groups 
“We do not act as isolated individuals but as social beings who derive an important part of our 
identity from the human groups and social categories we belong to” (Tajfel et al., 1984, p. 5).  
Groups must be treated as if they have their own life, laws and characteristics, regardless of 
whether you consider that they exist independently of their members, with their own lives, laws 
and characteristics separate from their members. (Simmel, 1950; Turner, 1984). Social identity 
theory, in contrast to identity theory, develops the self-concept as the psychological basis of 
group affiliation and the development of group norms. This is discussed below by considering: 
social groups and norms; belonging; categorisation; prototypes; and stereotypes.  
2.4.1 Social Groups and Norms 
The group is a collection of individuals who share a social categorisation of themselves (social 
self), which provides the psychological basis of group affiliation. This concept of social 
identification is a key aspect of social identity theory (Oakes and Turner, 1990; Reicher et al., 
1995). It brings together the classic notion of personal identity with that of social identity which 
relates to the groups to which the individual belongs. The replacement of a unitary with a 
multiple concept of selfhood, means that in becoming part of a group, individuals shift from 
the personal to the social level of identification. These identities are hierarchical, with the self 
as a social group member, being of a higher level to the personal self-categorisation of personal 
identity (Oakes and Turner, 1990). A key attribute of group membership is that people involved: 
consider themselves to be members; recognise one another as members; feel connected to other 
members; and coordinate their behaviour (Arrow et al., 2000). 
Group norms are a fundamental aspect of group structure and have a powerful influence on 
behaviour. These norms provide direction and motivation, and organise the social interaction 
of group members by regulating group member’s behaviour (Forsyth, 2010; Hahn, 2010). 
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Groups may develop their own norms which members must learn when they join the group. 
These norms are: prescriptive, defining the socially appropriate ways to respond in a social 
situation; proscriptive, defining those actions which group members should not do; and 
descriptive, describing what people usually do; and injunctive, which concern behaviours 
which people ought to do (Forsyth, 2010). 
2.4.2 Belonging 
Group membership is concerned with belonging to the group. The need to be both unique and 
to belong to a group is found in all cultures and is innate among human beings, and group 
identity brings meaning and clarity in social contexts (Adams and Marshall, 1996; Baumeister 
and Laury, 1995; Brewer, 1991; Brewer and Picket, 2003). Brewer (1991) hypothesised that 
“social identity and group loyalty are the strongest for those self-categorisations that 
simultaneously provide for a sense of belonging and a sense of distinctiveness” (p. 475). 
Belonging is dialectical linked with not-belonging, which together create the need to 
differentiate one group from another, and to the existence of ingroups and outgroups.  
2.4.3 Categorisation, Self-categorisation, and Depersonalisation  
Categorisation and self-categorisation, which are extensions of social identity theory, 
depersonalise an individual’s perception, transforming them into ingroup or outgroup 
prototypes. The process of self-categorisation, which is the cognitive basis of group behaviour 
(Terry and Hogg, 1996), places the self and others into ingroup and outgroup. This accentuates 
the perceived similarity of the relevant ingroup or outgroup prototype, that is, the cognitive 
representation of features which describe and prescribe attributes of the group (Terry and Hogg, 
1996). This act of categorising someone as a group member transforms how they are seen, 
thereby depersonalising them. Depersonalisation in this sense means viewing oneself as a 
category representative rather than as a unique individual. Therefore, we seek to include 
Page 28 
 
ingroups in the self because doing so increases our confidence that we can meet the demands 
of our world and achieve goals (Hogg, 2006). 
These processes produce conformity to ingroup norms by assimilation of self to the ingroup 
prototype (Abrams and Hogg, 1990; Turner, 1985; Turner and Oakes, 1989). This conformity 
is a deep process which transforms people’s behaviour to correspond to the appropriate self-
defining group prototype (Terry and Hogg, 1996). 
2.4.4 Prototypes 
Prototypes embody all the attributes which characterise groups and distinguish them from other 
groups, including beliefs, attitudes, feelings, and behaviours. Within groups, “people can 
distinguish themselves and others in terms of how well they match the prototype” (Hogg and 
Terry, 2000, p. 126). The content of prototypes strongly influences group phenomena by 
enabling people within groups to distinguish among themselves and others in terms of how 
well they match that prototype and maximise similarities within and differences between 
groups, so defining groups as distinct entities (Hogg, 2006; Hogg  and Terry, 2000). Prototypes 
may be formed as the average or most typical member, but in most cases the prototypic member 
does not actually exist (Posner and Keele, 1968; Reed, 1972). 
2.4.5 Stereotyping 
Tajfel (1984) observed that social stereotypes seem to fulfil at least three major functions 
(separately or in combination) for a social group; providing: “socially shared explanations of 
complex social events; positive differentiation from other relevant groups; and justification of 
actions planned or committed against other groups” (p. 698). 
Stereotypes refer to simplified ‘pictures in our heads’ (Lippmann, 1922), which may be 
descriptive, saying how people in a group supposedly behave, or prescriptive, saying how they 
ought to behave (Fiske, 1993).  
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Stereotyping can be viewed as “the agreement amongst members of the one social group that 
certain attributes are possessed by all or most members of some other group” (Turner, 1984, p. 
528). Therefore, a member of a group is viewed as having all the attributes of the stereotype of 
that group and as being distinct from members of other groups; which as proposed by Operario 
and Fiske (2001), “maintain division between ingroups (‘us’) and outgroups (‘them’)” (p. 24). 
This division between in and out groups encourages people to allocate more rewards to ingroup 
members than outgroup members” (Brewer, 1979, p. 307), and to have more positive 
unconscious reactions to words referring to ingroup than those referring to outgroups (Perdue 
et al., 1990). Stereotyping is then a powerful mechanism for making sense of the world, judging 
and for control (Lipmann, 1922; Operatio and Fiske, 2001). 
An alternative, although compatible, explanation has been put forward by Wright et al. (2002), 
which suggests that identification with a group is more than the mere recognition of a person’s 
membership of the group, and not simply whether one evaluates the group positively. They 
argue that ingroup identification involves the degree to which the person feels an enduring 
sense of interconnectedness between themselves and the group. Thus, at its most basic level, 
ingroup identification represents the degree to which the ingroup is included in the self. The 
‘exemplar model’ has also been suggested as an alternative to prototype based stereotyping. In 
this model, mental representations involve variability rather than typicality and homogeneity 
(Linville et al., 1989). The exemplars influence perception and categorisation and may operate 
at an unconscious level (Smith and Zàrate, 1992).  
Taken together, these features provide strength from the group, but can also provide the basis 
for ‘groupthink’ (Janis, 1972) where the individual simply conforms to the values and views 




This chapter reviewed the literature on human nature on the assumption that humans are 
innately social animals. This property is viewed as the ultimate reason for the creation of stable 
societies. The concepts of self, and identity were reviewed, leading to the conclusion that social 
identity is the key theoretical construction for social groups. This lays the foundations for a 
review of governance in the next chapter, based on the perspective that boards and 
organisations function as groups within a wider group based environment. 
While human nature includes a number of human qualities which, for example Smith 
(1790/2006) and Hobbes (1651/1999) set out; the literature review focused on those traits 
which are central to to the formation of social groups: self-interest, altruism and egoism, trust 
and conformity. 
Self-interest continues to provide a strong theoretical basis, particularly for economic and 
governance theories. Self interest is also associated with power. For example, Hobbes derived 
from self-interest, a state of universal conflict, in which he argued that some individuals might 
be content with sufficiency, but self-preservation required that even these seek “infinitely more 
power in order to protect themselves against the predations of the insatiable” (Hobbes, 
1651/1999, p. 102). Hobbes’s central argument suggests that humanity’s natural state is one in 
which each of us pursues self-interest so unabashedly that we need a strong central government 
to restrain our selfish natures or else we shall destroy each other. Edgeworth (1881) translated 
this into the economic precept that every agent is actuated only by self interest. He did however 
caveat that by adding that “man is for the most part an impure egoist, a mixed utilitarian” (p. 
104). 
Sen (1977) questioned the self-interest assumptions of economists and rational-choice theorists, 
arguing that sympathy for other people and commitment to a principle, produce two key 
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departures from self-interest. That commitment, which involves counter preferential choice, 
"drives a wedge between personal choice and personal welfare, and much of traditional 
economic theory relies on the identity of the two" (p. 329). Hirschman (1985) stated that “while 
the economic postulate of the self-interested, isolated individual had yielded some important 
insights, there were intrinsic weaknesses which leads us to believe that this assumption is too 
simpleminded to account for fundamental economic processes such as consumption and 
production” (p. 7).  
Dawes and Thaler (1988) recounted that economics can be distinguished from other social 
sciences by the belief that most, and possibly all, behaviour can be explained by assuming that 
agents have stable, well-defined preferences and make rational choices consistent with those 
preferences in markets. They however, note instances when predictions derived from this 
assumption of rational selfishness are violated in many familiar contexts.  
Altruism was considered as an alternative motivation to that of self-interest, and its existence, 
as a different quality of human nature, accepted. The quality of trust, as an expectancy that 
another person can be relied upon, is one which is required for the existence of society and is 
closely associated with the norm of reciprocity. The existence of human society depends on 
the property of conformity, which is also a proxy for other group properties such as compliance, 
obedience, leadership and followership. 
These human qualities led onto values, which serve as guiding principles of what people 
consider to be important, and enable the exploration of the nature of the self and the individual's 
relationship to society. Values are foundations used to characterise societies and individuals, 
and to explain the motivational bases of attitudes and behaviour. Conformity values emphasise 
self-restraint in everyday interaction, usually with close others, deriving from the requirement 
that individuals inhibit inclinations that might disrupt and undermine smooth interaction and 
Page 32 
 
group functioning. Overall, values are ideas held by individuals or groups about what is 
desirable, proper, good or bad. Differing values represent key aspects of variations in human 
culture. The individual’s value is strongly influenced by the specific culture in which they 
happen to live (Giddens and Sutton, 2013).  
Culture was considered, but from a sociological viewpoint Giddens and Sutton (2013) define 
culture as “the values, norms, habits and ways of life characteristic of a coherent social group” 
(p. 1054). 
The chapter then considered the literature on the individual and social self, and the various 
aspects of identity. Reicher et al. (2010) argue that perhaps the most profound implication of 
social identity theory is the idea of collective interest, which undermines dominant conceptions 
of rationality based on the individual.  
The concepts of social groups, the social self and social identity were brought together through 
identity theory and social identity, by considering: social groups, belonging, categorisation, 
self-categorisation, depersonalisation, prototypes, and stereotyping. While it is important to see 
groups as entities and not simply as a sum of the individual members, the role, background and 
characteristics of individual members should not be ignored. As Wertheimer (1924) puts it 
“there are entities where the behaviour of the whole cannot be derived from its individual 
elements nor from the way these elements fit together; rather the opposite is true: the properties 
of any of the parts are determined by the intrinsic structural laws of the whole” (p. 7). This 
seems to accord with Durkheim (1915), that “from the moment when it is recognised that above 
individual there is society, and this is not a nominal being created by reason, but a system of 
active forces, a new manner of explaining man becomes possible” (p. 447). 
The next chapter considers the literature on the theories of governance of society, which are 
based on the assumptions of individual rationality, self-interest, altruism, common interests, 
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and the manner in which individuals operate as groups or networks. The theories of corporate 
governance are then considered. These ultimately rest on the board as a small group of 
individuals which operates as part of and alongside other groups, the theory of social groups, 





CHAPTER 3: Governance 
This chapter reviews the literature concerning governance and corporate governance as 
institutions, and the manner in which these institutions affect people who operate within them. 
The chapter is divided into three parts:  
I  Governance Concepts, Theories and Models; 
II Public, Quasi Public and Third Sector Governance; and 
III Corporate Governance. 
I Governance Concepts, Theories and Models 
Part I is divided into four sections which are concerned with: the various definitions, concepts, 
theories and models of governance; the relationship between governance and government; 
economic governance; and network governance.  
3.1 Definitions 
Governance has multiple meanings: Jessop (2003) notes that “at the same time, however, it has 
become a rather fuzzy term that can be applied to almost everything and therefore describes 
and explains nothing” (p. 4). This echoes the observation of Stoker (1998), that the concept of 
governance is intuitively appealing but ambiguious, and is used for rhetorical rather than 
sustantive reasons. Heinrich and Lynn (2000) observed that despite the strong intuitive appeal, 
governance has not been defined clearly. This section seeks to clarify the the definitions of 
governance. 
There is a wide range of definitions of the term ‘governance’, which reflects the perceived 
scope of the concept and the disciplines from which they have been derived, concerning: rights 
and responsibilities under the rule of law (Kooiman, 1999; Lee, 2003; Lynn et al., 2001; 
Rosenau, 1992); networks (Rhodes, 1996, 2000); and the control of organisations in the public 
and private sectors (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; Cadbury, 1992; CIPFA, 1995; Rhodes, 2000). 
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These seem to be a mixture of general principle and process. Lee (2003) sought to summarise 
governance as a way of “defining rights and responsibilities of members who face certain 
common problems, public or private, and who want to resolve them jointly” (p. 4). 
Governance in democratic societies has been argued to be based on: a hierarchical 
centralisation with formal systems of control and accountability; or a weaker centralisation 
which allows for innovation and change through managerial power, maximisation of output 
and economic rationalisation. Alternatively, a decentralised approach can be followed which 
emphasises flexibility and expansion. A third approach rests upon decentralised self-
governance, which emphasises citizen power, devolution and participation (Newman, 2001). 
Other classifications in the governance literature include the: state-centric ‘old governance’ 
and society-centric ‘new governance’ (Pierre, 2000); market, participatory, flexible, and 
deregulation models (Peters, 1996); privatisation of services, contracting out, and compulsory 
competitive tendering or the introduction of a contract culture into the world of government 
(Andrew and Goldsmith, 1998); the managerial, corporatist, progrowth, and welfare models 
(Pierre, 1999); procedural, corporate, market, and network models (Considine and Lewis. 
1999); and collaborative governance where one or more public agencies directly engage non-
state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process (Ansell and Gash, 2007). 
Following the general category of rights and responsibilities; governance appears to mean how 
the state adapts to its external environment; and how social systems are coordinated, 
bureaucratically, democratically and through the market. (Beetham, 1996; Pierre, 2000). 
Coordination in the UK has fragmented into a system of local governance involving complex 
sets of organisations drawn from the public and private sectors, but which the centre of 
Westminster government cannot properly coordinate (Rhodes, 1992). Thus while bureaucracy 
remains important, it is not appropriate for all situations, similarly neither are market solutions. 
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The review of the governance literature will now be more narrowly focused in relevant areas 
under the headings of: government and governance; economic governance; networks; and in 
Part II, by a review of public sector governance.  
3.2 Government and Governance 
Rhodes (1996) states that, traditionally ‘governance’ was a synonym for government, but now 
governance signifies “a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of 
governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is 
governed” (pp. 652-653). Stoker (1998) argues that governance is also about “creating the 
conditions for ordered rule and collective action. ...[and] that the essence of governance is its 
focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions 
of government” (p. 17). This view does not fully accord with the reality of the state as regulator 
as it is in the nonprofit sector, which is addressed more generally by Fukuyama (2013b) who 
defined governance as a “government’s ability to make and enforce rules” (p. 3).   
The view of governance as a mechanism is related to the issue of power in governance 
relationships. Wilson (1887) saw governance as administration and a field of business, which 
is “part of political life only as the methods of the counting house are part of the life of society” 
(p. 210). Aspects of power were considered by Weber (1919/1946), who argued that “organised 
domination, which calls for continuous administration, requires that human conduct be 
conditioned to obedience towards those masters who claim to be the bearers of legitimate 
power. ... Thus, organised domination requires control of the personal executive staff and the 
material implements of administration” (p. 2). This comment concerns state regulatory power, 
which Mann (1984) reflects in the concepts of: infrastructural power, which the state derives 
from the social utility which cannot be provided by civil society itself; and despotic state power, 
which arises from the inability of civil society to control the infrastructure once it has been set 
up. Fukuyama (2013a) is more interested in infrastructural power, ie the logistics of political 
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control rather than despotic power, and he therefore excludes democratic accountability from 
the definition of governance and normative views on democracy and despotism from the 
definition of governance. 
Governance is political by nature, comprising formal and informal institutions, decisions, and 
influences (Lee, 2003). It is a regime of laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative 
practices which enables the provision of publicly supported goods and services (Lynn et al., 
2001). From a legal perspective, Sweet (1999) sees governance as ‘‘the social mechanism by 
which the rules in place in any given community are adapted to the experiences and exigencies 
of those who live under them” (p. 147). So in the UK, its highly functionally differentiated 
system has been made more complex by the trend towards establishing principal–agent 
relations throughout much of the machinery of government (Stoker, 1998). In this context the 
tasks of government in governance are: composition and co-ordination; managing social 
tensions to achieve policy objectives through collibration and steering; and integration and 
regulation (Dunshire, 1993; Kirkbride and Letza, 2004; Kooiman and Van Vliet, 1993). 
3.3 Economic Governance 
The concept of governance as applied to the economy or economic sectors is well recognised 
(Campbell et al., 1991; Hollingsworth et al., 1994; Kooiman, 1999; Wade, 1990). Van 
Kerksbergen (2004) noted that the concept had developed in a number of disciplines, including: 
economic history (North and Thomas, 1973; North, 1990); institutional economics 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1996); economic sociology (Smelser and Swedburg, 1994); 
comparative political economy; (Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Hall, 1999; Hollingsworth and 
Boyer, 1997); and labour relations and labour economics (Soskice, 1990; Streeck, 1992).   
Gamble (2000) argued that governance denotes the steering capacities of a political system: the 
ways in which governing is carried out. The state is always involved in governance, but often 
Page 38 
 
only in an enabling rather than a directing role; helping to establish and sustain the institutions 
in society, including crucially, markets which make steering possible. Van Kerksbergen and 
Van Waarden (2004) note that the economy cannot function in a vacuum. Institutions must be 
created to provide, monitor and enforce ‘rules of the game’, which among other things fix 
property rights, back up contracts, protect competition, reduce information asymmetries, and 
reduce risk and uncertainties. Governments are only one source of such institutions. Thus, 
governance is broader than government, since much of this takes place without direct state 
intervention or involvement. However, “the shadow of the hierarchy may either incite private 
actors to pre-emptively create private governance institutions or back up private governance 
arrangements such as courts enforcing contract law” (ibid, p. 147). 
3.4 Networks 
Governance is about autonomous self governing networks of actors (Stoker, 1998), which are 
the analytical heart of the notion of governance in the study of public administration (Börzel, 
1998; Dowding, 1995; Rhodes, 1990, 1997, 2000). Networks have been conceptualised as 
pluricentric forms of governance, in contrast to multicentric (market) and unicentric or 
hierarchical forms (state, firm hierarchy). They are considered to be autonomous, self-
organising, able to resist governmental steering, develop their own policies and mould their 
environments. They are characterised by the interdependence between organisations (public, 
private and voluntary), exchange of resources and negotiations, and by game-like interactions 
“rooted in trust and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and agreed by network 
participants” (Rhodes, 2000, p. 61). 
Coordination mechanisms are context dependent. Frances et al. (1991) observe “if it is price 
competition that is the central co-ordinating mechanism of the market and administrative orders 
that of hierarchy, then it is trust and co-operation that centrally articulates networks” (p. 15). 
More deeply, ‘rules of the game’ are the “outcome of the interactions of resourceful and 
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boundedly rational actors whose capabilities, preferences, and perceptions are largely, but not 
completely, shaped by the institutional norms within which they interact” (Scharpf, 1997, p. 
197).  
Networks are thus informally organised, permanent, rule governed relationships, whose agreed 
rules build trust, communication, reduce uncertainty and are the basis of non-hierarchical co-
ordination. Rhodes (1996) has the view that networks “are not better than either bureaucracies 
or markets. They have different characteristics and suit some policy areas some of the time. 
Reciprocity and interdependence, not competition, characterise network relations” (p. 665). 
They should be viewed as an alternative to, not a hybrid of, markets and hierarchies (Powell, 
1990).  
 
II Public, Quasi Public and Third Sector Governance Theories 
3.5 Public Sector Governance 
Part II reviews the literature concerned with the concepts and theories of the institutions, 
focussing on the nonprofit sector. For the purposes of this research the nonprofit sector 
comprises the following sub-sectors.  
- The ‘public sector’, that is all nonmarket government-owned entities and corporations 
(including quasi-corporations—corporations that are not legally incorporated) which 
are owned or controlled by government units (Lienert, 2009).  
- The ‘quasi-public sector’, which contains an increasing number of organisational forms 
and cannot easily be categorised into the public and private sectors. These include forms 
such as cooperatives, not-for-profits and government sponsored enterprises. One key 
determinant of publicness is the degree to which an organisation is affected by political 
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authority, and of privateness by the extent to which it exercises or is constrained by 
economic authority (Bozeman, 1987). 
- The ‘charity sector’ which is made up of a wide range of organisations operating under 
charity law to achieve their charitable objectives.  
This thesis is concerned with those organisations and sub-sectors which are: funded and 
regulated, directly or indirectly by government; and act to discharge the state’s responsibilities 
to people through a direct or indirect commissioner – provider relationship. This relationship 
however does not necessarily limit the scope of the activities an organisation carries out. 
The structure of the sector is historically determined and so this section considers the changes 
by describing the transition from public administration, through the neoliberal ideology, to 
New Public Management (NPM) as the means of implementing that ideology, and the public 
service motivation which resists that ideology.  
3.5.1 Public Administration 
Public administration is concerned with the management of public programmes, and needs to 
be “related to the broad generalisations of political theory concerned with matters such as 
justice, liberty, obedience and the role of the state in human affairs” (White, 1948, p. 10). 
Denhardt and Denhardt (2009) argue that the continued concern for operating efficiency, while 
at the same time operating in a way consistent with democratic values, ‘marks’ the field of 
public administration. This commitment to a democratic culture affects the work of those in 
public and charitable organisations. The differences between private sector governance and 
public administration rests on the differing purposes. While business is primarily concerned 
with profit, public service is concerned with delivering services, or regulating individual or 
group behaviour in the public interest.  
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Public administration can be characterised by the political nature of its view of service delivery, 
public policy making, and implementation, with a clear focus on the dominance of the ‘rule of 
law’ and the administration of a set of rules and guidelines. It emphasises the central role for a 
multi-layered bureaucracy in making and implementing policy along with the hegemony of the 
professional in public service delivery (Osborne, 2010; Schofield, 2001). The implementation 
of public policy is however made difficult by this hegemony and the multiple layers of 
bureaucracy (Hill and Hupe, 2003). Thus, Osborne (2010) observed “at worst, public sector 
managers and management are portrayed as the villains of the piece, thwarting the resolve of 
their political masters and often subverting the intentions of new policy for their own ends” (p. 
5). 
Historically, bureaucracies have been considered part of a legitimate democratic order because 
they are subject to control by a legislature which is itself accountable to the electorate. Bevir 
(2006) observes that if markets and networks are replacing bureaucracies, then new means of 
ensuring that the latter mechanisms remain appropriately democratic, are required. There is 
thus a continuing tension between social-orientated and business-orientated policy, which is 
often played out in the politics-policy environment (Sharkansky, 2005). 
The transformation of governance by  neoliberal ideology, implemented through NPM makes 
it appropriate to focus not on the individual state agency, but on the relationships among many 
different groups: public, private, and charity (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2009). 
3.5.2 Neoliberal Ideology 
“Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes 
that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms 
and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free 
markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework 
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appropriate to such practices. The state has to guarantee … the proper functioning of markets. 
Furthermore, if markets do not exist …. [t]hen they must be created, by state action if necessary” 
(Harvey, 2005, p. 2). Neoliberalism is a key reference point for many critical analyses of 
governance, and it provides a conceptual foundation for an array of changes and trends which 
have transformed local government. While it is not a unified doctrine, the common thread is 
the attempt to replace political judgement with economic market based evaluations (Davies, 
2017; Geddes, 2011).  
The conceptualisations of neoliberalism as: an ideology; a mode of regulation; and a market-
oriented governmentality (Byrne, 2016), are now discussed. 
(i) Ideology 
As an ideology, neoliberalism is seen, particularly by its opponents, to have as its defining 
feature the overriding concern with the possessive individual and a desire to roll back the 
frontiers of the state on the grounds that it is an enemy of freedom (Bruff, 2014; Hall, 2011). 
This view focuses on: the class politics of restructuring; state rescaling as part of that 
restructuring; economic policy-making; and efforts on the part of state managers to deal with 
the negative externalities of neoliberal social and economic policies (Brenner et al., 2010a, 
2010b; Harvey, 2007; Ong, 2007; Peck et al., 2009, 2013; Peck, 2010, 2011, 2013). 
Neoliberalism can thus be seen as an anti-political project which paradoxically can only be 
advanced by the state, and executed by sovereign agencies, whose full power and authority is 
not reducible to economic logic. There is a paradox that, while the state is a powerful instrument 
of neoliberalism, it is also its object of constant criticism (Davies, 2014, 2017). This elevation 
of market-based principles and techniques to the level of state-endorsed norms thereby 





The dominant view of neoliberalism is as a form of state or a mode of regulation (Bryne, 2016). 
In order to provide context, the concept of regulatory regime is first discussed. This is then 
followed by a consideration of definitions of regulation, and finally the application of 
regulation to the nonprofit sector. 
Regulatory regimes exist in all societies, with the objective of controlling activities of various 
markets, quasi-markets and the public sector. “National cultural norms and values, and rules 
and regulations usually dictate the structure of the regulatory framework and its key constituent 
bodies which, in turn, reflect the nature and level of financial accountability to civil society” 
(IFAC, 2001, p. 5). A regulatory regime is a means for achieving regulatory goals through 
setting the rules, institutional arrangements, and cultures (Hood et al., 2001). The institutional 
structure is made up of: rules which prescribe the legislative social frameworks; expected 
behaviours or outcomes; standards which are benchmarks against which compliance can be 
measured; mechanisms for determining the degree of regulatory compliance; and sanctions for 
failure to comply with the rules (Den Hartog, 1999; Kay and Vickers, 1990; May, 2007). The 
regulation of nonprofit public agencies has been defined by Hood and Scott (1996) as 
“processes by which standards are set, monitored and/or enforced in some way, by bureaucratic 
actors who are somewhat separate from units or bodies that have direct operational or service 
delivery responsibilities” (p. 321). Chambers and Cornforth (2013) observed that the private 
sector systems of corporate governance were paralleled in the public sector through NPM. They 
argue however, that an important difference between organisations in the nonprofit and for-
profit sectors is that the former are not fully independent, but are subject to a degree of political 
direction and control from government.  
Historically the UK has moved from a nationalised to a regulated economy. In 2005 there were 
674 recognised regulatory bodies in the UK, employing 61,000 staff. Ignoring regulations 
Page 44 
 
concerning health and safety, environmental regulations, and accounting audit regulations, 
about 30-40% of UK GDP was regulated by one of the superregulatory bodies such as the FSA 
or OFCOM (Persaud, 2005). This characteristic has persisted; in 2017 there are 46 UK 
government departments, which work with a total of 366 agencies and public bodies; 384 
agencies and other public bodies and 11 public corporations 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations). 
Regulation as a concept is not settled (Koop and Lodge, 2017). Baldwin et al. (1998) for 
example, propose three broad categories of regulation: an authoritative set of rules, 
accompanied by some mechanism for monitoring compliance with these rules; all the efforts 
of state agencies to steer the economy; and all mechanisms of social control, including 
unintentional and non-state processes. Regulation is thus more than mere monitoring, it is the 
use of legal instruments to implement social-economic policy objectives.  
Regulation has been given a number of definitions in the sphere of legal and socio-economic 
activities. For example, Den Hartog (1999) defines regulation as “the employment of legal 
instruments for the implementation of social-economic policy objectives” (p. 223). Regulation 
thus refers to an attempt by one organisation to control or modify the behaviour of another 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The impact of regulation is greater in the nonprofit sector than in 
the private sector since the former is subject to a high degree of political direction and control 
from government. Hence, the governing bodies of public service organisations are often 
constrained in their ability to steer the organisation (Chambers and Cornforth, 2013). 
Regulation is thus an instrument of policy and of politics which is grounded in the concept of 
the power which one party exerts to exercise this control and the response of the other party to 
resist or comply with this. While neoliberalism ideologically aspires to create markets which 
are free from state intervention, in practice, state intervention is increased in order to impose 
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versions of market rule (quasi-markets). The form of the regulatory regime is determined 
historically in the national context and of path dependency by the interaction of market-oriented, 
market-disciplinary initiatives with inherited regulatory frameworks, which are defined by 
social and political power (Peck et al., 2009). 
(iii) Governmentality 
Government covers not only the legitimately constituted forms of political or economic 
subjection, but also modes of action destined to act upon the possibilities of action of other 
people. Therefore, to govern is to structure the possible field of action of others (Foucault, 
1994). Thus, government encompasses both the traditional sphere of government linked to state 
institutions, and of others beyond the state, such as at the level of ‘community’, and the 
government of the self. This concept of ‘governmentality’ echoes an interpretive approach to 
governance, composed of the networks and power relations which connect various parts of 
civil society to the central state and civil society. These networks include all the actors and 
practices that constitute the norms and power relations (Armstrong, 1994; Parton, 1991). 
Further, these relations and norms are not only institutions or social structures, but rather 
contingent products of dominant discourses (Barry et al., 1996; Dean, 1999; Rose, 1998). 
Neoliberalism is argued to be a specific variant of governmentality which seeks to deal with 
the ‘social question’ and a “politically salient assault on the welfare state in Britain, Europe 
and the United States” (Rose, 1996, p. 51). It created a new form of government, comprising a 
diverse array of concepts, themes, theories, and ‘objects’ to be governed. This differs from 
classical liberalism, where the market was regarded as an autonomous, self-regulating sphere 
which good government ought to respect and keep a safe distance from. In Anglo-American 
neoliberalism in particular, the market becomes the principle upon which society is remodelled. 
Foucault (2008) observed that government has to intervene in society so that competitive 
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mechanisms can play a regulatory role, that is, a general regulation of society can be achieved 
by the market.  
3.5.3 New Public Management 
NPM is a set of highly mobile ideas about public management which has spread all over the 
world (Boston, 1996; Hood, 1991; Kettl,  1997). It is a body of doctrinal beliefs which answers 
administrative ‘what-to-do questions’ in government, is established as an accepted 
administrative philosophy, and provides a framework for making decisions about how to 
structure and manage public services based on neoliberal ideology (Aucoin, 1995; Boston et 
al., 1991; Stiglitz 1994). NPM is also a way of organising public services (Hood and Peters, 
1994), including the construction of ‘quasi-markets’, which exist in diverse sub-sectors such 
as health and social care, education, social housing; as well as in government wide systems of 
financial management, personnel management, procurement and auditing (Robinson and 
LeGrand, 1994; Schick, 1996). NPM entails the creation of: mission driven, decentralised, 
incentive based organisations; the introduction of private sector management methods to those 
organisations in the public sector through performance measures; managing by results, value 
for money and closeness to the customer; and the concept of marketisation. That is, the 
introduction of incentive structures through contracting out, quasi-markets, and of consumer 
choice (Boston, 1996; Peters, 1994; Rhodes, 2000). In all these reforms the market is a model 
for public policy implementation, with the institutional reforms associated with NPM formally 
separating policy from service delivery (Kaboolian, 1998). The market is however a quasi-
market, which may be described as a market-like situation where there are different kinds of 
producers competing with each other and which are under the close control of the public sector 
(Kähkönen, 2004) . 
These reforms have the avowed intent of increasing efficiency, responsiveness and 
accountability of public managers and to change the culture and context within which public 
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managers conduct their duties to increase government’s efficiency, effectiveness and 
accountability (Barzelay, 1992; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Hood, 1995, 1998).   
NPM has changed governance structures through the diversification and fragmentation of 
public service delivery, which has led to the blurring of the boundaries between public, private 
and third sectors organisations (Saliterer and Korac, 2013). This transformation has triggered 
the emergence of concepts such as citizen engagement in order to improve public trust in 
government, thereby challenging traditional accountability meanings, mechanisms, and 
relationships (Behn, 2003; Pina, 2007; Schwartz, 2005). Holding public services to account is 
argued to be one of the key purposes of performance management, particularly within an NPM 
perspective, which is commonly held to be strongly influential in how we consider public 
services (Hood, 1991; May, 2007). The ‘sanctions based model’, which focuses on punishment 
through agency theory is common within the public services (Behn, 2001; Bovens et al., 2014). 
Accountability, which is subjectively constructed and changes with context, has been 
categorised as: hierarchical, delivered through managerial structures; political, where 
organisations are accountable for the delivery of local and national ambitions; legislative 
through audit and inspection; professional through codes of behaviour; and to service recipients 
or more generally to ‘society’ (Lindberg, 2013; Romzek, 2000; Sinclair, 1995).  
The central problem of accountability arises from the delegation of authority to a wide range 
of public and some private actors. That is, how to give them sufficient autonomy to achieve 
their tasks, while at the same time ensuring an adequate degree of control. The problems of 
accountability have been made manifest by the transformations in public administration made 
by NPM (Scott, 2000). At a fundamental level, accountability is closely associated with 
authority (though not necessarily political authority), and the act of discretionary governing. 
With this authority comes responsibility which is individually assigned to a person (Mill, 
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1861/1977). This responsibility requires trust, which is a key mechanism of accountability and 
is thus a central precondition for the legitimate delegation of authority (Scott, 2000). The Audit 
Commission recognised that the quality of governance affects levels of trust in public services 
since “[t]rust is at the heart of the relationship between citizens and government. … even if 
formal service and outcome targets are met, a failure of trust will effectively destroy public 
value” (Audit Commission, 2003, p. 8). The public value paradigm is argued to be a successor 
to NPM as a means of balancing democracy and efficiency (Stoker, 2006; Christensen  and 
Lægreid, 2007). It seeks to meet the challenges of efficiency, accountability, and equity through 
its ability to point to a motivational force that does not rely on rules or incentives to drive public 
sector reform. It rests on a fuller and rounder vision of humanity than does either public 
administration or NPM (Alford and O’Flynn, 2009). It suggests that people are motivated by 
their involvement in networks and partnerships, and that these relationships with others are 
formed in the context of mutual respect and shared learning (Stoker, 2006). However this thesis 
focuses on NPM as the generally accepted model. 
Public administration and NPM thus have clear political and philosophical differences; with 
NPM focusing on efficiency, based on private sector models, and public administration 
focusing on the public sphere. In this context, public means those things which touch all 
citizens, and the arrangements of society as a whole, in potentially any aspect; are carried out 
in public, subject to public view; and carried out for the public, according to a norm or ethos 
of public service. The differences in ethos between the public and private sectors call into 
question the extent to which conceptions of efficiency or models of organisation and human 
behaviour derived from one can be applied without qualification to the other. The public service 




3.5.4 Public Service Ethos 
NPM promoted a shift away from talking about a public sector ethos, towards that of a public 
service ethos, which suggested a synthesis between the traditional ethos and private sector 
models of customer service (Brereton and Temple, 1999; Needham, 2006, 2014). For example, 
the customer orientation transfers the ethical considerations of public service from process to 
end product. This means that ethical considerations are couched in terms of optimum outcomes 
for customers rather than the motives of the actors engaged in service provision, regardless of 
the sector in which the service provider is located (Hebson et al., 2003; Needham, 2006, 2014).  
The Public Administration Select Committee (2002) stated that the “public service ethos should 
be the fundamental reference point for everything else in the [public service] reform 
programme” (p. 5). The common threads of public service ethos are: impartiality, 
accountability, trust, equity, probity and service. Le Grand (2010) observes that most models 
for public service delivery contain assumptions concerning “the motivations of the professional 
and others who provide the services concerned: that is to the extent which they are ‘knaves’, 
motivated primarily by self-interest, or ‘knights’, motivated by altruism and the desire to 
provide a public service” (p. 56). 
The role of nonprofit bodies is to provide services which society feels to be important. The 
belief in the importance of these and associated values is thought to be shared by those who 
work in those organisations. This is contrasted with the “supposedly more selfish outlooks of 
those who are employed in the private sector whose individual rewards tend to be tied to profits 
and sales. … This so-called ‘public service ethos’ is valued by policymakers” (John and 
Johnson, 2008, p. 105). Perry and Wise (1990) argue that there are rational and affective aspects 
to ethos. Rational motivations are those which advance an individual’s self-interest, such as 
the self-esteem that comes from working in the public interest. Affective motivations are about 
an individual’s emotional response to an organisation, including altruism and empathy. 
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Wanting to work for the public interest, seems to be a prime motivator, and that those working 
in the public sector have a more altruistic motivation than those in the private sector (Buelens 
and Broeck, 2007; Crewson, 1995; Houston, 2000; John and Johnson, 2008; Public Services 
Productivity Panel, 2002; Vandenabeele, 2007). There is no evidence that the public service 
ethos has been weakened by the reform of institutions by privatisation, NPM, quasi-markets, 
contracting out and private finance projects, performance related pay and sanctions of 
performance measurement (John and Johnson, 2008; Public Administration Committee, 2002). 
Needham (2014) observes the focus on value, rather than ethos, where value(s) may refer to 
the broader public or social value created by: public services (Alcock, 2010); and public value 
(Alford and O’Flynn, 2009; Moore, 1995). 
3.5.5 Public Service Motivation 
Motivation refers broadly to that which “energises, directs, and sustains behaviour” (Perry and 
Porter, 1982, p. 89); which is represented in the individual, job, work environment, and external 
environment. Chen and Bozeman (2013) observe that conventional wisdom suggests that 
motivation styles are either intrinsic or extrinsic (Hertzberg, 1966; Maslow, 1970; McGregor, 
1960). Motivation studies in the nonprofit management have strongly emphasised the 
importance of intrinsic motivation, perhaps due to the mission-oriented nature of this sector. 
People working in nonprofit sector organisations are regarded as having a strong sense of 
altruistic mission but have limited external incentives (Alatrista and Arrowsmith, 2004; 
Cunningham, 2008; DeVaro and Brookshire, 2007). This results in the ‘self-sorting’ of 
managers (Moore, 2000), in that nonprofit organisations are more likely to attract individuals 
who are less concerned about self-interest and instrumental rewards, but who are concerned 
more about ‘care and making a difference’ (Baines et al., 2011; Light, 2002). Notwithstanding 
this, there is evidence which also shows that nonprofit and for-profit employees demonstrate 
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similar desires for benefits, job security, and a pleasant physical environment (De Cooman and 
Pepermans, 2012).  
Employees of nonprofit organisations can be motivated by a mixture of motivators, such as 
salary, pension rights, interesting tasks, etc., and their associated motivations (self-interested, 
altruistic, intrinsic, extrinsic, etc.). Public service motivation (Perry et al., 2010) as a specific 
subset, plays an important role in the delivery of public services and the motivation which 
people have to serve others and contribute to the welfare of society at large. Therefore, public 
service motivation is distinguished by having “an orientation towards the known proximate 
other or the distant unknown or abstract other, including abstractions at the aggregate level 
such as the community or society as a whole—[which] makes public service motivation an 
integral characteristic of those who provide public services” (Brewer et al., 2012, p. 1). Perry 
and Hondeghem (2008) observe that “[p]ublic service motivation has been used by economists 
as ‘code’ for altruism, meaning the willingness of individuals to engage in sacrificial 
behaviours for the good of others without reciprocal benefits for themselves” (p. 5). 
The differences in work attitudes between nonprofit and for-profit employees has been 
theorised through public service motivation, although with differing emphasises. Firstly, on a 
predispositional basis: it is “an individual’s predisposition to respond to motives grounded 
primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organisations” (Perry and Wise, 1990, p. 368). 
Alternatively it is “the beliefs, values and attitudes that go beyond self-interest and 
organisational interest, that concern the interest of a larger political entity and that motivate 
individuals to act accordingly whenever appropriate” (Vandenabeele, 2007, p. 547). Or from 
an altruistic viewpoint, it is an individual’s orientation to delivering service to people with the 
purpose of ‘doing good’ for others and society, that is, a commitment to the public interest. 
This commitment is the: motivation to deliver public services to serve the relevant society, 
based on value and duty; compassion, which is an emotionally or empathically based 
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motivation to do good for other in distress by improving public services; and self-sacrifice, that 
is, the will to bypass one’s own needs to help others and society by providing services (Brænder 
and Andersen, 2013). 
From the perspective of a person’s work role, Christensen and Wright (2012) concluded that, 
regardless of sector, individuals with stronger public service motivation are more likely to 
accept jobs which emphasise service to others, with less weight being given to remuneration. 
This, they suggest, means that certain job characteristics or even job classes may be more 
attractive than others to individuals motivated by prosocial or altruistic values. 
Public service motivation is also shaped by ethical factors. For example, Houston (2005) found 
that government employees are more likely to volunteer than for-profit employees, which he 
argues generally lends support for the hypothesis that public service motivation is more 
prominent in public service than in private organisations. 
While this literature focuses on managers and workers, the analysis of the data indicates 
through socialisation and identification that the concepts are also relevant for non-executives 
in nonprofit organisations. This section follows this view by identifying and associating board 
member motivations with ways in which governance is enacted, without implying a direct 
causal link, which is of particular importance since board members have a high degree of 
discretionary power and scope for judgement (Froud et al., 2008). 
3.5.6 Summary 
This section considered public administration, the neoliberal ideology, and NPM as an 




The for-profit and nonprofit sectors are characterised by: their different organisational 
objectives, purposes, cultures, motivations of individuals; and the markets in which they 
operate. The governance of the nonprofit sector developed in an historical context, based on 
the neoliberal liberal ideology, but with resistance from those in the nonprofit sector. NPM 
forms a bridge between the historic values, culture and theories of the nonprofit sector and that 
of the corporate governance derived from the private sector; the theoretical bases for which are 
considered in the next section.  
III Corporate Governance 
 
Part III reviews the literature on corporate governance by: first considering the firms or other 
organisations to which the concept is applied; various definitions, and then the key theories of 
corporate governance. The behavioural theories of corporate governance are then discussed in 
terms of the ‘black box’, board dynamics and culture. 
3.6 The Organisation 
The definition of the firm (public corporation) arose from studying the operation of the private 
sector in the ‘free market’ (Coase, 1937; Penrose, 1995). The public corporation as a nexus-of-
contracts is driven by the requirements of financial markets, theorised in terms of the share 
price as a criterion of value (Davis, 2005). The generally accepted theory of the firm asserts 
that the core purpose of the firm is to maximise net revenue in the face of given prices and a 
technologically determined production function. Cyert and March (1963) question the 
economist’s view that the core purpose of a firm is to generate value for its owners, on the basis 
that the motivational and cognitive assumptions appear to be unrealistic. They argue for 
example, that entrepreneurs, like anyone else, can have a host of personal motives, and profit 
is just one of them. Further, they argue that the ‘firm’ of the theory has few of the characteristics 
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of actual business firms, having no complex organisation, no problems of control, no standard 
operating procedures, no budget, no controller, no aspiring ‘middle management’” (p. 7).  
Gavetti et al. (2012) argue that a theory of the firm, which was developed to answer aggregate 
outcome predictions, is not appropriate for developing process explanations and micro-
predictions. This resulted in the call for research which ‘opened up the black box’ of the firm 
in order to accumulate theory and evidence on how a firm behaves as a result of lower-level 
processes, possibly involving individuals and groups.  
Corporate governance, constructed on the basis of the (private sector) firm, has been transposed 
into the public sector through NPM, with organisations being created on a quasi-private sector 
basis, operating in quasi-markets. However, these sectors differ in purpose, culture, values and 
norms (Schraeder et al., 2005; Gordon, 1991). The primary purpose of the latter is to deliver 
government policy and services, particularly where the market is unable so to do. Similarly, 
corporate governance concepts have been transferred to the charity sector, which has the core 
purpose of altruistic delivery of services to those who fit within the charitable objectives of the 
organisation.  
Notwithstanding this, these types of organisation have similarities in that they can be viewed 
as similar “behavioural entities” (Dosi and Marengo, 2007, pp. 492-493), with specific cultures. 
Valle (1999) argues that given the stereotypes about public leaders, and the constraints of the 
regulatory environment arising from NPM, it is difficult for them to respond to the need to 
change culture and to adapt to significant changes in the external environment.  
3.7 Corporate Governance – Definitions and Theories 
Corporate governance can be viewed as a set of theories, concerned with the internal systems 
and processes that provide direction and accountability to any organisation. Organisations are 
led by boards which are small groups of individuals, whose behaviour can be described by the 
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theory of social groups, and self-identity, as discussed in the previous chapter. Public services 
are also concerned with the relationship between policy makers and / or trustees of public 
organisations and the senior managers given the task of making these policies a reality 
(Cornforth, 2003a). However, Cornforth (2003b) notes that “the governance of nonprofit 
organisations is relatively under-theorised in comparison with the governance of business 
corporations” (p. 6). 
The board, as a group, exercises authority over an enterprise and is therefore accountable for 
that enterprise. This phenomenon is found in equity corporations, NGOs, and many 
governmental organisations. Carver (2010) argues that governance is a social construct rather 
than a natural phenomenon, so theory must be driven by and anchored in the purpose of boards 
rather than derived from analyses of current practices. The literature review thus considers the 
key theories of corporate governance, which are rooted in the for-profit sector, and their 
relevance to nonprofit sector. The latter is not driven by the profit motive, and does not have a 
group of shareholders who have invested in the institutions for profit. 
The definitions and views of corporate governance reflect the ideas of the primacy of 
ownership, control of organisational objectives and resources, and oversight. “In the private 
sector, corporate governance is the umbrella term for all aspects of the powers and competences 
in the relations among different organisational units and between the organisation and its 
various stakeholders, particularly its shareholders” (Amquist et al., 2013, p. 1). It is concerned 
with the regulation, supervision, or performance and conduct oversight of the corporation 
(Daily et al., 2003; Letza et al., 2008; Monks and Minow, 2004; OECD, 2015; van Kerksbergen 
et al., 2004). Corporate scandals over the years have focused the corporate governance debate 
on solving practical issues such as corporate fraud, the abuse of managerial power and social 
irresponsibility, through regulations and codes of good governance practice (Letza et al., 2004). 
In the UK these codes are Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995), Hempel (1998), Turnbull (1992) 
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– replaced by the FRC’s Risk Guidance (2014), Higgs (2003), Walker (2009) and Kay (2012). 
However Cadbury (2002a) argues that what has been missing from governance initiatives is 
the essential building block of what boards are for, whom they should be serving, and what 
distinguishes governance from management.  
Reflecting the point of multiple definitions, Judge (2009) called for a “parsimonious, 
generalisable, and accurate theory of corporate governance which can explain and predict 
corporate governance practices and outcomes throughout the global economy” (p. iii). Leighton 
and Thain (1997) claimed that it is “impossible to frame a statement of board system rules that 
would be universally valid” (p. 64). Cadbury (2002b) disagreed, stating that he recognised the 
possibility of a “fully integrated and coherent system of governance” (p. xiii). Summarising, 
Carver (2010) observed that “whether or not board governance theory is unattainable, there can 
be no doubt that it has been elusive” (p. 150). 
3.8 Overview of Corporate Governance Theories 
Overviews of: agency; shareholder and stakeholder; stewardship; institutional; resource 
dependence; and managerial hegemony theories are considered below. Issues common to 
behavioural theories are considered in the suceeding section.  
3.8.1 Agency Theory 
Agency is the dominant corporate governance perspective (Dalton et al., 1998; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). It may have assumed that position initially through the work of Berle and Means 
(1932), who considered that corporations had assumed great economic and political importance, 
particularly in the USA as part of the industrial revolution. In that context, Berle and Means 
argued that “the separation of ownership from control produces a condition where the interests 
of the owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do diverge, and where many of the checks 
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which formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear. … [T]he corporation has changed 
the nature of profit-seeking enterprise” (p. 7).  
Smith (1776/2005) highlighted the hazards of removing the control of the company’s resources 
away from its owners by arguing that: “[t]he directors of such companies ... being the managers 
rather of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should 
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery 
frequently watch over their own” (p. 439). 
The agency relationship occurs where one party (the principal) delegates work to another party 
(the agent). In the context of a corporation, the owners are the principal and the directors are 
the agent (Berle and Means, 1932; Blair, 1995; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theory is 
concerned with resolving the conflicting desires or goals of the principal and agent, and the 
difficulty or expense for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing (Eisenhardt, 
1989a).  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed agency theory to integrate elements from the theories of 
agency, property rights, and finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm. 
They argue that the problem of inducing an agent to behave as if they were maximising the 
principal’s welfare is quite general and exists in all organisations. However, they explicitly 
restricted the scope of their paper to the analysis of agency costs generated by contractual 
arrangements between the owners and top management of the corporation. That is, they 
excluded nonprofits from their considerations. Nevertheless, the separation of decision and 
risk-bearing functions observed in large corporations is common to other organisations 
including nonprofits. This separation survives in part, because of the benefits of specialisation 
of management and risk bearing, but also because of an effective approach to controlling the 
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agency problem. In particular, organisations separate the ratification and monitoring of 
decisions from initiation and implementation of the decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
One implication of agency theory is that boards have a responsibility to mitigate the risks 
inherent in the separation of ownership from management which arise from: managers not 
always acting in the interests of the organisation either because of self-seeking behaviour or 
incompetence; and the asymmetry of knowledge held by the management and the knowledge 
that is available to the representatives of the owners. The main role of the board is therefore to 
obtain the necessary information to monitor the performance of the company and to hold the 
managers to account (Chambers et al., 2013). The innovation of agency theory is to insist that 
relationships should be viewed as no more than a series of implicit and explicit contracts with 
their associated rights (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Agency theory has been criticised from a behavioural point of view by Tricker (1996), who 
argues that along with stewardship and stakeholder theory, it is culturally specific in that it is 
derived from Western thought, with its perceptions and expectations of the respective roles of 
individual, enterprise and state and of the relationships between them. Davis et al. (1997) also 
argue that agency theory downplays the complexity of individual motivations and permutations 
of organisational life, and that it relates to a contested view about the self-centredness of human 
behaviour in organisations.  In summary, its assumptions are argued to be unrealistic (Cannella 
and Monroe, 1997; Davis and Greve, 1997), with little attention being paid to the collective 
values which underlie markets and enable the social choice of consent by the governed in 
corporate governance (Gomez and Korine, 2005).  
Agency theory describes a relationship between those governing and the governed, but the 
consent of the latter cannot be satisfactorily explained without reference to the: theories of 
human nature, values and conformity, discussed in the previous chapter; justice (Rawls, 1971; 
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Soltan, 1987; Tyler, 1990); and collective value of procedural fairness which underlies markets 
(Lind and Tyler, 1988; Thibaut and Walker, 1975). It is collective values which ensure that 
institutions are compatible with individual freedom and support the constitution of modern 
(economic) society (Arrow, 1974; Charkham and Simpson, 1999; Rawls, 1971).  
However, Hendry (2002) concluded that while most people are self-seeking to some extent, 
and managers are no exception, it is impossible for an organisation to function effectively 
without some measure of loyalty, honesty, cooperation, and trust between agents and principals. 
Agency theory is not invalidated because it ignores considerations such as power, complexity, 
bounded rationality, and the limited competence of managers, which are central to management 
and organisational life. However, these issues prompt a consideration of features of agency 
relationships other than those treated in the standard theory. 
3.8.2 Shareholder and Stakeholder Theories 
This section considers the shareholder and stakeholder theories together by discussing their 
common bases and differences; which seem to be polarised between: private property and 
social entity; contracts and communities; finance and politics, and shareholding and 
stakeholding (Friedman and Miles, 2002; O’Sullivan, 2000; Prabhaker, 1998); underpinned by 
conflicting and competing ideologies, cultures and value judgements (Letza et al., 2004). 
(i) Shareholder Theory 
In this theory, corporate governance has its ideological and theoretical origins in the belief in 
individual private ownership Letza (2004); with the two main models of shareholder-oriented 
governance: the principal-agent; and the myopic market model, sharing a common view that 
the corporation should serve the shareholders’ interests only (Letza et al., 2008). Friedman 
(1970) argues that in a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive as an 
employee of the owners of the business, is their agent who has responsibility is to conduct the 
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business in accordance with the desires of the owner, while conforming to the basic rules, laws, 
and ethical customs of the society This clear shareholder ideological position is developed by 
Engelen (2002), who proposed three ideological legitimations for shareholder theory, based on 
claims of: prudentiality, which stresses the efficiency of shareholder control through liquid 
stock markets (Jensen, 2000; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997); functionality, which means that since 
shareholders provide risk-carrying capital and since all other claims on corporate earnings are 
covered by contracts, shareholders are rightfully rewarded with the residual earnings of the 
firm; and morality, based on the principle of reward according to contribution (Locke, 
1700/1975). 
(ii) Stakeholder Theory 
This theory recognises the importance of the responsiveness of management to the well-being 
of stakeholders, who Freeman (1984) defines as “any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the firm’s objectives” (p. 25).  
Letza et al. (2004) identified two main types of stakeholder theory to be:  
- normative, which sees shareholders as investors rather than owners, but which believes 
that the public corporation should be conscious of its social obligations such as fairness, 
social justice and protection of employees; and 
- instrumental, which holds that a corporation should serve multiple interests of 
stakeholders, rather than shareholder interest alone, in order to make the corporation 
more legitimate. 
The central proposition of stakeholder model is that the firm which considers all its 
stakeholders is more equitable and more socially efficient than one confined to considering 
only the increase in shareholder wealth (Keasey et al., 1997). 
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Stakeholder theory can be viewed from the points of view of: sociology and ethics (Friedman 
and Miles, 2006; Phillips et al., 2005), and should thought of as being "explicitly and 
unabashedly moral" (Jones and Wicks, 1999, p. 206); and as a political position rather than as 
an economic theory (Chambers et al., 2013; O’Sullivan, 2000).  
Stakeholder theory can be considered as a set of theories for the management of stakeholders 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Heath and Norman, 2004) which include: an ontological theory 
which argues that the “purpose of the firm…is to serve as a vehicle for coordinating stakeholder 
interests’’ (Evan and Freeman, 1988, p. 314); management behaviour; a deontic theory 
concerned with determining the legitimate interests and rights of various stakeholders; along 
with a regulatory aspect whereby the interests and rights of specific stakeholder groups ought 
to be protected by government regulation. 
According to the stakeholder view, the strategic behaviour of an organisation should meet the 
needs of stakeholder groups in accordance with their respective importance; which Mitchell et 
al. (1997) argue is defined by power, legitimacy and urgency, of which power is the most 
important (Wartick, 1994).  
According to Fassin (2008), the success of stakeholder theory is due in large part to the 
simplicity inherent to the model. However, the theory has been criticised for: 
-  vagueness and ambiguity, with debate about the model and theories around 
stakeholders (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Gibson, 2000; Wolfe and Putler, 2002; 
Friedman and Miles, 2006);  
- its inability to provide a sufficiently specific objective function for the corporation 
(Jensen, 2000);  
- allowing management to use resources for other than increasing shareholder value (Von 
Hayek, 1985); or as just an excuse for management opportunism (Jensen, 2000; 
Marcoux,  2000; Sternberg, 2000).  
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- increasing diversity of, and lack of clarity about stakeholder expectations, complexity 
of trade-offs of stakeholder interests does make it difficult for managers to focus the 
business and its bottom line (Argenti, 1997).  
The key challenges for stakeholder governance are the reconciliation of the competing claims 
of economic efficiency and those of social justice (Kelly et al., 1997) along with balancing a 
multitude of ethical and moral interests (Nwanji and Howell, 2007).  
Stakeholder principles are however enshrined in guidance produced by the Hempel Committee 
(1998) which noted that good governance ensures that constituencies (stakeholders) with a 
relevant interest in the company’s businesses are fully taken into account, but the director’s 
relationship with the shareholders is different in kind from their relationship with the other 
stakeholders. The guidance states that if this were not so then there would be no clear yardstick 
for judging their performance. 
3.8.3 Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship theory challenges the belief that managers are always self-interested rational 
maximisers (Cornforth, 2003a; Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson, 1990b). While agency theory is 
a useful way of explaining relationships where the interests of the parties who are at odds, 
stewardship theory explains other types of human behaviour, which extend beyond economic 
considerations. In stewardship theory, pro-organisational and collectivist behaviours have a 
higher utility than self-interest. Stewards, when faced with competing stakeholders and 
shareholder objectives, are motivated to make decisions which they perceive to be in the best 
interests of the group. Stewardship is therefore differentiated from agency on psychological, 
situational and motivational grounds. The motivation in agency theory is extrinsic reward 
which forms the basis for the reward systems which represent its control mechanism. In 
stewardship theory, the focus is on intrinsic reward, including opportunities for growth, 
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achievement, affiliation and self-actualisation (Davis et al., 1997). The bases for this distinction 
can be found in theories of motivation (Alderfer, 1972; Maslow, 1970) and affiliation needs 
(McClelland, 1975; McGregor, 1966). 
On psychological and situational grounds, stewardship reflects a more complex and humanistic 
model of man (Argyris, 1964; Likert, 1967; Maslow, 1943; McGregor, 1966). For example, 
when people are placed in organisations they are influenced by the prevailing culture to take 
decisions by themselves, which the organisation would like them to take (Argyris, 1973). 
Therefore, where the assumptions of agency theory predominate, people act according to its 
precepts, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. This process is activated through the processes of: 
conformity; compliance; identification; and internalisation (Breckler et al., 2006; Kelman, 
1958). Identification occurs when managers define themselves in terms of their membership of 
a particular organisation by accepting its mission, vision, and objectives (Davis et al., 1997). 
As discussed in the previous chapter; according to social identity theory, the self-concept 
comprises a personal and a social identity which encompasses salient group classifications. It 
is through this social identification that the individual perceives themselves as being 
psychologically entwined with the fate of the group (Hogg et al., 1995; Stets and Burke, 2000; 
Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Organisational identification is a specific form of social identification 
where the individual defines themself in terms of membership of a particular organisation 
(Mael and Ashford, 1992). Brown (1969) concluded that employees are tied to a work 
organisation, (as a self-defining group), because of the opportunities the organisation offers for 
satisfying achievement-related symbolic motives. The character of the tie is that of 
identification rather than satisfaction, dependence or compliance.   
O’Reilly and Chatman, (1986) argue that the individual’s psychological attachment to an 
organisation, that is, the individual’s commitment, results from identification with the attitudes, 
values, or goals of the organisation. They also note a relationship between an individual’s 
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commitment to an organisation and to positive manifestations of altruism, such as voluntary 
participation and contributions, beyond those narrowly required by the job. Therefore, 
according to Davis et al. (1997), managers who identify with their organisation are motivated 
to help it succeed and should be empowered to perform their jobs because this will enable them 
to use their initiative to promote the success of their organisation and their principles. 
Critics of stewardship theory believe that there is, at best, mixed evidence to support this theory 
(Nicholson et al., 2007), and that its application can lay organisations open to risks of 
governance failure, strategic drift or inertia. In addition, there is a danger of ‘groupthink’ (Janis 
1972) or ‘upper echelons’ dominated thinking, (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) in which there is 
insufficient independent challenge on the board.  
3.8.4 Institutional Governance Theory  
Carpenter et al. (2007) argue that “the institutional theory of governance should be viewed as 
a complement to agency theory rather than as a competing theory ... [and that this view] is 
consistent with economics based models of accounting choice which assume that individuals 
maximise their utility subject to certain rules and institutional settings” (p. 2). However, 
institutional theory de-emphasises the importance of individual self-interest motives, and 
assumes that institutional environments exert a potent conforming influence (Hoffman, 1999; 
Oliver, 1991). The theory sees organisations as operating within a nexus of norms, values, and 
taken for granted assumptions about what constitutes appropriate or acceptable economic 
behaviour (Oliver, 1997). Selznick (1957) believes that “the process of instilling value in an 
organisation, is to infuse with value [original emphasis] beyond the technical requirements of 
the task at hand” (p. 17), although he does not say how this occurs (Scott, 1987). 
Institutionalisation is rooted in conformity and producing common understandings about what 
is appropriate and, fundamentally what is meaningful behaviour (Zucker, 1983), which makes 
the arbitrary seem entirely natural (Bourdieu, 1977/2013); or as Berger and Luckman (1966) 
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state: “[s]ociety is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product” (p. 
61). Institutionalism can be seen as the “process by which individual actors transmit what is 
socially defined as real” (Zucker, 1977, p. 728). Mayer and Rowan (1977) enlarge upon this by 
arguing that this involves social processes which come to take on rule like status in social 
thought and action, whereby individuals come to accept a shared definition of social reality. 
This conception is seen as being independent of the actor’s own views or actions but is taken 
for granted as defining the ‘way things are’ and / or the ‘way things are to be done’.  
Organisations conform to multiple institutionalised belief systems because they are rewarded 
for doing so with increased legitimacy, resources and survival capabilities (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). According to Scott (1987), institutions are based on 
the existence of a set of “differentiated and specialised cognitive and normative systems – 
institutional logic – and patterned human activities that arise and tend to persist, in varying 
forms and content, in all societies” (p. 500). 
Carpenter et al. (2007) argued that “in general, institutional theory focuses on those factors or 
environmental pressures over which the individual organisational decision maker is powerless 
to resist in the long run, even if his own self-interest motives are opposed to the decision 
imposed by the institutional environment” (p. 10).  
It was argued by Fiss (2008) that institutional theory is uniquely positioned to provide 
important contributions to corporate governance, by understanding it as containing implicit and 
explicitly normative theories or logics about the distribution of power and the ‘natural’ order 
of interests in the corporation. Power relations lie at the heart of corporate governance since 
institutions are inherently about the role of power (Stinchcombe, 1968), and always reflect 
political processes (Fiss, 2008). Conversely, efficiency-orientated approaches to corporate 
governance and law are limited in their ability to explain the politics of corporate control; and 
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that politics, like other social action, is embedded in social structures that influence collective 
action (Davis and Thompson, 1994).  
3.8.5 Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory was originally developed to provide an alternative perspective to 
economic theories of mergers and board interlocks, and to understand the type of inter-
organisational relations which played such a large role in market failure (Pfeffer, 2003). Davis 
and Cobb (2009) reflect that, for resource dependence theory, the motivation of those running 
the organisation is to ensure its survival and to enhance their own autonomy, while also 
maintaining stability in the organisation’s exchange relations. The three core ideas of the theory 
are that: (1) social context matters; (2) organisations have strategies to enhance their autonomy 
and pursue interests; and (3) power (not just rationality or efficiency) is important for 
understanding internal and external actions of organisations. It is this emphasis on power which 
distinguishes resource dependence theory. The basic theory can be summarised by the advice 
of Davis and Cobb (2009) to top managers to “choose the least constraining device to govern 
relations with your exchange partners that will allow you to minimise uncertainty and 
dependency and maximise your autonomy” (p. 6).  
In order to “understand the behaviour of an organisation you must understand the context of 
that behaviour, that is, the ecology of the organisation” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p. 1). While 
the theory is set squarely in the private sector, the issues of power, authority and leadership are 
applicable and more demanding in the nonprofit organisations. Anheier (2005) argues that “due 
to the important influence of values on organisational behaviour, management style and 
decision-making. … The importance of values in nonprofit organisations makes them 
intrinsically political institutions. Values do not exist in isolation, but are imprinted in 
organisational cultures, enacted through day-to-day activities, and evoked on special occasions 
and during decision-making. The link between values, power, and politics is critical, and values 
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form the basis of power” (p. 160). Carver (2001) observes, particularly in the context of 
conducting public business, that “[e]verything we do is a function of our values as they 
encounter various environmental conditions. … [which are] behavioural manifestations of the 
values that we bring to the existing circumstances. I may have little control over the 
environment, but my values are mine and are therefore subject to philosophical moulding and 
conscious intentions. Although the organisation embodies uncountable decisions, activities, 
goals, and circumstances, this mass of action occurs as the result of values held by persons at 
all levels” (p. 61). 
An organisation will attempt “to create an environment that is better for its interest” and “may 
use political means to alter the conditions of the external economic environment” (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978, pp. 189-190) by trying to shape government regulations. Traditionally, 
organisation theory has been dominated by the idea that change originates in the environment 
and the organisation, as an open system, constantly adapts to survive (Morgan, 2006). Resource 
dependence theory challenges this view that the environment is always the trigger and 
organisational change is always the response. According to the theory, organisations face 
environmental constraints in the form of external control over resources required for efficiency 
and survival and so must become interdependent with their environments. Anheier (2005) 
stated that organisations will “attempt to employ various strategies to manage dependencies 
and regain managerial freedom and autonomy. In the process the organisation influences and 
changes its environment as well” (p. 150).  
Resource dependence theory views boards as co-optative mechanisms whose purposes are to 
extract resources vital to the company’s performance, serve as a boundary spanning role, and 
enhance organisational legitimacy. The directors serving on the board are regarded as having 
prestige in their professions and communities, and thereby able to extract resources for 
successful company operations (Pfeffer, 1973; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Also Provan (1980) 
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suggested the existence of a ‘powerful’ board of directors be defined in terms of prestige and 
external linkages will be effective in obtaining large amounts of funding. Pfeffer and Salancik 
(2003) suggest that managing external relationships in order to leverage influence and 
resources is the prime purpose of the board, and hence board members are selected for their 
background, contacts and skills in ‘boundary-spanning’. Rao and Sivakumar (1999) propose 
that one way of operationalising the necessary communication between the organisation and 
the environment is to focus on board interlocks, which connect and structurally embed the 
organisation in an intercorporate network. The theory asserts that firms depend on their 
environment and enact multiple strategies such as various inter-organisational relationships, 
boards of directors, corporate political action and executive succession, to manage these 
dependencies. 
3.8.6 Managerial Hegemony Theory 
Managerial hegemony theory is concerned with the issue of power on boards, which can be 
considered as class hegemony and managerial hegemony. Class hegemony exists when 
directors view themselves as an elite at the top of the company and recruit new directors 
according to how well new appointees are perceived to fit into that elite. Managerial hegemony 
is present where the management of the company, with its knowledge of the day-to-day 
operations, effectively dominates the directors and hence weakens the influence of the directors 
(Mace, 1971; Huse, 2007; Berle and Means, 1932). This means that: the holding and exercise 
of power on the board changes over time and power distance between board members can also 
vary; power on boards often rests with managers rather than with the outsider or non-executive 
directors or lay members; and board members add value by understanding the circumstances 
in which managerial hegemony is beneficial to the organisation and the circumstance in which 




3.9 Behavioural Theories of Governance 
This section reviews issues common to behavioural theories of corporate governance; that is, 
those theories which seek to describe what happens inside what is conventionally called the 
‘black box’ of corporate governance (Dulewicz, 2010; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Higgs and 
Dulewicz, 1998; Lockhart, 2006; Pettigrew, 1992; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995). These 
theories implicitly recognise the difference between nature of governance as a function, and 
board as a complex structure within the ‘black box’ which is meant to deliver this function 
(Andersson and Edenfield, 2015).  
This section first considers the black box in terms of the open system concept. A parallel is 
then drawn between the structure of nonprofit corporate governance and implied interactive 
hierarchical structure of the black box of general systems theory. This analogy raises the 
questions of where the boundary of the black box should be drawn, and how to understand its 
interactions with the environment. The issues of boardroom power and influence are then 
considered in that context. In particular, the behavioural interactions between individuals and 
groups are shown to affect the way in which corporate governance is enacted. Board group 
processes are then considered in the final part of this section. This then leads to consideration 
of a framework for considering the dynamics of the board in Section 3.10. 
3.9.1 Black Box as Used in Corporate Governance Research 
While the term ‘black box’ is often used rhetorically, in general systems theory it is defined as 
an open system, which interacts with the external environment, and can acquire qualitatively 
new properties through emergence (Ashby, 1956; von Bertalanffy, 1968). The environment of 
a system can consist of further systems, each interacting with their environments. The mutual 
interactions of the component systems ‘glue’ these components together into a whole. In this 
general principle of hierarchical structure, the highest level of the hierarchy encompasses a 
view of the whole, without seeing the details of the components or parts. At the lower levels, 
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one sees a multitude of interacting parts but without understanding how they are organised to 
form a whole. According to the reductionist view, the laws which govern the parts determine 
or cause the behaviour of the whole, that is, ‘upward causation’ from the lowest level to the 
higher ones. In emergent systems, however, the laws governing the whole also constrain or 
‘cause’ the behaviour of the parts (Heylighten, 1998). 
Public and quasi-public-sector governance can be viewed as a hierarchically organised set of 
systems. The highest level comprises the state and its governance, enclosing its sub-sectors, 
such as the public sector, within that the individual sub-sectors such as the NHS and social 
housing, within those sub-systems lie further embedded sub-systems comprising the specific 
organisations, and within those the ‘black box’ of the board. Within that board sub-system lies 
further embedded sub-systems. This section considers the board as the system and its parts as 
sub-system. The ‘upward’ interactions between the board and the regulatory and political 
domains within which it is situated are not considered in this section. 
A question is then, where to draw the boundary of the sub-system and how to identify the 
mutual interactions between that sub-system and its environment. It is necessary to identify the 
sub-system or ‘black box’ of the board. This means that it is necessary to move outside the 
boardroom, to senior management and beyond, to understand the full board organisation, 
interactions and overlapping outer networks. The relationships between these groups should be 
examined through the analytical lens of power and politics, together with a more micro-process 
focus through studies of, for example, trusting, influencing and problem solving (Pye and 
Pettigrew, 2005). This requires the development of a dynamic and holistic view of the conduct 
and behaviour of a board. It is these interactions and behavioural processes among and between 
actors in and around the boardroom rather than on the performance of boards which is the focus 
of a behavioural theory of boards (Van Ees et al., 2009). The presence of complex group 
dynamics within formal and informal structures in the boards of directors means that 
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behavioural variables can actually provide better explanations than agency theory for board 
outcomes (Hambrick et al., 2008; Huse, 2005; Minichilli et al., 2009).  
3.9.2 Boardroom Power and Influence 
Behavioural theories are concerned with the reality of power and influence within the 
boardroom social group, and in the wider group networks; operating at the micro level, and 
relying upon social psychological theories, rather than just agency theory. These behavioural 
issues include for example: controversial or candid discussions seldom occurring in 
boardrooms (Hambrick et al., 2008); groupthink (Janis, 1972); undiscussability arising from 
group social prohibition (Argyris, 1985); pluralistic ignorance where which group members 
(plural) underestimate the degree to which others share their concerns (Merton, 1957; Miller 
and McFarland, 1987; O'Gorman, 1986; Suls and Green, 2003; Weick, 1996; Westphal and 
Bednar, 2005); and social distancing where less attention is paid to remarks and opinion of an 
outgroup member (Bogardus, 1959; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Moscovici and Doise, 1994; 
Williams and Sommer, 1997). 
3.9.3 Board Group Processes 
Much research has focused on: the role of the individual rather than the group dynamic (Pye, 
2001; Dalton and Dalton, 2011); the contributions of the chair (Rechner and Dalton, 1991); 
non-executive directors (Pye and Camm, 2003); or CEO (Maitlis, 2004) to board work. 
However, research on groups emphasises the dynamic and combinatorial aspects of group 
behaviour, in particular: the importance of member participation (Huisman, 2001); group 
morale and consensus building (Jehn et al., 1999); the role of cognition at an individual and 
group level (Kilduff et al., 2000); board performance (Finkelstein et al., 1996; Hillman et al., 
2008; Jehn, 1995; Pugliese et al., 2014); board effectiveness (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; 
Steiner, 1972); decision making (Zhu, 2013); and coalition formation which sterilises group 
dynamics through isolation of members (Cronin et al., 2011).  
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3.10 The Dynamics of the Board 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) describe boards of directors as “large, elite and episodic decision-
making groups that face complex tasks pertaining to strategic-issue processing” (p. 492). 
Nadler et al. (2004) emphasise the uniqueness of the board, the high degree of formality and 
social ritual which is used to reinforce the aura of power and privilege of the board, and the 
difficulty in building a cohesive team. Other studies have highlighted the importance of board 
composition, behaviour and culture in the development of an effective board (Chait et al., 1993; 
Herman and Heimovics, 1990).  
This section reflects on these issues, by considering in the first instance the responsibilities of 
the board as an entity and its characteristics as a team. Membership of the board elite is then 
discussed, which leads to the issue of social control of boards. The inter-relationships between 
board groups are then considered through a review of the relationships between non-executive 
and executive directors, and of the critical role of management. These points then lead to 
Section 3.11, which discusses board culture. 
3.10.1 Responsibilities and Characteristics of the Board 
The organisation’s board of directors is ultimately responsible for its business and affairs, and 
thus the responsibility for good governance rests with it. The board may delegate its decision-
making authority to the organisation’s top management team, but it is still responsible for 
running the organisation without micromanaging. It is well recognised that boards are different 
from executive and other teams in certain key respects. Leblanc (2004) identifies the key 
differences to be: the existence of ‘outsiders’, that is, non-executive directors, who have limited 
exposure to the organisation; a large membership, and relatively infrequent meetings. Steiner 
(1972) argues that these interactions may hinder the board as a group from achieving its full 
potential; board effectiveness depending on social-psychological processes such as group 
interaction, the exchange of information and critical discussion. Forbes and Milliken (1999) 
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proposed that social-psychological processes affect board performance through the exchange 
of information and critical discussion within the boardroom.  
While the board cannot delegate its responsibilities, it may use board committees, (covering 
such areas as audit, internal control, risk, executive remuneration and management 
appointments, governance issues and corporate policies, nominations and selection of non-
executive directors), to assist in its decision making. They also bring together non-executives 
and management, allowing detailed discussions on management matters while filtering out 
management matters, and so allowing a focus on strategic decisions required of the board 
(Armstrong, 2012). 
3.10.2 The Board Elite 
In order to understand why organisations do the things they do, or perform the way they do, it 
is necessary to understand: the experiences, abilities, values, social connections, aspirations, 
and other human features of the individuals at the top of the organisation (Finkelstein et al., 
2009; Westphal and Zajac, 2013); and the behaviour of groups of these actors as they operate 
as boards of directors, executive committees or top management teams such as the SMT 
(Pettigrew, 1992).  
Boards have traditionally been viewed as an homogenous elite group connected through social 
network ties, which provides access to its members to seats on boards (Domhoff, 2002; 
Mizruchi and Bey, 2005; Useem, 1984; Westphal and Milton, 2000). However, Hambrick and 
Mason (1984) argued that the strategic apex of firms contain more than individual leaders, and 
that it was necessary to pay more attention to top management teams (although the definition 
of a top team is often inconsistent and arbitrary) (Flatt, 1992).  
The skilfulness of social influencing behaviour has potentially important consequences for 
organisations and society by affecting who rises to central positions in the corporate elite (Stern 
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and Westphal, 2010). This view of the micro-level social influence processes in corporate 
leadership and governance complements the traditional focus of organisation theorists on 
structural sources of power (Fiss, 2006; Fiss and Zajac, 2006; Kipnis and Schmidt, 1988; Wade 
et al., 1997; Westphal and Bednar, 2008; Westphal, 1998; Westphal and Stern, 2007). 
3.10.3 Social Control in Boards 
Boards can be viewed as a locus of social control processes whereby directors, through their 
service on boards, become socialised into the normative expectations and priorities of the 
corporate elite (Domhoff, 1970; Mills, 1956; Palmer et al., 1995; Palmer and Barber, 2001; 
Useem, 1982). However, socialisation processes alone are argued to be inadequate to ensure 
the social solidarity of large groups (Coleman, 1994; Hechter, 1987); and must be reinforced 
by social sanctions such as social distancing (Barkow, 1974; Bogardus, 1959; Merry, 1984; 
Wood, 1974) against group members who violate the collective interest.  
Social control includes both ‘negative’ social sanctioning by directors of their fellow directors 
if they have acted against the board as a social group, and the ‘positive’ mentoring of fellow 
directors, by experienced and already socialised directors, about normatively appropriate ways 
to participate in board discussions (McDonald and Westphal, 2013). This social control also 
extends across groups within the organisation and the sector where corporate leaders socially 
distance themselves from peers who violate prevailing norms of director conduct (Westphal 
and Khanna, 2003). This process may play a critical role in perpetuating the interests, social 
integrity and a shared ‘class-wide rationality’ or group consciousness as members of a unified 
business elite (Palmer, 1983; Useem, 1982, 1984; Westphal and Khanna, 2003).  
Thus, control in corporate governance is a social phenomenon. For example, directors exercise 
social sanctioning over other directors not because it serves their own personal economic or 
political personal interests; but because those directors violated normative expectations for 
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members of the corporate elite by failing to respect the autonomy of managers on another board 
(Westphal and Khanna, 2003).  
Control is also sought and exercised through social processes such as ingratiating behaviour, 
which Jones (1964) defines as “an act of social deference or submission to another person” (p. 
164), This includes opinion conformity, or verbal statements which validate an opinion held 
by another person, and flattery (Gordon, 1996; Jones, 1964; Tedeschi and Melburg, 1984; 
Westphal and Stern, 2006, 2007).   
Social identification also plays a major role in the influencing. For example chief executives 
of large organisations socially identify with each other as fellow corporate leaders, and this 
mutual identification facilitates cooperative behaviour such as advice seeking and giving 
typically not associated with board interlock ties (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; McDonald 
and Westphal, 2003; McDonald et al., 2008; Useem, 1984; Westphal, 1999; Zand, 1972). 
3.10.4 Non-Executive – Executive Director Relationships 
Early perspectives on CEO – director relationships drew primarily from agency theory. 
However, the mechanisms of social influence, helping behaviour, social learning mechanisms, 
and norms of reciprocity, have been argued to be important in the description of these 
relationships. 
While non-executive directors are formally independent of management, there are powerful 
social and psychological factors in play which may compromise this view (Westphal, 1999). 
For example, a CEO may use personal influence over director selection to render boards 
passive and favour personal friends and other individuals with whom they share social ties 
(Johnson et al., 1993; Kimberley and Zajac, 1988). Furthermore, the appointment process itself 
may create social ties, since given the norm of reciprocity, non-executive directors may feel 
socially obliged to support CEOs who favoured their appointment (Johnson et al., 1993; Wade 
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et al., 1990). The norm of reciprocity links board composition to a variety of other policy and 
strategy outcomes that indicate a lack of independent board control over top management 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009). As a corollary, CEOs who were subjected to increased board control 
can retaliate by withdrawing their support for other CEOs of firms where they serve as non-
executive directors (Westphal and Zajac, 1997). 
Westphal (1999) argues that social ties between the CEO and the board provide the means for 
the CEO to receive and accept more advice and counsel from the board and so improve 
organisational performance. This differs from the dominant agency view that a lack of board 
social independence from management: reduces a board’s contribution to strategic decision 
making through co-optation, or packing their boards with supporters (Herman, 1981; Mace, 
1986; Wade, et al., 1990); and makes non-executive directors less vigilant in monitoring and 
exerting less control over top managers with whom they have close personal ties (Fredrickson 
et al., 1988; Spencer, 1983; Walsh and Seward, 1990). 
In the for-profit sector, non-executive directors are the formal link between the shareholders of 
a firm and the managers entrusted with the day today functioning of the organisation (Forbes 
and Millikin, 1999), acting as boundary spanners between the organisation and its environment 
(Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997). While this role gives them a unique perspective on 
stakeholder management, is also likely to lead to conflict if expectations are not clearly defined 
within the governance mechanisms of the organisation (Aldrich and Herker, 1977; Floyd and 
Lane, 2000; Friedman and Podolny, 1992; Tushman and Scanlan, 1981). 
3.10.5 Management 
Senior managers and directors of large, established organisations who are members of this 
‘inner circle’ are normatively expected to protect the interests of organisations, the autonomy 
and final decision-making authority of top managers themselves; and of the executives who 
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run them (Domhoff, 1970; Useem, 1982). While managers play a critical role in providing a 
moral framework for organisational members (Barnard, 1938; Grojean et al., 2004; Mendonca, 
2001), they are constrained by organisational hierarchies, formal rules and rigid demarcations 
and disciplinary strategies. This means that their capacity “to act or make choices is not their 
intrinsic property but an effect of their relationship with the state in which they are both 
empowered and disciplined” (Clarke and Newman, 1997, p. 29).  
Managers act in formal and informal groups or coalitions, the most powerful being designated 
as the ‘dominant coalition’, which is the social network having the greatest influence on the 
selection of an organisation’s goals and strategies (Ansoff, 1983; Charan, 1991; Neilsen and 
Hayagreeva Rao, 1987; Pearce and David, 1983; Pearce and DeNisi, 1993; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). While not necessarily so, this is often synonymous with ‘top management team’ (Pearce, 
1995). While membership of the coalition may change over time, its institutionalised nature is 
likely to support the status quo (Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The dominance 
of the coalition is partially secured by its ability to institutionalise its power (Cyert and March, 
1963; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The influence exerted by the dominant coalition may take 
place through formal authority and informal communications (Ibarra, 1993; Ibarra and 
Andrews, 1993; Pearce and David, 1983; Tichy et al., 1979).  
The real day-to-day control over the organisation lies, not with its senior management team, 
but more diffusely among the many middle ranking executives who have line responsibilities 
both to carry out the often abstract strategy announced at the top and provide the information 
flow from which future top-level strategic decisions derive (Hertig, 1998; Kärreman et al., 
2006). This environment encourages the development of ethical plasticity, that is, a highly 
flexible, relativist and self-protective sense of right and wrong (Jackall, 1988). The recognition 
of this plasticity can be argued to be a key requirement for promotion, since many executive 
directors put their reputations at stake to implicitly vouch for the value of these middle and 
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upper middle managers. The directors encourage talented middle managers by fostering a sense 
of optimism about the organisation’s prospects, which promotes trust, delayed gratification, 
and a host of other cooperative forms of behaviour by middle managers (Langevoort, 2000). 
This leads to the necessity to rethink strong assumptions of rationality in the context of 
individual behaviour. (Langevoort, 1997; Mitchell, 1999). 
3.10.6 Summary of Board Dynamics 
The responsibilities of the board for the governance of the organisation were discussed. While 
these responsibilities cannot be delegated, certain functions can be passed to board committees, 
typically in respect of audit, remuneration and nominations. While boards must legally comply 
with legislation and regulation, Van den Berghe and Levrau (2004) emphasise that corporate 
governance is about both “doing the right things” and “doing the things right” (p. 462).  
Boards can be understood as elites, which according to Pettigrew (1992) goes beyond the 
individual position holder to that of the behaviour of groups of actors as they operate as boards 
of directors, executive committees or top management teams. 
The ways in which boards operate were then considered, based on the view that boards are a 
locus of social control processes whereby directors, through their service on boards, become 
socialised into the normative expectations and priorities of a self-perpetuating corporate elite.  
The major role played by social identification in this phenomenon was considered. This occurs 
both within the organisation, for example between the chief executive and non-executives, and 
identification with the organisation itself. The social ties between members of the board can 
significantly affect the independence of the non-executives and their role in holding the 
executive to account.  
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The internal structures of the black box of corporate governance were explored through the 
interplay of the formally constituted board with the senior management team and wider 
management groups. The day to day control of the organisation has been recognised as lying 
not so much with its senior management team, but more diffusely among the many middle 
ranking executives, who struggle for power within the cultural frameworks of the organisation. 
3.11 Board Culture 
Directors develop a specific boardroom culture through their relationships with each other 
(Leblanc and Gillies, 2005) which provides for: effective board functioning, with a balance 
trust and distrust (Nooteboom, 1996); closeness and distance, dependence and interdependence 
(Huse, 1994); and boardroom consensus and conflict. The cultural elements of commitment, 
creativity and criticality have been identified as the main predictors in board decision making 
(Huse, 2005; Huse et al., 2005). Forbes and Milliken (1999), also emphasised that group shared 
beliefs underpin key dynamic board processes.  
This section considers the concepts of culture in relation to the ways in which boards function; 
and discusses: the nature and roles of norms and rules in governance; the moral bases and 
effects of motivation, generally; and their specific applications in the nonprofit sector.  
3.11.1 Norms and Rules 
Organisational actions are guided by both formal and informal rules (Gouldner, 1954; Jackall, 
1988; March and Olsen, 1989; Weber, 1922/1978; Zhou, 1993). According to this view, rules 
of appropriate behaviour infuse all areas of organisational activity and lead to regularity and 
structure in organisations. The principal idea is that corporate boards of directors are guided in 
their decisions by both historical precedents and formal rules which are not easily modified. 
This because board actions become institutionalised, and norms of appropriate beliefs and 
behaviour become established (March and Olsen, 1989; Zucker, 1977). 
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In a corporate bureaucracy, the sources of control by corporate directors reside not so much in 
their economic or social capital but in the formal authority derived from their position (Ocasio, 
1999). Formal rules thereby provide a legitimate basis for actions and decisions by boards of 
directors and allow for the reproduction of the legitimate basis of authority (Weber, 1922/1978). 
This formalisation also serves to objectify rules; that is, make the definitions of rules and 
objectives appear objective and external to organisational actors, and thus frame decisions 
(March, 1994; Zucker, 1977). Appropriateness of rules is shaped by both the legal fiduciary 
requirements (Clark, 1991) and the normative commitments which board members make to 
exercise the duties of loyalty, care, due diligence, and good business judgment, with their 
ultimate responsibility to "do the right thing" (Lorsch, 1989, p. 70). Thus, rules become infused 
with value, as symbols of the organisational mission and as embodiments of institutional 
purpose (Selznick, 1957), increasing social identification among the organisation's executives 
and its board of directors. This particularly affects the process of board challenge.  
The style of governance appears to be significantly influenced by sub-sector cultures, historical 
practices, and the regulatory environment. The basic structure of the trustee board supported 
by officers persists. For example, in local government elected members work collectively as a 
non-executive council supported by professional civil servant bureaucrats (Cornforth and 
Chambers, 2010). However many non-executive councillors struggle with their role of holding 
their executive colleagues to account (The Audit Commission, 2003). In the NHS, non-
executives had an impact on monitoring the executives, in a ‘control’ function, while attention 
to strategic issues, the ‘service’ function, faltered (ICSA,  2011). There is a similar situation in 
social housing where these issues are compounded by the  power of the housing sector regulator 
(Brennan and Solomon, 2008; Malpass, 2000; McDermont, 2007). It is common to the 
nonprofit sector that board members often avoid a challenging style in formal board meetings 
because of their relationships with officers (Abbot et al., 2008). 
Page 81 
 
Cairnes (2003) argues that good corporate governance results when board social dynamics, and 
the social system in which the board and management functions, interact effectively. These 
subtleties of human social systems have as much to do with director’s personal and group 
awareness, relationship skills and capacity for taking responsibility and being personally 
accountable as it does with written rules and, procedures. Cohesiveness and esteem among the 
board members have been argued to be critical for effective board task performance (Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999; Huse et al., 2005).  
3.11.2 Motivation Generally 
The motivations of board members have been argued to have a significant influence on 
corporate governance. These motivations are now considered from the viewpoints of the 
theories relating to: (i) power, authority and influence; (ii) social identification, and (iii) 
personal motives.  
(i) Power, Authority and Influence 
The internal workings of a board are best understood through the attributes its members, its 
working style, and actual board task performance (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). These attributes, 
as with any other decision-making group, include the preparation and the use of knowledge 
and skills, effort norms, and cognitive conflicts. Further, the boardroom is often a place for the 
execution of power, with power games played out between various groups of board members 
(Pettigrew, 1992; Westphal and Milton, 2000). Boards can also be an arena where: the interests 
of an inner circle of business elites are addressed (Useem, 1984); and esteem is related to both 
power and the inclusion in an inner circle. Even though all board members have the same 
responsibility and are equally liable, often some groups of board members have higher esteem 
and power than other board members (Huse and Solberg, 2006; Huse et al., 2005). 
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The study of board roles should not be separated from that of power in institutions and society, 
or from studies of the composition and attributes of top management teams (Pettigrew, 1992). 
Chambers et al., (2013), argue that power on boards often rests with managers and not with the 
non-executive directors or lay members. According to this view, the reality of board power is 
best described by managerial hegemony theory; but subject to the context of various constraints 
and the latent power of stakeholders such as external board members (Cornforth and Chambers, 
2010; Herman, 1981). From this perspective, the board becomes little more than a ‘rubber 
stamp’ for management’s decisions and its function becomes essentially symbolic, giving 
legitimacy to managerial decisions. Cornforth and Chambers (2010) argue that the managerial 
hegemony theory also applies to public institutions, with the separation of the public or users 
of the service organisations from the professional managers. This leads to the conclusion that 
the largely voluntary and lay nature of board involvement in public sector may mean that board 
members power is even more limited than in the private sector (Peck, 1995; Steele and Parston, 
2003). This view of limited non-executive power is challenged by a contingency approach to 
board power relations, which argues that power relations will be shaped by contextual, 
situational and personal variables (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995, 1998; Zald, 1969).  
(ii) Social Identification 
As discussed in Chapter Two, at any point in time an individual is a collection of both 
conflicting and complementary identities which helps to explain their role in society and their 
attitudes towards the environment (Ashforth et al., 2008; Stryker, 1968). Social identity theory 
provides a basis for explaining an individual’s actions and behaviour patterns, based on 
normative prescriptions relating to the social group to which the individual belongs (Ashforth, 
2001; Callero, 1985). It has been suggested that this idea of multiple identities and 
identifications of directors is an important predictor of board behaviour and the motivation for 
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engagement in board tasks. (Dutton et al., 1994; Hambrick et al., 2008; Golden-Biddle and Rao, 
1997). 
The level of engagement of the board members in their tasks depends on their level of 
identification with the organisation (Golden–Biddle and Rao, 1997; Hillman et al., 2008). 
Dutton et al. (1994) define organisational identification as the “degree to which a member 
identifies himself or herself with the same attributes that he or she believes define the 
organisation” (p. 239). Organisational identity thereby influences how members define 
themselves, their interpretation of issues and roles, responses to problems, and feelings about 
outcomes (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; 
Dutton et al., 1994). It influences the construction and enactment of the directors’ roles and 
determines when corporate control mechanisms such as board independence are less necessary 
or effective (Boivie et al., 2011; Golden–Biddle and Rao, 1997). It also makes it possible to 
understand how individual directors engage in boardroom activities, along with the 
effectiveness of the board as whole (Melkumov et al., 2015). 
(iii) Personal Motives 
Without an understanding of a director’s motives, it is difficult to understand board processes 
or effectiveness. The motives of the CEO, are particularly important, which if unchecked by 
the board, have been consistently blamed for corporate excesses and failures (Hambrick et al., 
2008). The key CEO’s motives or traits in this respect are: self-esteem, - an individual’s global 
evaluation of self-worth, (Baumeister et al., 1996; Brockner, 1988; Ganster and Schaubroeck, 
1991; Harter, 1990; Rosenberg, 1965); overconfidence, - an overestimation of one’s own 
abilities, performance, level of control and chance of success (Langer, 1975; Moore and Healy, 
2008); and narcissism – which is manifested by a grossly inflated sense of self-importance and 
the tendency to overestimate personal achievements and capacities (Bollaert and Petit, 2010; 
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Freud, 1914; Judge et al., 1997) which if unchecked by the board, have been consistently 
blamed for corporate excesses and failures (Hambrick et al., 2008). 
Self-esteem may also be viewed very positively and has been associated with various outcomes 
of non-executive functions such as the: successful handling of jobs with ambiguous roles (Jex 
and Elacqua, 1999); acceptance of change (Wanberg and Banas, 2000); motivation and 
organisational commitment (Hui and Lee, 2000); resistance to influence (Brockner, 1988); and 
policy experimentation (Knight and Nadel, 1986). 
3.11.3 Motivation in Nonprofits 
Volunteering can serve at least three purposes: sociability; altruism; and self-interest 
Nightingale (1973). It can also be regarded as serving the purposes of: personal well-being, 
community spirit and inclusiveness (Smith and Holmes, 2012; Thoits and Hewitt, 2001); 
individual and collective empowerment (Gooch, 2004; Nichols  and Ralston, 2011); and the 
public good (Mangan, 2009). Keleman (2017) argues that volunteering is a complex term 
which is associated with a range of overlapping and inter-related motivations, which may be 
categorised as:  
(i) altruistic, linked to ideas of selflessness and working towards the common good and 
collective ideals (Cieslik, 2015); 
(ii) instrumental and forced (where the ‘volunteer’ is directed to do so), which are both 
linked to individualistic concepts such as personal betterment (Santore, 2008) or 
responsible citizenship (Marinetto, 2003); and  
(iii) militant volunteering, which embraces collectivism in the sense that it resembles 
‘new social movements’ (Bassel, 2014; Sklair, 1995).  
The personal motivations which draw people to volunteer to serve as non-executive directors 
of nonprofit organisations include: empathy for a charitable cause, the prestige of association 
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with an elite organisation, the opportunity for humanitarian leadership, relationship with 
prominent people, and the importance of an organisation within a community. There is a 
perception that these motivations lead to nonprofit boards being too often ignorant of the 
business of the organisation, generally passive and uncritical recipients of reports by 
management, and conducting meetings in a state of non-contentious fellowship (Firstenberg, 
2008). 
Since nonprofit non-executive directors (trustees) are either not paid, or paid very little, for 
undertaking their duties, it is not unreasonable to assume that they carry out their roles for the 
reasons described above rather than for extrinsic pecuniary motives. This section considers the 
concept of intrinsic motivations, such as moral obligation and altruism, felt by trustees to 
support the ultimate beneficiary of the nonprofit organisation. The argument concerning the 
ethical concept of moral obligation leads to the observation that the for-profit culture 
underlying corporate governance does not adequately describe it in the nonprofit context. 
Moral obligation in the nonprofit sector can be viewed as the intrinsic motivation to act to the 
benefit of the recipients of the services provided by the organisation. This morally based 
conduct, which is also used interchangeably as ethics, can be more widely understood as a 
study of human moral conduct or the rules of conduct recognised as appropriate to a particular 
profession or area of life. As discussed in Chapter Four below, it relates to moral principles or 
conscience (Nwanji, 2016), and moral philosophers orient themselves within the virtue, 
teleological or deontological schools of thought (Harris, 2010b). Nwanji (2016) notes in a 
discussion on corporate governance in the private sector that “deontological (or duty based) 
ethics and teleological (or utilitarian) ethics are general perspectives which can help to explain 
the moral behaviours of those responsible for managing the affairs of an organisation” (p. 48). 
However, in the nonprofit sector, as Hursthouse (2013) argues, the virtue ethic of “helping the 
person would be charitable or benevolent” (p. 1) would seem more appropriate. Kant 
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(1785/2000) provided a deontological position when he argued that duty and obligation should 
bind humanity. Moral duties are categorical because they should be followed simply because 
they are duties and for no other reason. It is thus the action itself which is the object of moral 
evaluation (Kant, 1781, 1785, 1790, Donagan, 1977; Davis, 1980). The Kantean deontological 
ethical approach argues that we should, as Burns (2000) states, “impose on ourselves the 
demand that all our actions should be rational in form” (p. 28). 
While it can be argued that non-executive directors in the private sector are mainly extrinsically 
motivated, those in the nonprofit are primarily intrinsically motivated. This intrinsic motivation 
can be explained by virtue ethics, teleologically, principally through altruism or 
deontologically as a sense of moral duty. Thus, the extrinsic motivational culture of the for-
profit sector does not seem an appropriate model for the intrinsically motivated nonprofit sector. 
The theoretical route for this overlay is considered in Chapter Four in terms of new historical 
institutionalism and path dependence. 
This leads to the issue of motivation in nonprofit organisations where there is a clear distinction 
between: the board, whose members are trustees of the social purpose of the organisation; and 
the senior management. The motivations of these two groups play an important role in 
nonprofit governance where non-executives are primarily generally intrinsically motivated, 
and the executive motivated both extrinsically and intrinsically. The assumption that executive 
directors are only extrinsically motivated is challenged by the view that they tend to be attracted 
to (and retained in) industries and organisations that fit with their dispositions (Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 1984; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). That is, they are also intrinsically 
motivated, since the activities of the public sector or nonprofit organisations coalesce around a 




3.11.4 Summary of Board Culture 
The board provides the moral framework of values and standards within the organisation 
through its decisions regarding strategy, incentives, and internal control systems. The board’s 
legitimacy is closely related to a set of broad, societal, normative judgments and values, 
promulgated by institutional sources such as the state and the professions. This provides a 
distinctive culture within the nonprofit sector, based in the regulatory environment created 
through NPM, and societal expectations of board member behaviour as exemplified by the 
Nolan Principles.  
Formal and informal rules pervade all forms of decision making by boards of directors. They 
frame decisions which are appropriate, shaped by both: the legal fiduciary requirements; and 
the normative commitments which board members make to exercise the duties of loyalty, care, 
due diligence, and good business judgment, with their ultimate responsibility to "do the right 
thing". Thus, rules become infused with value, as symbols of the organisational mission and as 
embodiments of institutional purpose, increasing social identification among the organisation's 
executives and its board of directors. 
It is argued that good corporate governance results from the effective interaction of the board 
and management, which has as much to do with director’s personal and group awareness, 
relationship skills and capacity for taking responsibility and being personally accountable as it 
does with written rules and procedures. 
The internal workings of a board can be understood through the attributes its members, its 
working style, and actual board task performance. However, these should not be separated from 
studies of power in institutions and society, since the boardroom is often a place for the 
execution of power, with power games played out between various groups of board members 
in the interests of an inner circle of business elites. 
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Board and management behaviour is shaped through social identification, which can explain 
how an individual’s actions and behaviour patterns, come to be based on normative 
prescriptions relating to the social group to which the individual belongs. This provides the 
motivational base for the effectiveness of the board as a whole, and engagement of individual 
non-executives and executive directors in board tasks. 
The intrinsic motivations of executive and non-executive directors in the nonprofit sectors 
coalesce around a ‘mission’. The personal motivations which draw people to serve as directors 
of nonprofit organisations centre on this concept. 
3.12 Behavioural Theories Conclusions 
Leighton and Thain (1997) liken a board of directors to a ‘black box’, whose “internal workings 
can only be surmised from public information about decisions announced and actions taken” 
(p. xv). Sections 3.9 to 3.11 dealt with the behavioural issues associated with the board and 
applied them to the higher order hierarchies associated specifically with the highly regulated 
nonprofit environment, which includes the issues of regulation, quasi-markets, public 
accountability, and legally defined governance structures. The culture and motivation within 
this sector is characterised by its: purpose of distributing value rather value creation; operation 
within a public regulatory framework; and generally non-financial personal motivations. 
The scope of the ‘black box’ is proposed to include: the formally constituted board; and the 
senior management team, with its links to the management outside that senior team. These 
components were considered through the lens of group and individual motivations such as 
power and influence, identification and socialisation.  
Emphasis was placed on the behaviours of board elites as individuals and as groups operating 
on boards or senior management teams, who share a “class-wide rationality” or group 
consciousness as members of a unified business elite (Palmer, 1983; Useem, 1982, 1984). 
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This led onto the idea of social control of boards, and particularly of board members by the 
chief executive, and other struggles for power which challenge the assumptions of agency 
theory. The dynamics of power and influence, collaboration and control, which are core to 
theories of behavioural governance, can properly be explored through an in-depth qualitative 
approach involving the direct study of boards and contact with corporate directors (Gillies and 
Morra, 1997; Roberts et al., 2005). 
The culture of boards was then discussed in the context of the relationships which its members 
have with each other, and the group shared beliefs which underpin key dynamic board 
processes. Motivation relating to power and influence, social identification, and personal traits, 
has been argued to have a significant influence in corporate governance. The financial 
compensation characteristic of the private sector is generally not present in the nonprofit sector. 
Therefore, specific consideration was given to the motivation which are emphasised in the 
nonprofit sector such as an empathy for a charitable cause, the prestige of association with an 
elite organisation, the opportunity for humanitarian leadership, relationship with prominent 
people, and the importance of an organisation within a community. The nonprofit environment 
is characterised by the social purpose of the nonprofit organisation, public funding, regulatory 
control or oversight, and the operation of quasi-markets implemented through NPM. This 
significantly affects the motivation of the non-executive board in undertaking their assigned 
roles.  
The study of corporate governance at this ‘micro-level’ is then based upon the ways in which 
‘elite’ individuals and groups interact between themselves and the environment. The 
behavioural motivational characteristics of groups, appears to be a major cause of the 
conflicting and ambiguous results in empirical studies based on agency theory. This has led to 
calls for new directions and alternative theorising in research on boards and corporate 
governance (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003; Davis, 2005; Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004; 
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Hambrick et al., 2008). Alternative studies have focused on behavioural processes and 
dynamics in and around the boardroom (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Huse, 1998, 2005; Leblanc 
and Schwartz, 2007; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Westphal, 1999; Westphal et al., 2001; 
Zajac  and Westphal, 1998). Thus, theoretical progress will depend upon greater attention being 
paid to the inner workings of boards (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Pettigrew, 1992), which 
seek to articulate the multiple meanings of corporate governance rules, techniques, and 
processes as they arise in practice; and recognise the multiple meanings of practice in both 
local detail and wider contexts (Ahrens and Kalifa, 2013). Pugliese and Bezemer, (2015) 
contend that since boards can only legally execute their power as a group, understanding board-
room interactions and director participation is fundamental to effective governance. This can 
only be achieved by entering the boardroom and studying director interactions, which will 
highlight that this process is measurable, multidimensional and dynamic. 
3.13 Chapter Summary 
The various definitions and forms of governance were summarised by Lee (2003) as ways of 
defining rights and responsibilities of members who face certain common problems, public or 
private, and want to resolve them jointly, and by Pierre (2000) as social co-ordination.     
There is a clear distinction between government and governance in the literature, with the latter 
being concerned with forms of power and authority, patterns of relations and obligations (Lee, 
2003). While government is just one source of power, it is responsible for the public sector, 
and the development of NPM corresponds to the neoliberal viewpoint of ‘less government and 
more governance’. That is, “organisations that get things done will no longer be hierarchical 
pyramids with most of the real control at the top. … Because organisations will be horizontal, 
the way they are governed is likely to be more collegial, consensual, and consultative. The 
bigger the problems to be tackled, the more real power is diffused and the larger the number of 
persons who can exercise it - if they work at it” (Cleveland, 1972, p. 13).  
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The concept of NPM redefined the public and quasi-public sectors by bringing in private sector 
values and methods. This process can be seen to unite the governance processes in these sectors 
through the concept of producing benefits for the ownership of the organisations.  
The social contract sees the state as a construction of the general public because real people 
‘will it’ to exist. Thus, the nature of public organisations can be enlightened by social contract 
philosophy, to as broad a portfolio as the public wishes. Therefore, as Carver (2001) argued, 
for nonprofit organisations, the relationship of the public to the public organisation is one of 
ownership in that both the state and the public organisation are creatures of the public and 
wholly subject to its dominion. For nonprofit organisations of a more quasi-public nature, 
ownership may be more akin to the ‘moral’ ownership of social contract than it is to a legal 
kind of ownership.  
From a private sector perspective, Carver (2007) argued that “corporate governance exists for 
one reason and one reason alone: to ensure that shareholders’ values… are transformed into 
company performance” (p. 1030). However, the diverse nonprofit sector has different purposes, 
motivations and cultures to that of the equally diverse private sector. Chambers et al. (2013) 
conclude that nonprofit boards differ from those in the private sector in that their core purpose 
is social performance (public value) as well as financial performance. They observed that, in 
addition, public boards may suffer from a pressure to conform to the social norms associated 
with the NPM practice; copying governance structures, rituals and procedures from the private 
sector without regard for their fitness for purpose for the public sector. However, in contrast to 
private sector boards, their accountabilities may be blurred as a result of the influence of 
political patronage and the subversion of formal authority, and there is relatively little 
involvement in the setting of strategy as opposed to the endorsement of strategy.    
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This and the preceding chapters have identified the underlying issues of individual and group 
motivations in corporate governance, including the issue of direct, indirect, conscience-
controlling and institutional values. The importance of considering motivation and behaviour 
in corporate governance is reflected by Jensen and Meckling (1994), who stated that 
“understanding human behaviour is fundamental to understanding how organisations function, 
whether they are profit-making firms in the private sector, nonprofit enterprises, or government 
agencies intended to serve the ‘public interest’. Much policy disagreement among managers, 
scientists, policy makers, and citizens arises from substantial, though usually implicit, 
differences in the way we think about human nature - about the strengths, frailties, intelligence, 
ignorance, honesty, selfishness, generosity, and altruism of individuals. … They care about not 
only money, but about almost everything—respect, honour, power, love, and the welfare of 
others.” (p. 4).   
Research based on the agency theory perspective of corporate governance has produced 
conflicting and ambiguous results; which has led to calls for alternative theorising on boards 
and corporate governance (Daily et al., 2003; Davis, 2005; Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004; 
Hambrick et al., 2008). Daily et al., (2003) called for “fortresses in research about boards and 
governance to be dismantled” (p. 378); and Gabrielsson and Huse, (2004) argued the need to 
devote more attention to the internal organisation of the board, such as relationships, 
motivations, and abilities among various kinds of directors, which in turn, could influence 
board and firm level outcomes.   
The cumulative effect of research into boards provides a compelling critique of the shareholder 
value approach, in which directors are dutiful agents of their shareholder principals disciplined 
by the operations of a market for corporate directors. Davis (2005) observes that “boards of 
directors in practice look little like the antiseptic monitoring devices contemplated by theorists, 
and are indeed very much social institutions” (p. 151). 
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Both agency and stewardship theory, (along with other theories of corporate governance) have 
been criticised for only illuminating particular aspects of corporate governance and board roles. 
As a result there have been calls for frameworks that combine the insights of different theories 
(Cornforth, 2003; Hung, 1998; Tricker, 2000). 
After reviewing the main theories, this Chapter then considered behavioural aspects of 
corporate governance: which focussed on issues of motivations, power, and interactions. The 
requirement to ‘study the board from the inside’ is emphasised. Various studies have been 
carried out to more closely study behavioural processes and dynamics in and around the 
boardroom to better understand conditions for effective corporate governance. These include: 
perceptions of the effectiveness of board chair leadership (Harrison et al., 2012); stakeholder 
relations, (Huse, 1998); CEO-board power and director interlocks, (Zajac and Westphal, 1996); 
boards as strategic decision making groups (Forbes and Milliken, 1999); the contribution to 
strategy made by chairmen and non-executives, (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999); behaviour and 
performance, (Westphal, 1999); the effects of board network ties, (Westphal, et al., 2001); 
accountability (Huse, 2005); and gaining access to the black box which is the board, (Leblanc 
and Schwartz, 2007). 
The approach to data collection, described in Chapters Five and Six below, is predicated on the 
belief that: theoretical progress will depend upon greater attention being paid to the inner 
workings of boards (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Pettigrew, 1992); and that this can best be 
achieved by entering the boardroom and studying director interactions directly (Gillies and 
Morra, 1997; Roberts et al., 2005).  
Chapter Four now discusses the theoretical bases of the board behaviours discussed, in terms 
of rationality used within the nonprofit sector, institutions, and the application of dialectics and 
path dependency in the formation and operation of the sector.  
Page 94 
 
CHAPTER 4: Rationality, Historical Institutionalism, 
Contradiction, and Path Dependency 
The literature review identified the importance of context and motivation as  issues for 
corporate governance. This chapter therefore considers the concepts of rationality as a basis for 
morality and motivation. It then discusses the theoretical bases for the way in which corporate 
governance in UK nonprofit sector was created from the ‘for-profit’ sector, through a 
consideration of: historical institutionalism; followed by an outline of the dialectical approach 
as the creative engine of change; which is expressed through path dependency.  
The concept of rationality has been so deeply embedded in western culture that to call 
something irrational is regarded as an insult. Section One provides a critique of ‘rationality’ 
which will serve to bind together the substantive theory of corporate governance for nonprofits 
based on moral and ethical values and beliefs. 
Section Two considers new institutionalism, with a focus on sociological institutionalism. The 
nature, production and reproduction of institutions as social constructed entities are discussed. 
The ways in which they cause and are themselves changed by behaviours are central to the 
theoretical view posited. There is an emphasis on cultural specificity of the nonprofit sector, 
which provides a means to better understand the ways in which ideas, values and beliefs affect 
institutional change in that sector.  
The dialectical mode of thought is then considered in Section Three and proposed as a driver 
for the transmission of corporate governance into the nonprofit sector. The ways in which this 
change is enacted, is described through path dependent mechanisms in Section Four. 
4.1 Rationality 
This section considers the questions of what constitutes ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’, and how 
they support moral concepts. The nature of reason is considered first, which leads onto 
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considerations of the various interpretations of meanings and types of rationality: purpose, 
subject, meaning and rationale (Abulof, 2015). The inter-relationships between emotion, power 
and morality are then discussed. The discussion on rationality is then summarised by the view 
of the social construction of reality which is heavily influenced by: history; context; ideology; 
conceptions of human nature; emotions; and power. 
4.1.1 Reason 
Sibley (1953) suggests that for some philosophers, ‘reason’ is a principle which demands a 
utilitarian attitude from its moral agents in matters of conduct. The ‘rational’ person is thus one 
who will act to ‘maximise values’. In this sense the meaning of ‘rational’ as applied to conduct 
should be split between ends and means. The ends entail: (a) an informed awareness of the 
nature of the ends which are proposed to be achieved, including an awareness of their 
significance as they affect other ends, not only of the actor, but also of others affected by actions 
of the actor; and (b) an informed ranking, which judges which of the ends is of more value to 
the reasoner than its competitor. The means to those rationally chosen proposed ends are those 
which are selected because, on the best available evidence, they are the most effective way of 
realising those ends, taking into account all other measures lying within the reasoner’s power 
necessary to safeguard the attainment of those ends. 
Others such as Kant, view ‘reason’ as a principle of formal equity, such as the categorical 
imperative. The Kantian account of reason provides an option, which O’Neill (2000) describes 
as reason being embedded within complex traditions. That is, rationality is what a given 
tradition or community takes it to consist in. Williams (2016) argues that Kant characterises 
reason in terms of a self-reflexive procedure, where it is autonomous, submits to no external 
authority, and gains authority from submitting itself to critique. Reason assumes a universal 




Rationality is the quality or state of being reasonable, based on facts or reason (Websters 
dictionary), which implies conformity between belief and the reasons to believe, or of the 
actions for the reasons for those actions. Belief and reason are thereby intimately 
interconnected. In common usage however, the cultural concept of a ‘reasonable person’, who 
strictly speaking, is a person who has the ability to reason, is commonly used to refer to a 
person who is sensible and has sound judgement, and an unreasonable person is one who makes 
irrational or poor judgements. 
All rationalisation processes have the aim of ordering perceptions into comprehensible and 
meaningful regularities which can be translated into patterns of social action, and rationality 
itself is the attempt to consciously master fragmented realities through regularities of action. 
Weber (1922/1978) identified four components of rationality to be: ‘practical’, ‘theoretical’, 
‘substantive’, and ‘formal, which are discussed below. 
Weber (1904/1958) designates every way of life which views and judges worldly activity in 
relation to the individual's purely pragmatic and egoistic interests as ‘practical rational’. This 
represents the capacity for means-end rational action, which accepts given realities and 
calculates the most expedient means of dealing with the difficulties they present by careful 
weighing and increasingly precise calculation of the most adequate means (Weber, 1919/1946). 
Theoretical rationality involves the construction of increasingly precise abstract concepts rather 
than through action, which seeks to give a coherent meaning for the random events of everyday 
life. Kalberg (1980) observes that, “even though theoretical rationality masters reality through 
thought, it contains a potential indirectly to introduce patterns of action.” (p. 1152). Substantive 
rationality directly orders action into patterns, in relation to a past, present, or potential ‘value 
postulate’ (Weber, 1922/1978), and is a manifestation of man's inherent capacity for action 
based on ‘rational’ values. Weber regarded only value rational and means-end social actions as 
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rational. The value rational sub-ordinates realities to values, and means-end rationality is based 
on means-end calculations and represents a formal or practical rationality based on specific 
interests. Formal rationality is similarly concerned with means-ends calculation but based on 
rules, laws and regulations. Substantive rationality sub-ordinates reality to values. 
Weber (1904/1958) proposes that the existence of a rationalisation process depends on an 
individual's implied or stated, unconscious or conscious, preference for certain ultimate values 
and the systematisation of action to conform to these values. In this view there is no absolute 
standard for the rational and for rationalisation processes. Values acquire ‘rationality’ from 
their status as consistent value postulates. Therefore, as Weber (1904/1958) argues, nothing is 
intrinsically irrational, but results from the incompatibility of one set of values with another. 
“Something is not of itself ‘irrational’, but rather becomes so when examined from a specific 
‘rational’ standpoint.” (p. 53).  
Abulof (2015) argued that rationality could be categorised under headings which include: 
purpose; meaning; and motivation, which are now considered.  
(i) Purpose 
The three purposes of rationality are to: describe or explain; prescribe what is regarded as 
rational; and provide a ‘subjunctive rationality’, which represents the position where people 
acted ‘as-if’ they were goal directed. Satz and Ferejohn (1994) argue that in subjunctive 
rationality “all formal rationality entails is that an agent’s action is explicable as if she is 
maximising preferences. ... Saying that people act consistently is not to say why they act. … 
But it is to say that some of their actions can be described as if they had reasons, as if their 
behaviour was goal-directed” (p. 75). However, Elster (2007) argues that “‘as-if’ explanations 





Abulof (2015) proposes the meaning of rationality to relate to both: how decisions are made, 
that is, to the quality of the cognitive decision-making process; and to why certain decisions 
are made. The how process can range from: some purposeful behaviour relating to means to 
ends within a given context, as in bounded rationality; to a full, rationality based perfect choice, 
linear sequence of carefully formulating goals, complete information, full knowledge of 
consequences and probabilities, and finally ranking them to maximise expected-utility. The 
why question centres on motivation, which extends as a continuum between instrumental and 
substantive rationality.  
(iii) Motivation 
Quackenbush (2004) argued that instrumental rationality is only concerned when “people act 
in accordance with their motivations, regardless of what those motivations may be” (p. 94). 
Substantive rationality presumes material self-interest and utilitarian power-seeking as the 
main, if not sole, human reasoning, sidestepping faith, ideology, and morality (Johnson, 1996; 
Kacelnik, 2006). Rational choice theory generally subscribes to instrumental rather than 
substantive rationality (Elster, 2007). However, Gintis (2009) argues that rationality “requires 
only preference consistency” (p. 1), and can thus readily accommodate social and moral 
motivations. Kalberg (1980) argues that, only action aligned to substantive rationality can 
overcome the practical rational way of life based on interests, the formal rational orientation to 
rules, and reality's stream of disjointed occurrences. This can occur, he argues, most effectively 
after the values of a given substantive rationality have been rationalised through theoretical 




4.1.3 Ethical Rationality 
In the substantive view, belief, where ethical values are arranged to explain the ‘meaning of 
existence’, stands opposed to science, or calculation, where values are excluded from 
theoretical rationalisation processes. Ethical rationality is situated within this former category, 
which implies conformity to an internally binding or obligatory moral good. Importantly, only 
substantive rationalities place ‘psychological premiums’ on ethical action in the world (Kalberg 
1980).  
Weber (1922/1978) defines an ethical standard as a type of value-rational belief among 
individuals which imposes a normative element upon human action that claims the quality of 
the 'morally good' to be the same as the aesthetic concept of beauty. This ethical rationality 
implies an imperative for conformity to a moral good which is felt to be internally binding or 
obligatory, regardless of, or in spite of, any external social forces. The individual who values 
rationally, orients his action to an internally unified and comprehensive ethical substantive 
rationality, acts methodically with reference to an ethic of conviction and rationalises action 
‘from within’ in all spheres of life to conform to its internally binding values (Weber, 
1922/1978, 1915/1951, 1919/1946). However, the formal rationalisation processes in the 
economic and the legal spheres and in the bureaucratic form of domination have come together 
to form a network of patterns of action which suppress value-oriented action (Weber, 
1922/1978, 1927). 
Habermas (1987) argues that Weber's theory of rationalisation is flawed because it is based in 
the “methodical-rational lifestyle peculiar to the Occident” (p. 294), and specifically in the 
context of the development of the capitalist economy. In this economy, money is used as the 
rational yardstick for legitimating social action, even in cases where money cannot measure 
adequately the realities of societal functions (Marcuse, 1968). Further, Habermas (1985) 
argued for a communicative rationality based on a non-coercive, unifying, consensus-building 
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discourse in which the participants overcome their subjectively based views in favour of a 
rationally motivated agreement. This presumes a more complex concept of rationality than 
provided by the Weberian rationalisation of action systems, emphasising the importance of 
culture on rationality (Habermas, 1987).  
4.1.4 Rationality and Emotion 
The ends-means view of an ‘emotionless’ rationality is criticised. The emotional basis of 
rational choice theory is then discussed, and the argument made that emotion is not 
synonymous with irrationality, but rationality is dependent upon emotion, and emotion is 
necessary for rationality.  
Sibley (1953) argues that the ends-means view of rationality presumes the additional 
component of the will. An act of will entails acting in accordance with the decisions reached 
by a process of reflection, which does not allow for any emotional influences. To fail in this 
respect is to be irrational, in the sense of being foolish, absurd, or unintelligent. This means a 
good rationale must be independent of emotions, personal feelings or any kind of instincts, and 
for the process of evaluation or analysis, to be called rational, should be highly objective, 
logical and ‘mechanical’. Therefore, if a person has been, even slightly, influenced by emotions, 
feelings, instincts, or culturally specific moral codes and norms, the analysis may be termed 
irrational. It seems inconceivable that any human has ever met these stringent requirements. 
Rationality is thus more than mere calculation and is intimately connected with meaning, 
emotion, belief and cognition. In the sense that emotion is synonymous with passion, Hume 
(1739/2007) argues that “a passion must be accompany’d [sic] with some false judgment, in 
order to its being unreasonable; and even then ’tis not the passion, properly speaking, which is 
unreasonable, but the judgment” (p. 217). Camus (1942) argued that he could understand 
‘meaning’ only in human terms, and of the impossibility of reducing this world to a rational 
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and reasonable principle. He further observed that all that can be said is that the world, in itself 
is not reasonable.  
Landsbergen et al. (1992) identified the internal and external rationality models in the context 
of rational decision making. The focus on the individual as rational decision maker is based on 
the assumption of ‘external rationality’ which maximises decision utility in light of constraints 
imposed on resources, information, or time, expected utility, marginal cost-benefit, and various 
optimisation criteria (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947; Raiffa and Schlaifer 1961). The 
external rationality assumes “a standard rationality, one not imposed by the individual decision 
maker” (Landsbergen et al., 1992, p. 248). Internal rationality approaches focus on decision 
criteria and processes imposed by the individual through rational processes, habit, or impulse 
rather than on the externally-imposed standard of the external rationality model. Landsbergen 
et al. (1992) further argue that internal and external rationality are complementary approaches 
to understanding decision making, the external approaches are useful for developing normative 
approaches and techniques to aid decision making, and internal approaches provide 
explanations of actual decision making. Nussbaum (2001) argues that “[e]motions are not just 
the fuel that powers the psychological mechanism of a reasoning creature, they are parts, highly 
complex and messy parts, of this creature’s reasoning itself” (p. 4), and further, that we will 
have to consider emotions as part and parcel of the system of ethical reasoning (ibid). Thus, 
according to Greenspan (1988, 2000), emotions play an important role both in determining and 
in undermining rational thought and action, particularly in a social context.  
Mercer (2010) argues that “emotion and cognition meet in beliefs and that this rendezvous is 
necessary for rationality” (p. 25). Thus, rationality is dependent upon emotion, and emotion is 
necessary for rationality (Damasio, 1994; Harris et al., 2008; Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2006). 
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Mercer (2010) further argues that an “emotion is a subjective experience of some diffuse 
physiological change, whereas a feeling is a conscious awareness that one is experiencing an 
emotion” (p. 3) (emphasis in the original). A belief is a proposition, or collection of 
propositions; which presupposes uncertainty (Becker, 1996; Calhoun, 2004). Elster (1999) 
argued that “[e]motions may affect beliefs and through them, emotions, and through them, 
behaviour. … Emotions may affect emotions and through them, beliefs and through them, 
emotions and through them, behaviour” (p. 330). Further, emotions influence how people feel, 
what they want and what they believe (Mercer, 2010). So, ‘utility’ in decision making is 
something which is experienced, rather than being something which is considered before a 
choice is made (Kahneman and Tversky, 1983; Kahneman, and Krueger, 2006).  
This view implies socially constructed realities in which emotions play an important role both 
in determining and in undermining rational thought and action (Greenspan, 1988, 2000). In 
these realities: all the assumptions of rational choice are shown to affected by emotional 
attitudes, and the order of preference can be inverted (Ainslie, 1992); incorrect estimates of 
what our future emotions and preferences will be made (Gilbert, 2006); and partial assessments 
of the past will be made, where all but the highs of unpleasantness or pleasure are ignored 
(Kahneman, 2000). Judgments of reasonableness, which are central to the concept of rationality, 
can be similarly endorsed or rejected in accordance with an individual’s ideological 
commitments to a particular conception of human nature. Further, reality is complicated by the 
fact that some apparent irrationalities may serve group cohesion (Oosterbeek et al., 2004).  
Thus, the view of objective judgements which depend only upon objective facts, independent 
of human nature, is argued to be flawed. Beliefs, expectations or theories influence 
interpretations of evidence (Jervis, 1976). Emotion and emotional beliefs thereby can be 
viewed as something which affects decision making through altering our view of the world. 
Although the term ‘emotional belief’ is often taken as a synonym for irrational beliefs, which 
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undermines rationality; Mercer (2010) argues that emotion and emotional beliefs are not 
irrational, but rather that emotion is important to rationality. He argues that, for example, justice 
can be viewed as an emotional belief which means that someone who is troubled by injustice 
may expend effort to understand the sources of that injustice or act to alleviate it. Without the 
emotion there would be no concern and no reason to expend effort on the problem. Beliefs 
about injustice cannot be understood or analysed independently of how one feels about injustice. 
Emotion is thereby not an irrational, idiosyncratic force, for when emotion constitutes and 
strengthens beliefs it has predictable effects: as an assimilation mechanism, which helps with 
the selection and interpretation of evidence; and as a carrier of utility, which means that people 
care about process as well as outcome. Moreover, rationality is dependent upon emotion, and 
emotion is necessary for rationality (Damasio, 1994; Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2006; Harris et al., 
2008). Emotion and cognition are not competing processes, and their mental mechanisms 
appear to be intertwined (Phelps, 2006; Turner and Stets, 2005).  
4.1.5 Rationality and Power 
Understanding rationality and power is the key to understanding actual political and 
administrative behaviour (Flyvbjerg, 2000). There are contrasting views about power. For 
Habermas (1990), reality is characterised by context-independent universals, where the only 
active form of power is the ‘force of the better argument’. In contrast, Foucault (1988) argues 
for the local and the context-dependent, and for the analysis of strategies and tactics as a basis 
for the struggle for power. While agreeing that in politics one must side with reason, Foucault 
(1980) warns that “to respect rationalism as an ideal should never constitute a blackmail to 
prevent the analysis of the rationalities really at work” (p. 317).  
Flyvbjerg (1998) argues that power defines rationality rather than just discovering what reality 
‘really’ is. It defines what counts as rationality and knowledge, and thereby counts as reality. 
The subjective nature of this reality is manifest through interpretation, which is itself a means 
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of becoming master of something and subduing and becoming master involves fresh 
interpretation (Nietzsche, 1908/1996). Flyvbjerg (1998) further argues that power defines, and 
creates concrete physical, economic, and social realities. Rationality is context-dependent, the 
context of rationality is power, and power blurs the dividing line between rationality and 
rationalisation. The freedom to interpret and use rationality and rationalisation for the purposes 
of power is a crucial element in enabling power to define reality and, hence an essential feature 
of the rationality of power. The relationship between rationality and rationalisation is often 
what Goffman (1959) calls ‘front-back’. He argues that ‘up-front’ is the public face of 
rationality which is frequently presented as rationality, but the most important part sits 
backstage, hidden from view, where power and rationalisation dominate. 
4.1.6 Rationality and Morality 
Philosophers, such as Hume, Hobbes, Locke and Aquinas, argue that moral requirements are 
based on standards of rationality.  
McInerny (1997) argues that, for Aquinas morality is rational activity, where the human agent 
acts knowingly-willingly. The will is an example of a rational appetite, which is informed by 
an intellectual understanding of the world. Actions are judged to be good or bad in relation to 
real human goods for which they are either conducive (good) or detrimental (bad). To have 
acted well, is simply to have done something that is good in every respect. 
Sheridan (2016) argues that Locke (1663-4/1997) seems to hold two distinct positions on 
morality, that of ‘natural law’ and the other that of hedonism. The natural law position is that 
moral rules are founded on divine, universal and absolute laws and as such are obligatory, but 
are discernible by human reason. The hedonistic moral theory holds that all goods and evils 
reduce to specific kinds of pleasures and pains, which require sanctions and rewards to provide 
morality with its normative force. Locke's hedonism is intended as a theory of moral motivation, 
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serving to fill a motivational gap between knowing moral law and having reasons to obey that 
moral law (Darwall, 1995). According to this, reason deduces natural law, but it is hedonistic 
considerations alone which offer agents the motivating reasons to act in accordance with its 
dictates. Morality carries both intrinsic and extrinsic obligatory force (Locke, 1663-64/1997).  
Chung (2014) argues that the Humean conception of practical rationality (ie instrumental 
rationality) is based on the premises that: (a) no preferences or desires, by themselves, are 
irrational or rational; (b) the basic role of reason and other rational faculties are confined to the 
following two roles; (b-1) to inform the agent with true beliefs about the world, and (b-2) to 
inform the agent with the most effective means to achieve a given end in the light of these true 
beliefs about the world. That is, reason and rationality say nothing about the agent’s ends 
themselves. 
Kant (1785/2000) argued that all specific moral requirements are justified by the universal 
principle of the categorical imperative, as the supreme principle of morality, which is as an 
objective, rationally necessary and unconditional principle. All immoral actions are thus 
irrational since they violate the categorical imperative. Therefore, whenever we try to give a 
reason for an action we must appeal to universal motives. In contrast, Nietzsche (1882/2001) 
argued against those “historians of morality [who] unsuspectingly stand under the command 
of a particular morality and, without knowing it…Their usual mistaken premise is that they 
affirm some consensus among peoples … and then conclude that these principles must be 
unconditionally binding also … or, conversely, they see that among different peoples moral 
valuations are necessarily different and infer from this that no morality is binding - both of 
which are equally childish” (pp 202-3). 
The tension between a universal and a contextual morality is emphasised by Foucault (1984) 
when he argues that the “search for a form of morality acceptable by everyone in the sense that 
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everyone would have to submit to it, seems catastrophic” (p. 37). This was supported by 
Flybjerg (2000) by his comment that “despite more than two thousand years of attempts by 
rationalistic philosophers, no one has been able so far to live up to Plato’s injunction that to 
avoid relativism our thinking must be rationally and universally grounded” (pp. 8-9).  
4.1.8 Summary 
While reason provides a basis for rationality and morality, all these terms are contested, 
including that of the divide between universality and contextualism. There is, however a strong 
belief that reason and rationality must be associated with a calculative drive to maximise some 
sort of utility. 
The rationalisation process depends on an individual's implied or stated, unconscious or 
conscious, preference for certain ultimate values and the systematisation of the individual’s 
action to conform to these values. Values acquire ‘rationality’ from their status as consistent 
value postulates. Therefore, something is not of itself ‘irrational’, but rather becomes so when 
examined from the perspective of a different set of values.  
The meaning of rationality relates to both how and to why certain decisions are made. The why 
question concerns the issue of the motivations of agents, which can include: those used in 
rational choice theory such as self-interest and utilitarian power-seeking; and the emotional; 
and the social and moral.  
Emotions play an important role in rational thought and action, particularly in a social context. 
Rationality requires the meeting of emotion and cognition in beliefs, making rationality 
dependent upon emotion, and emotion a necessity for rationality. 
The moral bases relate to ethical standards, which rationally impose an obligation to act 
consistently according to values and beliefs. Thus, rationality implies conformity and 
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consistency between belief and the reasons to believe, or of the actions for the reasons for 
action. Consistency with an underlying belief set is seen to be the key to rationality, which 
dispenses with the concept of rationality in favour of rationales. Etzioni (1988) argues that 
rationality may be ascribed to rationales that are both justifiable and refutable in the eyes of the 
choosing actor. Convictions and actions which the actor holds as inherently unfalsifiable might 
then be seen to be non-rational, rather than irrational.  
In summary, if reality is socially constructed, and rationality is about making sense of reality, 
then rationality itself must be socially constructed. The factors which affect this construction 
relate to: history; context; ideology; conceptions of human nature; emotions; and power. Power 
is a particularly strong influence, since it defines what counts as rationality and knowledge. 
Power thereby counts as reality. It defines, and creates, concrete physical, economic, and social 
realities, and the subjective nature of this reality is manifest through interpretation. This 
interpretation means that reality and rationality are context-dependent, and that context is 
power. 
Theories concerned with the ways in which this reality is historically constructed are now 
discussed in the Sections 4.2 to 4.4. 
4.2 New Institutionalism 
This section discusses the theoretical underpinning for the way in which corporate governance 
in UK nonprofit sector was created from the ‘for-profit’ sector, through a consideration of new 
institutionalism. Three analytical approaches to New Institutionalism: historical; rational 
choice; and sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996) are considered, and an 
argument made for preferring the sociological approach. The various definitions of an 
institution are considered in the first instance followed by an outline of historical, rational 
choice and sociological institutionalisms. The ways in which institutions, ideas, beliefs and 
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behaviours interact are then considered. The ways in which institutions are produced and 
reproduced are considered, which then leads onto a discussion of the dialectical approach and 
path dependency.  
4.2.1 Institutions 
Historical, rational choice, and sociological institutionalisms provide differing meanings for an 
institution, but they have in common that they view them as rules which structure behaviour 
(Steinmo, 2008). The most common definition of an institution is: ‘rules’, which may be either 
formal rules and organisations (Streeck and Thelen, 2005), or informal rules and norms (Hall, 
1989; Marcussen, 2000). Institutions provide moral or cognitive templates for interpretation 
and action. The individual is seen to be an entity deeply embedded in a world of institutions, 
composed of symbols, scripts and routines, which provide the filters for interpretation, of both 
the situation and oneself, out of which a course of action is constructed (Hall and Taylor, 1996). 
Institutions are generally regarded as enduring entities which cannot be changed 
instantaneously or easily (Alford and Friedman, 1985; Hall and Taylor, 1996; March and Olsen, 
1984; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1987; Thelen and Steinmo, 
1992). Where institutionalists differ is over their understanding of the nature of the beings 
whose actions or behaviour is being structured.  
4.2.2 Historical Institutionalism 
Historical institutionalists define institutions as the formal and informal procedures, routines, 
norms and conventions embedded in the organisational structure of the polity or political 
economy. These are in general associated with organisations and the rules or conventions 
promulgated by formal organisation. 
Historical institutionalists are proponents of an image of social causation which is ‘path 
dependent’ in the sense that it rejects the traditional postulate that the same operative forces 
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will generate the same results everywhere, in favour of the view that the effect of such forces 
will be mediated by the contextual features of a given situation often inherited from the past. 
4.2.3 Rational Choice Institutionalism 
The rational choice school argues that humans are rational individualists who calculate the 
costs and benefits in the choices they face. The importance of institutions is that they frame the 
individual’s strategic behaviour. People follow rules because humans are strategic actors who 
want to maximise their personal or individual gain. For example, the development of a 
particular organisational form can be explained as the result of an effort to reduce the 
transaction costs of undertaking the same activity without such an institution (Williamson 1975, 
1985).  
Rational choice institutionalists base their actions on a characteristic set of behavioural 
assumptions which include a fixed set of preferences or tastes, and behaving entirely 
instrumentally in order to maximise the attainment of these preferences. They do so in a highly 
strategic manner that presumes extensive calculation (Hall and Taylor, 1996). This 
straightforwardly egoistical view is challenged in this thesis.  
In rational choice institutionalism, institutions are created by voluntary agreement between 
actors to realise a stylised specification of the function the institution performs. Institutions 
affect individual action by a strategic calculus which is also deeply affected by the actor’s 
expectations about how others are likely to behave as well. The degree to which this can be 
applied to formal group decision making is contested by social group theory (Arrow, 1951; 
Black, 1948; Sen, 1966, 1970, 1998).  
Rational choice theory is variously described (Elster, 1986; Farmer, 1992; Hogarth and Reder, 
1987; Simon, 1982), but Macdonald (2003) defines it as a “theory of social behaviour whose 
distinctive theoretical assumption is that actors in the theory behave according to the rationality 
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assumption” (p. 552). The rationality assumption comprises: purposive action; consistent 
preferences; and utility maximisation. Purposive action posits that most social outcomes can 
be explained by goal-oriented action rather than being motivated by habit, tradition, or social 
appropriateness. Consistent preferences refer to those which are ranked, are transitive, and do 
not depend on the presence or absence of essentially independent alternatives. Utility 
maximisation assumes that actors will select the behaviour that provides them with the most 
subjective expected utility from a set of possible behaviours. 
Rational choice is theoretically and empirically challenged, for instance by Elster (2007) who 
opines that it had less explanatory power than he used to think; and found the evidence quite 
weak that real people acted on the basis of cold mathematical calculation. 
4.2.4 Sociological Institutionalism 
Sociological institutionalism offers a wider interpretation of institutions than those based on 
the economic conceptions of rationality and efficiency (Mason et al., 2007). They are defined 
by Scott (2001) as “social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience ... are 
composed of cultural cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that together with 
associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life ... are 
multifaceted, deniable social structures, made up of symbolic elements, social activities, and 
material resources” (pp. 48-49). Hall and Taylor (1996) argue that it is this symbol system 
which provides the ‘frames of meaning’ which guides human actions, thereby breaking down 
the divide between ‘institutions’ and ‘culture’. In fact, culture itself is regarded as an institution 
which provides a template for behaviour. 
Scott (1995, 2001) considers institutions to rest on regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive 
pillars, which “together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning 
to social life” (Scott 2001, p. 48). The regulative pillar comprises both formal and informal 
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mechanisms which prioritise “rule setting, monitoring and sanctioning activities” (ibid, p. 52). 
Power is central to the operation of the regulative pillar and of corporate governance (Scott, 
2001). The institutionalisation of corporate governance is, as Powell and Colyvas (2008) 
observe, "a political process, and the success of the process and the form it takes depends on 
the relative power of the actors who strive to steer it" (p. 5). The normative pillar is rooted in a 
prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension of social life, which depends on values and 
norms as the basis of social obligation (Suchman, 1995). Scott (2001) described the cultural-
cognitive pillar of institutions as the means of making meaning through the shared conceptions 
that constitute the nature of social reality, which explains how behaviours are shaped by both 
technical aspects and cultural rules promoted within the external environment. 
In general, economists and rational choice theorists stress regulative elements (Moe, 1984; 
North, 1990; Williamson, 1975); early sociologists favoured normative elements (Hughes, 
1939; Parsons, 1934; Selznick, 1948); and more recent organisational sociologists and cultural 
anthropologists emphasise cultural-cognitive elements (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Douglas, 
1986; Zucker, 1977). 
Sociological institutionalism recognises the view in which, according to Steinmo (2008), 
humans are fundamentally social beings who are neither as self-interested, nor as ‘rational’ as 
rational choice theory would have it (March and Olsen, 1989), rather they are ‘satisficers’ who 
act habitually, and follow a logic of appropriateness in which the important institutions (rules) 
are social norms that govern everyday life and social interaction. 
This institutionalist view accords with the arguments made in previous Chapters concerning 
the characteristics of human nature and the contextual basis of rationality and of motivation. 
This view also provides the grounding for determining the links between the creation and 
reproduction of institutions as defined by sociological institutionalism and behaviour. 
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4.2.5 Institutions and Behaviour 
Institutions thus influence behaviour by specifying what should be done and what one can 
imagine oneself doing in a given context. In many cases, institutions are said to provide the 
very terms through which individuals assign meaning, basic preferences and identity. So, when 
individuals act as social convention specifies, they simultaneously constitute themselves as 
social actors, in the sense of engaging in socially meaningful acts, and reinforce the convention 
to which they are adhering. 
Institutions are produced and reproduced through social processes by which individuals accept 
a shared definition of social reality; and behaviours become habitualised so as to minimise the 
effort of decision-making (Berger and Luckman, 1966; Scott, 1987; Tolbert  and Zucker, 1996). 
Rules become institutionalised as classifications built into society as reciprocated typifications 
or interpretations, which involve the social processes by which, for example obligations come 
to take on a rule-like status in social thought and action (Meyer and Rowen, 1977).  
While the idea that social behaviour is anchored in rule systems and cultural schema is common 
ground for institutionalists (Scott, 2004), the different schools have differing views about how 
this happens. Hall and Taylor (1991) argue that historical institutionalism utilises both a 
calculus and a cultural approach but does not precisely define the casual link between them. 
Rational choice institutionalism does have a clear link, but this is based on a relatively 
simplistic image of human motivation (Cook and Levi, 1990; Mansbridge, 1990). Sociological 
institutionalists theorise that there are culturally specific ways in which institutions can affect 
the underlying preferences or identities of actors. This cultural specificity provides additional 
ways by which the institutional environment may affect the strategies which actors choose. 
This is manifest in the attempt to better understand: the ways in which ideas, values and beliefs 
affect history and politics; and who are specifically applying these insights to understanding 
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institutional change more broadly (Katznelson and Weingast, 2005; Marcussen, 2000; 
McNamara,  1998).  
The production and reproduction of institutions, ideas and the environment should be viewed 
as co-evolutionary processes, driven by internal contradictions. The outcomes are contingent 
and non-predictable rather than linear and predictable. The dialectical processes which drive 
change are discussed in Section 4.3, and the path dependent outcomes of these forces of change 
are considered in Section 4.4. The path dependency approach integrates agency into the 
analysis rather than seeing actors as prisoners of the institutions they inhabit (Mahoney, 2000; 
Steinmo, 2008). 
4.3 Dialectics 
Dialectics are a mode of thought which helps us to understand a world full of paradoxes (or 
contradictions). Hegel's dialectic is based on his belief in connectedness, or the interrelation of 
all aspects of the universe (O’Connor, 2003). It involves the reconciliation of ostensible 
paradoxes to arrive at absolute truth, through a three-step process comprising the movement 
from thesis to antithesis to synthesis (O’Connor, 2003). In this model, the thesis is a static, 
clearly delineated concept, which then moves to its opposite (or antithesis). This antithesis 
represents any contradictions derived from a consideration of the rigidly defined thesis. The 
thesis and antithesis are yoked together and resolved to form the embracing resolution, or 
synthesis. Macey (2000) argues that this is a continuing process because each time synthesis is 
achieved it "generate[s] new internal contradictions, and then a further resolution" (p. 96). 
Formal logic from Aristotle through Immanuel Kant had been based on three laws of thought: 
identity, non-contradiction, and the excluded middle; which categorically rejects the possibility 
that truth is compatible with the presence of contradictions (Wilde, 1991). However, Hegel 
(1816/2000) argued that everything was contradictory; and further maintained that there is 
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absolutely nothing whatever in which we cannot and must not point to contradictions (Hegel , 
1830/2009). Hegel's ‘contradiction’ challenges the classical notion of static self-identity, A = 
A, or A not = non-A. While negation or contradiction means opposition, reflection or relation, 
it can also indicate the mere insufficiency of a category, its incoherence, or its self-
contradictoriness. The Hegelian dialectic assumes rationality to be the driving force in the 
universe. Arguing in the framework of materialist dialectics, Mao (1967) stated that “the law 
of contradiction in things, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law” (p. 311); and that 
the “fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies with 
the contradictoriness within the thing” (p. 313).  
Dialectical thinking derives its dynamic of negation from its ability to reveal ‘contradictions’ 
within almost any category or identity through the triadic structure of thesis, antithesis and 
synthesis. Any real-life system will have multiple and interconnected contradictions, one of 
which is the principal contradiction, whose existence and development determines or 
influences the existence and development of the other contradictions and its principal aspect. 
The principal contradiction plays the leading and decisive role, while the rest occupy secondary 
or subordinate positions. This situation is dynamic, so the principal and the non-principal 
aspects of a contradiction can transform themselves into each other and the nature of things 
transforms themselves accordingly (Mao, 1967). This view can be argued to parallel the 
grounded theory concept of the definition of core category upon which substantive theory rests. 
It thus provides the basis for the how the system of nonprofit governance is considered within 
thesis, reflecting a fluid process in which different neoliberal and public service worldviews 




The dialectical approach thereby describes the motor for change, which arise from internal 
contradictions, but the actual changes are contingent and cannot be mechanistically determined. 
This contingency is now considered in the section on path dependency. 
4.4 Path Dependency 
North (1990) sees path dependency as a process which constrains future choices, as “a way to 
narrow conceptually the choice set and link decision-making through time. It is not a story of 
inevitability in which the past neatly predicts the future” (pp. 98-99). A path dependent decision 
is one which is informed by its historical setting such that the rationality at issue is ‘bounded’ 
in some relevant respect and thereby likely to produce sub-optimal outcomes.  
Path dependency is a property of contingent, non-reversible dynamical processes, which 
include a wide array of social processes that can properly be described as ‘evolutionary’ in a 
world governed by insignificant accidents of history (David, 2000). These processes play out 
dynamically over time. So an explanation is required of how the drivers of change unravel 
themselves over time such that they allow for the possibility of change as a function of time 
(Kay, 2005). In contrast to Smith (1776/2005), Liebowitz and Margolis (1995) argue that “in 
the world of path dependence…our expectations for market outcomes are turned upside down. 
The Invisible Hand does not work in the world of path dependence” (p. 33). 
While path-dependent analyses are highly sensitive to events which take place in the early 
stages of an overall historical sequence, once contingent historical events take place, path-
dependent sequences are marked by relatively deterministic causal patterns or what can be 
thought of as ‘inertia’, or as ‘self-reinforcing’ sequences, such that over time it becomes 
difficult or impossible to reverse direction (Mahoney, 2000). The creation of institutions 
corresponds to a ‘critical juncture’ (Abbott, 1997; Collier and Collier, 1991; Lipset and Rokkan, 
1967), which is characterised by the adoption of a particular institutional arrangement from 
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among two or more possibilities. These junctures are ‘critical’ because once a particular option 
is selected it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple 
alternatives were still available (Levi, 1997). Thus, the particular form(s) which the nonprofit 
sector in the UK and elsewhere take are argued to be determined from these critical junctures. 
The utilitarian; functional; power; and legitimation explanations provide the dominant 
theoretical frameworks for the analysis of institutional reproduction. In the utilitarian 
framework, actors rationally choose to reproduce institutions - including perhaps those which 
are sub-optimal. Institutional change occurs when it is no longer in the self-interest of actors to 
reproduce a given institution. Rational choice analysts predict that institutions will emerge only 
when it is in the private interests of individuals to establish them (Hechter et al., 1990), but do 
not typically treat the genesis of institutions as contingent (Hill, 1997).  
In the weak functional view, the reproduction of institutions is explained in terms of their 
consequences and as such is compatible with a wide range of theoretical explanations 
(Stinchcombe, 1968). The strong version explains institutional reproduction through its 
functional consequences, such as adaptation and survival in the larger system within which the 
institution is embedded. Thus, once contingent events initially produce a particular institution, 
functionalist logic identifies predictable self-reinforcing processes, which may mean that the 
institution which is ultimately adopted may be less functional in the long-run than alternative 
institutions that could have been developed. 
Those who adopt ‘power’ explanations of self-reinforcing processes assume that actors make 
decisions by weighing costs and benefits, which are distributed unevenly, with actors having 
conflicting interests in institutional reproduction. Thus, an institution can persist even when 
most individuals or groups prefer to change it, so long as the elite which benefits from the 
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existing arrangement has sufficient strength to promote its reproduction (Collins, 1975; 
Oberschall and Leifer, 1986; Rueschemeyer, 1978). 
In a legitimation framework, institutional reproduction is based on actors' subjective 
orientations and beliefs about what is appropriate or morally correct (Dowling and Pfeffer, 
1975; Linz, 1978; Scott, 1991; Thelen, 1999). Beliefs in the legitimacy of an institution may 
range from active moral approval to passive acquiescence in the face of the status quo. 
Legitimation explanations assume the decision to reproduce an institution derives from the 
actor’s self-understandings about what is the right thing to do, rather than from utilitarian 
rationality, system functionality, or elite power. An institution is thereby reproduced because 
it is seen to be legitimate; and the reproduction of the institution reinforces its legitimacy. 
Immergut (2006) argues that it may not be possible or desirable to make historical analysis 
more scientific and exact, if the very purpose of the historical approach is precisely to capture 
the unpredictable, contingent nature of human action, which stems precisely from the self-
reflective capacities of human actors. In the constructivist view, actors construct and are 
constructed by symbolic constructs such that culture and institutions are 'constitutive' of human 
agency (Calhoun, 1991, 1994; Hattam, 2000; Jupille et al., 2003). This lack of explanatory 
power is a basis of criticism of path dependency (Kay, 2005). This criticism is however 
common to many approaches in the social sciences.  
The mechanism by which path dependency operates depends on whether agents operate under 
rational choice theory assumptions or use a more informal, intuitive and post-positivist 
approachs. The notion of context-bound rationality is at the heart of decision making in a path-
dependent process. It is the guiding habits of thinking which inform and restrict the choices 
taken (Wittgenstein, 1969, 1983), in which the notion of ‘hinge propositions’, guide the 
assumptions of a certain activity which inform and restrict the choices taken. These guiding 
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unevaluated assumptions are forms of tacit knowledge which are ingrained into the way agents 
construct their situations, their decisions and their actions. 
4.5 Chapter Summary  
This chapter brought together the concepts of rationality, morality, and ways in which they act 
together as theorised by sociological institutionalism. It argues that change is driven 
dialectically by internal contradictions, which are implemented contingently through path 
dependence. The institutions of corporate governance in the nonprofit sector are thus argued to 
arise contingently from the internal contradictions arising from an historical context. 
The concept of rationality was discussed from the points of view ethics, emotion, power and 
morality. While rationality and rationalisation processes have been argued to be, in greater or 
lesser degree, universal (Parsons, 1937; Weber, 1915/1951, 1922/1978); this thesis argues that 
rationality itself is socially constructed, and therefore contextual, but it is consistency with 
underlying beliefs which is seen to be the key to rationality. 
Rationality underpins the creation and maintenance of institutions. Institutions are the product 
of ideas and the creation of institutions and their change can be regarded as a product of changes 
in ideas held by actors which are produced and reproduced through social processes by which 
individuals accept a shared definition of social reality. The factors which affect this social 
construction include: historical context, ideology, conceptions of human nature, emotions, and 
power. Power is a particularly strong influence, since it defines what counts as rationality and 
knowledge and thereby counts as reality. It defines, and creates the subjective nature of this 
reality which is manifest through interpretation. This interpretation means that reality and 
rationality are context-dependent, and that context is power. 
Sociological institutionalism was argued to be the most appropriate way to theorise institutions. 
It sees them as social structures which bring meaning to social life, whose foundations include: 
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the regulative, which includes rule setting and power; and the normative, which are dependent 
on values and social norms. In this view, humans are fundamentally social beings who follow 
the logic of appropriateness in which the important institutions (rules) are social norms that 
govern everyday life and social interaction. 
Institutions, ideas and the environment are viewed as co-evolutionary processes, driven by 
internal contradictions, where the outcomes are contingent and non-predictable rather than 
linear and predictable. This path dependent evolutionary approach constrains future choices, 
rather than allowing for neat predictions based on the past. It is highly sensitive to critical 
junctures which create institutions, but once these paths are embarked upon it is possible to 
describe them as being reproduced through relatively deterministic causal patterns which over 
time make it difficult or impossible to reverse direction. 
The realities of corporate governance have been constructed by power in different 
environments. Political power imported the processes and structures into the nonprofit sector 
through NPM. The power of interpretation has influenced the political establishment to import 
these structures and transmit them through standards and organisations into the nonprofit sector. 
However, in action, the nonprofit sector argued to be significantly affected by concepts such 
as moral duty and altruism. This can be conceptualised as differentiating the realities and 




CHAPTER 5: Methodology 
This chapter is presented in sections concerning: the philosophical underpinning of 
methodology; an analysis of the critical theory and constructivist paradigms of inquiry; a 
review of the methodologies associated with those paradigms; the application of the 
constructivist paradigm to this research; and a description of the research methods used. 
Section One provides a philosophical perspective, by considering the positions of the 
phenomenology and pragmatism on the concepts of reality, truth and knowledge. The 
relationship between phenomenology and pragmatism is then considered, which leads to a 
review of the philosophical basis of grounded theory. 
Section Two considers the nature of the critical theory and constructivist paradigms of inquiry. 
Collis and Hussey (2003) argue that, having decided which paradigm to adopt, the choice of 
methodology is largely determined. Section Three then provides an explanation of the concepts 
and practicalities of grounded theory, followed in Section Four by a description of its 
application in the constructivist grounded theory approach to this research. This leads onto 
Section Five, which provides an explanation of the ethnographic technique and its relationship 
with grounded theory, and along with a consideration of the elite interviews used. The final 
section then provides a summary of this Chapter. 
5.1 Philosophical Perspective 
The philosophical perspective is based upon a consideration of the concepts of reality, truth 
and knowledge. Reality can be totally separate from, or a construction of, the mind. Truth may 
be interpreted as reflections of reality based on evidence which is determined by an 
understanding of reality at any given point in time. Knowledge is a means of reflecting reality 
and truth, involving the interpretation of facts derived from data as well as abstract 
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comprehensions of phenomena; and theory which provides ways of explaining or giving 
meaning to understandings extrapolated from data. (Howell, 2013). 
This research follows a constructivist paradigm of inquiry using grounded theory, which has 
its roots in pragmatism and symbolic interactionism. This chapter considers: phenomenology 
through a discussion of the positions of the phenomenologists Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-
Ponty; and pragmatism through the literature of James, Pierce, and Dewey. The relationship 
between phenomenology and pragmatism is then considered, leading to a review of the 
philosophical basis of grounded theory. 
5.1.1 Phenomenology 
Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person 
point of view. It recognises that the centrality of experience is its intentionality, which is 
directed toward an object by virtue of its content or meaning (which represents the object) 
together with appropriate enabling conditions (Smith, 2013). Phenomenology can be 
considered as an umbrella term which encompasses both a philosophical movement and a range 
of research approaches. It is a discipline which "aims to focus on people's perceptions of the 
world in which they live in and what it means to them; a focus on people's lived experience" 
(Langdridge, 2007, p.4).  
Husserl (1913/1969) argues that to “understand the essential nature of phenomenology requires 
a new way of looking at things… one that contrasts at every point with the natural attitude of 
experience and thought” (p. 43). Husserl (1927/1971, 1935/1965) formulated the concept of 
epoché, as a way of suspending judgement as to whether objects of consciousness exist. Husserl 
(1939/1954) argues that this means ‘bracketing’ or seeing things as they really are. In what 
Husserl describes as the first epoché, “the natural sciences” (p. 135), the researcher must set 
aside prior scientific assumptions. The second epoché is that of the ‘natural attitude’, which 
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requires a suspension of our ‘naïve’ belief in the existence of what presents itself in the life-
world to focus instead on its subjective manners of appearance and givenness. Husserl 
(1939/1954) refers to this focus on experience (apart from issues concerning the existence of 
what is experienced) as the “phenomenological psychological reduction” (p. 236). 
For Husserl, phenomenology represents the essence of consciousness and is centred on the 
defining trait of intentionality which involves the core of the relationship between an act and 
the object of consciousness. “We understand under Intentionality the unique peculiarity of 
experiences ‘to be the consciousness of something’ ” (Husserl, 1913/1969, p. 242). The premise 
of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is that experience is to be transcended to discover 
reality, by suspending personal opinion, to arrive at a single, essential and descriptive 
presentation of a phenomenon. 
A distinction can be made between descriptive and interpretive, (or hermeneutic), 
phenomenology. Interpretive phenomenology emerged from the work of hermeneutic 
philosophers, such as Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur, who argue for our embeddedness in 
the world of language and social relationships, and the inescapable historicity of all 
understanding. In his hermeneutical philosophy, Heidegger (1927/1962) said that the “meaning 
of phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation,” (p. 37), which constitutes 
an inevitable and basic structure of our ‘being-in-the-world’. We experience a thing as 
something that has already been interpreted.  
The division between these descriptive and interpretive variants of phenomenology finds 
reflection in research. Heidegger (1927/1962) argued that “every inquiry is seeking [Suchen]. 
Every seeking is guided beforehand by what is sought. Inquiry is a cognizant of an entity both 
with regard to the fact it is and with regard to its Being as it is … Inquiry itself is the behaviour 
of a questioner, and therefore of an entity, and as such has its own character of Being” (p. 24).  
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Heidegger posited the concept of Dasein as a way of being involved with and caring for the 
immediate world in which one lived, while always remaining aware of the contingent element 
of that involvement, of the priority of the world to the self, and of the evolving nature of the 
self itself. “We are ourselves the entities to be analysed” (Heidegger, 1920-21/2004, p.67). 
Thus, Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology rejects Husserl’s idea of the suspension of 
personal opinions, focusing instead on the subjective experience of individuals and groups. It 
is an attempt to unveil the world as experienced by the subject through their life world stories. 
That is, all we have and description itself is an interpretive process.  
Carman (1999) argues that “[u]nlike Husserl, but like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty looks beyond 
the subject object divide to try to gain insight into the concrete structures of worldly experience” 
(p. 206). Merleau-Ponty bases his phenomenological project on an account of bodily 
intentionality and the challenge it poses to any adequate concept of mind, raising the question 
of the very notion of the mental as a distinct phenomenal region mediating our intentional 
orientation in the world. Merleau-Ponty (1945) differs from Husserl on consciousness and 
sensation, when for example, he writes that “the greatest lesson of the reduction is the 
impossibility of a complete reduction” (p, xiv). Carman (1999) argues that Merleau–Ponty 
(1945) may be seeking to reconcile Husserl’s conception of transcendental subjectivity with 
Heidegger's analytic of Dasein, when he writes “far from being, as has been believed, the 
formula for an idealistic philosophy, the phenomenological reduction belongs to existential 
philosophy: Heidegger’s ‘being-in-the-world’ appears only on the basis of the 
phenomenological reduction” (p, xiv). 
Merleau-Ponty (1945) insists that “the material and form of knowledge are artefacts of analysis. 
I posit a material of knowledge when, breaking away from the original faith of perception, I 
adopt a critical attitude toward it and ask myself, ‘What am I really seeing?’ Indeed, in ordinary 
experience, “neither object nor subject is posited” (p. 241).  
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Merleau-Ponty argues then that phenomenology is the study of essences, where the term 
essence refers to the essential meanings of a phenomenon; that which makes a thing what it is 
(van Manen, 1990). Heidegger (1954/1977) describes the essence [Wesen] of a phenomenon 
as “the way in which it remains through time as what it is” (p. 3). However, Merleau-Ponty 
(1945) emphasised that the world and the self are inseparable. Moran (2008) stated that people 
should be seen as “integrated into the natural order, as fundamentally belonging to the world, 
though not merely as objects in the world as their presence generates the social world of culture” 
(p. 403).  
Myers (1984) argues that phenomenology and pragmatism share a special vision of the manner 
in which man is intentionally related to his world. However, according to Rosenthal and 
Borgeois (1980) the difference between Merleau-Ponty and pragmatism is critical, “since in 
maintaining that the a priori is not merely applied to the world but is discoverable there, he 
understandably moves closer to Heidegger in thinking that the apprehension and description of 
structures are more fundamental than the kind of explanation that is typically sought by 
pragmatism” (p. 189). 
5.1.2 Pragmatism 
Pragmatism (Dewey, 1920, 1925, 1929; James, 1878, 1896, 1902, 1907, 1909; Pierce, 1877, 
1878) is a philosophical movement which includes those who claim that an ideology or 
proposition is true if: it works satisfactorily; the meaning of a proposition is to be found in the 
practical consequences of accepting it; and unpractical ideas are to be rejected. Pragmatists 
generally subscribe to a set of maxims and themes, such as: (i) the centrality of the question 
“of the concrete practical difference made to theory if it were true and its rival(s) false; (ii) that 
no sense can be made of the idea that there are facts which are unknowable in principle and 
forever hidden behind the veil of phenomena; (iii) theories and models are to be judged 
primarily by their fruits and consequences, not by their origins or their relations to antecedent 
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data or facts; and (iv) all beliefs and theories are best treated as working hypotheses which may 
need to be modified, refined, revised, or rejected in light of future inquiry and experience. 
James (1909) considered truth to be “a property of certain of our ideas. … True ideas are those 
that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas are those which we cannot” 
(pp. v-vi). Dewey (1916) states that the “meaning of objects is the effect they produce” (p. 309). 
That is, whether a “belief is good or bad depends upon whether the activities which it inspires 
in the organism entertaining the belief have consequences which are satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory to it” (Russell, 1945, p. 825). Truth is thus dependent on human action. Similarly 
Pierce (1877) argues that true opinions are those which inquirers will accept at the end of 
inquiry; that is, views which cannot be improved, no matter how far inquiry on that subject is 
pressed or pushed.  
Dewey's (1939) criterion of truth is “a method, to be used by intelligent men who would have 
a sympathetic regard for persons of differing views” (p. 775). The guarantee of objectivity is 
“the social sensitivity of the observer to the needs of others” (Dewey, 1920, p. 147). To judge 
the credibility of grounded theory, Glaser and Strauss (1967) use a criterion based on the 
feelings of empathy aroused in the observer: if the reader is so caught up in the description that 
that person feels as if they were in the field, they are more likely to be convinced of the accuracy 
of an account than if the description were flat and unconvincing. The judgment is also based 
on the assessment of how the researcher came to his conclusions, whom he interviewed, and 
how he might have appeared to those he studied.  
5.1.3 Philosophical Bases of Grounded Theory 
Grounded theory brings together the two contrasting and competing traditions of Columbia 
University positivism and Chicago school pragmatism with field research (Charmaz, 2006). It 
evolved from the tradition of symbolic interactionism and pragmatism inherited largely from 
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Dewey and Mead (Fisher and Strauss, 1978, 1979a, 1979b; Strauss, 1991). According to 
Blumer (1969), ‘symbolic interaction’ refers to a particular form of interaction which occurs 
between persons. He argues that its “peculiarity consists in the fact that human beings interpret 
or ‘define’ each other’s actions instead of merely reacting to each other’s actions. Their 
‘response’ is not made directly to the actions of one another but instead is based on the meaning 
which they attach to such actions” (p.19). 
Leibnitz (1989) observed that “[s]ince reality has thus passed for a vision, what is to prevent a 
vision from passing as reality. The more consistency we see in what happens to us, it is true, 
the more our beliefs are confirmed that what happens to us is reality” (p. 154). The nature of 
reality was argued to be fluid by Strauss (1993), who observed that “fragmentation, splintering, 
and disappearance are the mirror images of appearance, emergence, and coalescence. … where 
nothing is strictly determined. Its phenomena should be partly determinable via naturalistic 
analysis, including the phenomenon of men participating in the construction of the structures 
which shape their lives” (p. 19). This leads to the statement of a set of working axioms behind 
the conception of the methodology of Glaser and Strauss: that the world is very complex, with 
events being the results of multiple factors coming together and interacting in complex and 
often unanticipated ways. Therefore, Charmaz (2006) argues that any methodology which 
attempts to understand experience and explain situations will also have to be complex. Glaser 
(1978) imbued grounded theory with dispassionate empiricism, rigorous codified methods, 
emphasis on emergent discoveries, and its somewhat ambiguous specialised language which 
echoes quantitative methods. Strauss’s Chicago School heritage meant that he viewed human 
beings as active agents in their lives and rather than the mere recipients of larger social forces 
(Charmaz, 2006).  
This idea of active agents echoes the point that it is process, not structure, which is fundamental 
to human existence, since human beings created structures through engaging in processes. The 
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importance of connecting human action with structural explanations was recognised by 
Giddens (1979) through the concept of structuration, which “in social theory, the notions of 
action and structure presuppose one another; but that recognition of this dependence, which is 
a dialectical relation, necessitates a reworking both of a series of concepts linked to each of 
these terms, and of the terms themselves” (p. 53). He saw the concept of structuration as 
involving “the duality of structure, which relates to the fundamentally recursive character of 
social life, and expresses the mutual dependence of structure and agency” (p. 69). 
5.2. Paradigms of Inquiry 
The previous section considered underlying issues concerning beliefs about the world. It 
focused on phenomenological views of reality, truth and knowledge which underpin the 
paradigms of inquiry which are now considered. This section considers paradigms of inquiry 
which have been described as a set of basic beliefs or a world view (Guba and Lincoln, 1994), 
built on implicit assumptions, accepted definitions, comfortable habits, and values defended as 
truths (Patton, 1999). They represent the accepted rules and standards for scientific practice 
such as law, theory, application, and instrumentation, serving to define that which should be 
studied, the questions which should be asked, and the rules to be followed in interpreting the 
answers obtained (Kuhn, 1970). The various paradigms of inquiry reflect different views on 
these issues as reflected in their ontologies and epistemologies. While they overlap, the 
paradigms move progressively from the objectivist view of reality of positivism, to the 
subjectivism of phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. A review of the 
critical theory and constructivist paradigms is now provided to give a background for the choice 
of the constructivist paradigm for this research.. 
5.2.1 Critical Theory Paradigm 
Kincheloe and McLaren (2000) observe that critical theory usually refers to the theoretical 
tradition developed by the Frankfurt School (Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse) based in the 
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German tradition of philosophical thought, especially those of Marx, Kant, Hegel and Weber. 
From the perspective of the Post World War 1 era, critical theory holds that injustice and 
subjugation shape the lived world (Bottomore, 1984; Held, 1980; Jay, 1973).  
Power concepts, such as hegemony, ideology and language are central to critical theory, and 
combined with a “pronounced interest in critically disputing actual social realities … The 
aim … is to serve the emancipatory project, but without making critical interpretations from 
rigid frames of reference” (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009, p. 144).  
McCarthy (1994) observed that “one of the first tasks of critical theory was to challenge the 
privileged ‘non-position’ of social-scientific knowledge by analysing the modes of its 
production, the roles it played in society, the interests it served, and the historical processes 
through which it came to power” (pp. 14-15). Habermas (2003) argued the importance of 
subjectivity because observation must be replaced by dialogue. Critical theory accepts that 
social and historically constituted power relations affect and mediate all ideas and thinking, 
and that values and facts can never be separated. Moreover, facts always contain an ideological 
dimension. This subjectivism reinforces the reflexive view of McCarthy (1994), who argues 
that objectivist view of positivism misses the point that the “social world is produced and 
reproduced in and through the social actions of actual actors, including the activities of agents 
engaged in analysing it” (p. 15). This reflexivity, which makes explicit the underlying 
ideological perspectives in relation to self-conscious subjectivity, normative morality and 
epistemological precepts, is central to critical theory. Howell (2013) observes that “critical 
theorists challenge positivistic positions and traditions and questions whose interests are served 
by institutional arrangements” (p. 81). Theory is then, developed in an historical context, by 
subjective humans (Howell, 2013). 
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Critical theory adopts an historical realism stance, where reality is shaped by social, political, 
cultural, ethnic, and gender factors, then crystallised into a series of structures which are now, 
inappropriately, taken as ‘real’, natural and immutable. The structures are, for all practical 
purposes, ‘real’, a virtual or historical reality. The investigator and investigated are assumed to 
be interactively linked, with the values of the investigator inevitably influencing the inquiry. 
Findings are therefore value mediated, thereby challenging the traditional distinction between 
ontology and epistemology. What can be known is inextricably interlinked with the interaction 
between a particular investigator and the particular object or group being investigated. 
Guba and Lincoln (1994) argue that the transactional nature of the inquiry requires a dialectical 
dialogue between the investigator and the subjects of the inquiry to transform ignorance and 
misapprehensions. This enables historically mediated structures once regarded as immutable, 
to be transformed into a more informed consciousness.  
5.2.2 Constructivist Paradigm 
Schwandt (2000) argues that constructivism means that human beings do not find or discover 
knowledge, so much as construct it. Concepts, models, and schemes are invented to make sense 
of experience, and are continually tested and modified in the light of new experience. 
Furthermore, these constructions are made against an historical and sociocultural backdrop of 
shared understandings, practices, language, and so forth. Constructivist core beliefs involve 
holistic, multiple realities and the fact that multiple realities raise more questions than answers; 
prediction and causality are unlikely outcomes of constructivist research although levels of 
understanding can be achieved (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).  
There is a distinction between weak and strong constructivism. Schwandt (2000) links weak 
constructivism to critical theory through the ideological perspectives of knowledge discovery, 
generation and accumulation. The weak constructivist methods of organising and analysing 
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data and identifying cause and effect are contextual and intersubjective in terms of assumptions, 
beliefs and culture.  
Strong constructivism developed through the recognition that language is part of social 
existence and that evaluation of beliefs depends on the language games from which those 
beliefs emanate. In this context, Schwandt (2000) held that “the meanings of different language 
games or different forms of life are incommensurable” (p. 200). Which, as Howell (2013) notes, 
leads to epistemological relativism, consequently all statements relating to values are 
community based and so should be treated with suspicion and continually doubted. 
Constructivists believe that the act of inquiry begins with issues and / or concerns of 
participants and unfolds through a ‘dialectic’ of iteration, analysis, critique, reiteration, 
reanalysis (Guba and Lincoln, 1989). This leads eventually to a joint construction made by the 
inquirer and respondents, which can be evaluated for its fit with the data and information it 
encompasses.  
For constructivists, realities are apprehended in the form of multiple, intangible mental 
constructions, socially and experientially based, local and specific in nature (although elements 
are often shared among many individuals and even across cultures). Realities are dependent for 
their form and content on the individual persons or groups holding the constructions. 
Constructions are not more or less ‘true’ in any absolute sense, but simply more or less 
informed and / or sophisticated. Constructions are alterable, as their associated realities change. 
Friere (1982) argues that “thinking dialectically, the concrete reality consists not only in 
concrete facts and (physical) things, but also includes the ways in which the people involved 
with these facts perceive them. Thus in the last analysis, … the concrete reality is the 




Constructivist epistemology is transactional and subjectivist. The investigator and the object of 
investigation are assumed to be interactively linked so that ‘findings’ are created as the 
investigation proceeds. The conventional distinction between ontology and epistemology 
disappears as with critical theory. Individual constructions can be obtained and refined only 
through interaction between and among investigator and investigated, and that varying 
constructions are interpreted using conventional hermeneutical techniques, and are then 
compared and contrasted through a dialectical interchange (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). 
5.2.3 Summary 
The critical theory and constructivist paradigms of inquiry were discussed and related to their 
underlying philosophical positions. This research is based on socially constructed corporate 
governance, which is constructed within an historical context, shaped by social factors, as 
reflected in the critical theory paradigm. However, within the given environmental context of 
the subject of the study, a weak constructivist paradigm is followed. This is grounded in the 
view that cause and effect are contextual and intersubjective in terms of assumptions, beliefs 
and culture. Longino (1993) argues that “the vehicles by which social values and ideology and 
models are expressed in inquiry and become subtly inscribed in theories hypotheses and models 
defining research programmes” (p. 263). 
The following section describes the grounded theory approach which this research uses, based 
on a constructivism.  
5.3. Methodologies  
This research adopts a phenomenological paradigm which recognises the subjective nature of 
reality, shaped by people who are part of the reality being investigated. Similarly, researchers 
have implicit and explicit values, which determine what are recognised as facts and the 
interpretations. An explanation of the grounded theory approach used in this research is now 
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provided, which describes: first, the general approach; second, a description of coding, thirdly, 
an explanation of the paradigm model used in the axial coding analysis; and lastly, validity and 
relevance. 
5.3.1 Grounded Theory Approach 
Grounded theory is a systematic method of developing theory which is grounded in the data. It 
proceeds by the researcher alternating between inductive and deductive thought. “Joint 
collection, coding and analysis of data is the underlying operation. The generation of theory, 
coupled with the notion of theory as process, requires that all three operations be done together 
as much as possible” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 43).  
Data can be collected using theoretical sampling, which is the process directed by evolving 
theory rather than by predetermined population dimensions (Strauss, 1987), and is a pivotal 
strategy in grounded theory methodology (Charmaz, 2000). Theoretical sampling occurs when 
“the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyses his data and decides what data to collect next 
and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges” (Glaser, 1978, p. 36). 
Initial sampling decisions are based on a general sociological perspective and a general 
problem, but once data are collected and coding begins, the researcher is led in “all directions 
which seem relevant and work” (ibid, p. 46).  
Grounded theory is concerned with “the interpretation of a situation in relation to the course of 
action rather than calculation alone” (Howell,  2009, p. 225), and such interpretations result in 
theory building. Glaser and Strauss (1967) argue that while verifying existing theories is the 
researcher’s principal and vital task, the main goal in developing new theories is purposeful 
systematic generation from the data of social research. They argue that generating grounded 
theory is a way of arriving at theory suited to its supposed uses. To achieve this goal: it must 
be able to predict and explain behaviour; be useful in the theoretical advance in sociology; be 
usable in practical applications; and provide a perspective on behaviour. The theory should 
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provide clear categories and hypotheses such that the crucial ones can be verified and readily 
operationalised in quantitative studies when appropriate. This would be achieved by presenting 
the theory as a well-codified set of propositions, using conceptual categories and their 
properties, in which there is a feeling of ‘ever-developing’ to the theory. This would allow it 
to become quite rich, complex, and dense, and make it fit and relevant and easy to comprehend. 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) use the technique of constant comparative analysis to generate 
middle range: substantive theory, which is developed for a substantive, or empirical, area of 
sociological inquiry; and formal theory, which is developed for a formal, or conceptual, area 
of sociological inquiry. Both substantive and formal theories must be grounded in data. 
Comparative analysis can generate conceptual categories and their conceptual properties, 
which are concepts indicated by the data (and not the data itself) and hypotheses or generalised 
relations among the categories and their properties. Generating hypotheses requires evidence 
only to establish a suggestion rather than building a body of evidence to establish a proof of a 
hypothesis. The process entails the identification of emerging categories and then accumulating 
interrelations form an integrated central theoretical framework – the core of the emerging 
theory.  
Substantive theory is an integrating scheme arising from the data. This model of integration for 
substantive theories are not necessarily applicable to other substantive areas, Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) urge caution in such an extension.  
Theory is thus generated using comparative analysis as a strategic method used for obtaining 
accurate evidence, establishing the generality of a fact, generating substantive and formal 
theory. While replications are the best means for validating facts, Glaser and Strauss argue that 
whether the fact is entirely accurate will not be too troublesome, for in generating theory it is 
not the fact, but the conceptual category (or a conceptual property of the category) which is 
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important. The evidence may not necessarily be accurate beyond doubt, but the concept is 
undoubtedly a relevant theoretical abstraction about what is going on in the area studied.  
5.3.2 Coding 
Coding means categorising segments of data with a short name which simultaneously 
summarises and accounts for each piece of data. It demonstrates how you select, separate and 
sort data to begin an analytic accounting of them, and represents the pivotal link between 
collecting data and developing emergent theory to explain these data. Charmaz (2006) 
described grounded theory coding as generating the bones of the analysis, and theoretical 
integration assembles these bones into a working skeleton. Thus, coding shapes the analytical 
frame from which an analysis is built; and coding is the pivotal link between collecting data 
and developing emergent theory to explain these data. Coding defines what is happening in the 
data and begins to grapple with meanings. She argues further that ”we construct our codes 
because we are actively naming data – even when we believe our codes form a perfect fit with 
actions and events in the studied world. … Coding is our view … Nonetheless, the process is 
interactive. … we try to understand the participants’ views and actions from their perspectives. 
These perspectives usually assume much more than what is immediately apparent. We must 
dig into our data to interpret participants’ tacit meanings. From the beginning, the process of 
coding produces tensions between: analytic insights and described events, whether spoken 
accounts or written observations; between static topics and dynamic processes; and between 
participants’ worlds and professionals’ meanings” (p. 47).  
The initial coding itself then depends on researcher sensitivity rather than a mechanical process. 
Charmaz and Mitchell (1996) argue that a mechanistic application of methods yields mundane 
data and routine reports. They believed that a keen eye, open mind, discerning ear, and steady 
hand can bring you close to what you study and are more important than developing 
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methodological tools, and that flexibility rather than strict adherence to process guidelines was 
preferable in order to use imagination to develop theory.  
Howell (2000) argues that “grounded theory constructs substantive theory using theoretical 
coding is the basis of grounded theory. The essential relationship between data and theory is a 
conceptual code” (p. 31). Glaser and Strauss (1967) emphasise that joint collection, coding, 
and analysis of data is the underlying operation. The generation of theory, coupled with the 
notion of theory as process, requires that all three operations be carried out together as much 
as possible. Charmaz (1983) states that they serve “as shorthand devices to label, compile, and 
organise data” (p. 111). Corbin and Strauss (1990) propose the use of open, axial and selective 
coding. Open coding examines phenomena through comparing and categorising data; axial 
coding is the restructuring of the whole process by finding connections between the data; and 
selective coding illustrates how the phenomenon fits around a core category. 
The initial objective for grounded theory is to identify categories and properties which are 
relevant to the theory and allow a level of integration. According to Glaser (1978) “the goal of 
the analyst is to generate properties which fit, work and are relevant for integrating theory. To 
achieve this goal the analyst begins with open coding” (p. 56). 
Cresswell (1998) states that the purposes of axial coding are to sort, synthesis, and organise 
large amounts of data and reassemble them in new ways after open coding. Axial coding 
involves the restructuring of the whole process by finding connections between the data, 
indicating how the categories created by open coding fit together and congregate around a core 
category. Strauss and Corbin (1990) state that in “axial coding we continue to look for 
additional properties for each category and to note the dimensional location of each incident, 
happening or event” (pp. 114-115). Strauss (1987) sees axial coding as building “a dense 
texture of relationships around an ‘axis’ of a category” (p. 64).  
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5.3.3 Paradigm Model 
This research uses the paradigm model (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) in the axial coding process 
to identify the conditions, actions and interactions, and consequences associated with the 
phenomenon. This model is then used to establish the relationship among the categories, 
forming the basis for the selective coding which identifies the core category and its 
relationships with the sub-categories. This is then used to develop the substantive theory of 
nonprofit corporate governance. The basic features of the paradigm model are: identification 
of causal conditions of the phenomenon; a description of the phenomenon; understanding the 
context; identification of the intervening condition; which leads to a statement of its actions 
and interactions; and consequences.  
Causal conditions are events and occurrences which influence the development of the 
phenomena, such as being at a certain kind of place or experiencing a particular type of 
influence (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Causal conditions are necessary but not sufficient to 
develop the phenomena, they explain “why and how persons or groups respond in certain ways” 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 130). The identification of a causal condition of a phenomenon 
requires a systematic reference back to the data for the set of events, happenings or incidents 
that led to the occurrence of the phenomenon (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
The phenomenon according the Strauss and Corbin, (1998) is a “repeated pattern of 
actions/interactions, events, or happenings that represent individual and group responses to 
problems and situations in which they find themselves …. The phenomenon represents an 
answer to the question of ‘what is going on here’” (p. 130). 
The context refers to the particular set of conditions and intervening conditions: the broader set 
of conditions, in which the phenomenon exists. It denotes “the specific set of conditions 
(patterns of conditions) at a particular time and place that interact dimensionally to create the 
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particular circumstances or problems by which individuals respond through blend of 
action/interaction” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.132).  
Intervening conditions are those which “mitigate or otherwise alter the impact of causal 
conditions on the phenomena” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 131). These general contextual 
conditions influence strategies to mitigate or alter the impact of causal conditions. 
Action / interaction strategies refer to the actions and responses which occur as the result of the 
phenomenon. An action represents the stream of actual causal interventions which people use 
to resolve situations or issues they encounter. Interactions are mutual and reciprocal action or 
influence. Strauss and Corbin (1998) characterise actions and interactions as strategic or routine. 
Strategic actions / interactions are purposeful and are intended to resolve a problem or to 
respond to the unexpected. Routines are the actions / interactions taken in response to everyday 
life which includes rules, protocols, and ways of acting that maintain the social order. Actions 
which occur in response to changes in the context, “may be ‘strategic’ when they are taken in 
response to problematic situations, or ‘routine’ when they are carried out without much thought” 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.165). Actions / interactions play a significant role in establishing 
the dynamics between individuals, groups and organisations. This thesis discusses strategic 
behaviours and director’s responses to contexts affecting the strategic actions and interactions, 
and behaviour of governing boards in ensuring effective corporate governance practice. 
The consequences refer to the outcome or results of actions / interactions (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998). Whether consequences are intended or unintended, or direct or indirect, they are the 





The determination of the way the phenomenon fits around a core category involves the process 
by which emerging categories are organised and unified around a core category (Corbin and 
Strauss, 1990). This process addresses the issue of validity, that is, the extent to which the 
research findings accurately represent what is really happening in the situation. Theoretical 
coding is a sophisticated level of coding that follows the codes you have selected during 
focused coding. Glaser (1978) introduced the concept of theoretical codes as a way to specify 
possible relationships between categories developed through focused coding. Glaser (1992) 
argues that these codes preclude a need for axial coding because they “weave the fractured 
story back together again” (p. 72). 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) argued that theoretical sampling addressed the issues of what groups 
or subgroups to turn to next in data collection, and for what theoretical purpose, in that the 
basic criterion governing the selection of comparison groups for discovery is their theoretical 
relevance for furthering the development of emerging categories. The types of comparison 
groups affect the generality of both scope of population and the conceptual level of the 
emerging theory. 
5.4 The Application of Constructivist Grounded Theory to This Research 
The grounded theory methodology is used, which according to Glaser & Strauss (1967) is 
“faithful to the everyday realities of a substantive area is one that has been carefully induced 
from diverse data … Only in this way will the theory be closely related to the daily realities 
(what is actually going on) of substantive areas, and so be highly applicable to dealing with 
them” (pp. 238-239).  
Charmaz (2000) argues that the grounded theory of Glaser, Strauss and Corbin remains imbued 
with positivism, with its assumptions of an objective, external reality, a neutral observer who 
discovers data. She believes the nature and connections between objective and subjective 
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realities to be a key issue. Schwandt (1998) argues that one can “reasonably hold that concepts 
and ideas are invented (rather than discovered) yet maintain that these inventions correspond 
to something in the real world” (p. 237). Corbin and Strauss (2008) concurred with the 
constructivist view that “concepts and theories are constructed [emphasis in the original] by 
researchers out of stories that are constructed by research participants who are trying to explain 
and make sense out of their experiences and / or lives. Out of these multiple constructions, 
analysts construct something they call knowledge” (p. 10). Schwandt (1998) says that most 
would agree that “knowing is not passive – a simple imprinting of sense data on the mind – but 
active; mind does something with these impressions, at the very least forms abstractions of 
concept. In this sense, constructivism means that human beings do not find or discover 
knowledge, so much as construct it. We invent concepts, models, and schemes to make sense 
of experience and, further, we continually test and modify these constructions in light of new 
experience” (p. 237). 
Charmaz (2006) argues that objectivist grounded theory assumes that data represent objective 
facts about a knowable world: the researcher finds them and ‘discovers’ theory from them. 
Objectivist grounded theorists believe that the careful application of their methods produces 
theoretical understanding. Therefore, the objectivist proponents argue for a stricter adherence 
to grounded theory steps than would constructivists. The constructivist approach assumes an 
obdurate, yet ever-changing world but recognises diverse local worlds and multiple realities, 
and addresses how people’s actions affect their local and larger worlds. Thus, those who take 
the constructivist approach aim to show the complexities of particular world, views and actions. 
Corporate governance operates within the historical and social context and the generally 
accepted theories which shape the individual’s and society’s views of how people should act. 
Corporate governance is socially constructed; a social process that places emphasis on the 
dynamic nature of social reality (Letza et al., 2004; Letza et al., 2008), which strongly discount 
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a positivist or post positivist view of the existence of a single objective reality. The framework 
does however correspond to the ontological stance of critical theory, in that it is historically 
shaped principally by social, political and cultural factors and is deeply connected with the 
concepts of power and ideology. However, at the level of each organisation, realities are 
constructed within the overall cultural, economic and legal frameworks by the boards and the 
interaction of the individuals within each board and the broader organisation. This accords with 
the constructivist view that reality is constructed by individuals in a form of multiple, intangible 
mental constructions as they assign meaning to the world around them. Thus, meaning does 
not lie dormant within objects waiting to be discovered; but is rather created as individuals 
interact with and interpret these objects (Crotty, 1998; Howell, 2013). According to Graham 
and Thomas (2008) the researcher and researched interact “so that the ‘findings’ are literally 
created as the investigation proceeds” (p. 111). 
Research into nonprofit corporate governance and board dynamics highlights the need to 
understand how norms of board practices, exported from the private sector, operate within the 
nonprofit organisations. The research question centres upon the issue of providing, theoretical 
explanations of behaviour which must allow for process, and recognise context and change 
(Goulding, 2000). Grounded theory can be used to allow theory to emerge from the particular 
corporate governance processes and contexts (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
The research therefore follows a constructivist grounded theory approach as proffered by 
Charmaz (2003, 2006) as an alternative to the classic (Glaser 1978, 1992, 2003, 2005) and 
Straussian grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin 1990, 1994, 1998; Corbin and Strauss, 1990). 
The constructivist approach “reaffirms studying people in their natural environment” (Charmaz, 
2000, pp. 509-510), and follows the approach of Charmaz (2006), for whom grounded theory 
can be viewed as a set of principles and practices, rather than as prescriptions or packages, and 
grounded theory methodology should be used as flexible guidelines rather than rules, recipes 
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and requirements. Furthermore, grounded theory methods can complement other approaches 
to qualitative data analysis, rather than stand in opposition to them. Thus, ethnography and elite 
interviews are used as data collection methods for this research, as described in Section 5.5, 
within the framework of grounded theory methodology. This allows a wide range of data 
sources to be used, and which helps the researcher to gather various perceptions and viewpoints 
on the problem (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  
5.5  Methods 
Mertens (2005) considered that, in terms of the chosen paradigm, the "researcher's theoretical 
orientation has implications for every decision made in the research process, including the 
choice of method" (pp. 3-4). A research method comprises a set of specific procedures, tools 
and techniques to gather and analyse data. The way in which data is collected and the mode of 
analysis is determined by the methodological approach and the philosophical position which 
guides that approach. However, Patton (1999) argues that what is important is the 
“appropriateness of methods for the specific evaluation research purpose and question, not 
adherence to some absolute orthodoxy that declares one or the other approach to be inherently 
preferred” (p. 1206). 
The research is based within a phenomenological paradigm, using constructivist grounded 
theory. The qualitative methods used in this research are based on a combined ethnographic 
and grounded theory approach which uses participatory observation, and interviewing. Both 
participatory observations and interviewing have a significant subjective element of 
interpretation; as Denzin and Lincoln (2005) observe “[t]he socially situated researcher creates 
… those realities and representations that are the subject matter of inquiry” (p. 641). The 
ethnographic approach, as applied to the study of boards, can also be argued to be biased in 
favour of the world view of those at the top of the organisations and those easy to access, and 
can thereby lack analytical rigour and outcome (Delamont, 2009).  
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The relationship between ethnography and grounded theory is now considered in the next 
section, followed in the succeeding two sections by discussions on ethnographic participatory 
observations and interviewing with special emphasis on the ‘elites’ who are the principal 
research subjects. 
5.5.1 Ethnography and Grounded Theory 
Ethnography focuses on the manner in which people interact and collaborate in observable and 
regular ways (Gill and Johnson, 2010). The aim of ethnographic research is to see the world 
through the eyes of the members of the culture being examined in naturally occurring 
conditions and to document the social interactions among these members (Arnould and 
Wallendorf, 1994; Barnes, 1996; Belk et al., 1988; Longabaugh, 1980; Pettigrew, 2000). 
Researchers who use ethnography, immerse themselves in a social setting for extended periods 
of time, observing behaviour, listening to what is said in conversations, with the aim of 
interpreting the social world in the way that the members of that particular world do (Collis 
and Hussey, 2003). Grounded theory and ethnography are argued to be highly compatible with 
ethnographic studies able to provide the thick description which can produce useful data for 
grounded theory analysis (Pettigrew, 2000).  
According to Charmaz and Mitchell (2001), “using grounded theory methods can streamline 
fieldwork and move ethnographic research towards theoretical interpretation. Attending to 
ethnographic methods can prevent grounded theory studies from dissolving into quick and dirty 
qualitative research” (p. 160). Thus, a grounded theory study takes a different form to other 
types of ethnographies by giving priority to the studied phenomenon or process-rather than to 
a description of a setting.  
The grounded theory data collection and analysis processes are in part based on the researcher’s 
values and experience, and as such cannot claim scientific neutrality. Researchers and research 
participants make assumptions about what is real, possess stocks of knowledge, have social 
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statuses, and pursue purposes that influence their respective views and actions in the presence 
of each other. Grounded theory methods do however, move ethnographic research towards 
theoretical development by raising description to abstract categories and theoretical 
interpretation by preserving an open-ended approach to studying the empirical world yet 
adding rigour to ethnographic research by building systematic checks into both data collection 
and analysis. 
5.5.2 Participatory Observations 
Observation has been characterised by Adler and Adler (1994) as the “fundamental base of all 
research methods” in the social and behavioural sciences (p. 389) and by Werner and Schoepfle 
(1987) as “the mainstay of the ethnographic enterprise” (p. 257). Social scientists mainly 
conduct observation-based research through participant, reactive or unobtrusive observations. 
Participant observation requires a long-term immersion in the everyday life of that community. 
In reactive observation, people are aware of being studied and are amenable to interacting with 
the researcher only in response to elements in the research design; and in unobtrusive, non-
reactive, observation people are unaware of being studied (Angrosino, 2005). Denzin and 
Lincoln (2005) caution that there is no pure, objective, detached observation and therefore the 
effects of the observer’s presence can never be erased.  
The importance of direct observational research on corporate elites is accepted (Brannen, 1987; 
Winkler, 1987); but its importance is matched by its difficulties (Thomas, 1995; Useem, 1995). 
Cormode and Hughes (1999) note that research into elites presents very different 
methodological and ethical challenges from studying non-elites. These differences relate to the 
characteristics of those being studied, power differentials between the elite and the researcher 
and the politics of the research process (Moyser and Wagstaffe, 1987; Hertz and Imber, 1993). 
This research overcame these issues by the use of an ethnographic approach, where the 
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researcher was a member of the ‘corporate elite’ under investigation within the UK nonprofit 
sector. 
5.5.3 Interviewing 
The interview is one of the most, if not the most, commonly used research tools in social 
science (King, 2004) and in political science (Berry, 2002; Lilleker, 2003; Richards, 1996). 
Holstein and Gubrium (1995) estimate that “90% of all social science investigations use 
interviews of some sort” (p. 1). Burnham et al. (2004) characterise elite interviewing as “a 
situation in which the balance is in favour of the respondent” (p. 205), and this can lead to 
additional challenges in gaining access and the respondents’ tendency to seek to control the 
agenda (Burnham et al., 2004; Bygnes, 2008). 
The interview is not a neutral tool, rather it is a conversation which produces situated 
understandings grounded in specific interactional episodes. Interviews are also influenced by 
the personal characteristics of the interviewer, such as class, ethnicity, and gender (Atkinson 
and Silverman 1997; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Fontana, 2002; Hertz, 1997; Holstein and 
Gubrium, 1995; Scheurich, 1995). Furthermore, Fontana and Frey (2005) assert that 
“interviewing is inextricably and unavoidably historically, politically, and contextually bound” 
(p. 695).  
Fontana and Frey (2005) explain that while the most common form of interviewing involves 
face-to-face verbal interchange, it can also take the form of face-to-face group interchange and 
telephone surveys. The interviews can be structured, semi-structured or unstructured. 
Structured interviewing aims to capture precise codable data to explain behaviour within pre-
established categories. This is achieved by the interviewer asking all respondents the same 
series of pre-established questions with a limited set of response categories. Semi-structured 
and unstructured interviews evolve as the individual interviews proceed and information is 
gathered from one interview to the next. Howell (2013) argues that this reflects the inductive 
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discovery process. Fontana and Frey (2005) observe that unstructured interviewing attempts to 
understand the complex behaviour of society without imposing any a priori categorisation that 
may limit the field of inquiry. 
This research included unstructured interviews of members of the nonprofit corporate elite for 
the purposes obtaining theoretical saturation. Lilleker (2003) defines elites as “those with close 
proximity to power or policymaking” (p. 207) or those with particular expertise (Burnham et 
al., 2004). Underlying governance and political theories are created and interpreted by 
corporate elites; and these elites have determined every notable case of corporate governance 
reform in the UK which have been achieved through self-regulation (Price, 2016). These key 
reforms are Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995), Hampel (1998), Turnbull (1999), Higgs 
(2003), Walker (2009) and Kay (2012). This system of self-regulation means that corporate 
elites are central to the process of governing. The elite, in the context of this research, refers to 
executive and non-execute directors, chairmen, and chief executives. 
May (2001) observes that elite interviews can “yield rich insights into people’s biographies, 
experiences, opinions, values, aspirations, attitudes and feelings” (p. 120), and provide insights 
into events within the corporate ‘black box’.  
According to Berry (2002) the paradox of elite interviewing is that the valuable flexibility of 
open ended questioning exacerbates the validity and reliability issues that are part and parcel 
of this approach. While open-ended questioning is the riskiest but potentially most valuable 
type of elite interviewing, it requires interviewers to know when to probe and how to formulate 
appropriate follow-up questions. Davies (2001) observes that qualitative interview data tend to 
be cast in terms of the exploration of respondents’ perceptions and sensibilities rather than the 
factual accuracy of those perceptions. He then argues that, for validity reasons, interview data 
is best reinforced by other forms of data through triangulation with such sources as interviews 
and documentary sources, and published secondary-source information. The use of any one 
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method on its own exposes the research to the criticism that it does not adequately shed light 
on a phenomenon. This can be addressed by triangulation by using multiple methods, which 
helps to facilitate a deeper understanding. Triangulation methods include: consistency 
checking by using different methods of data collection; examining the consistency of sources 
from within the same method; use of multiple observers and analysts; and the application of 
different theoretical perspectives to examine and interpret the data (Denzin, 1978; Patton, 
1999). 
As Sarantakos (2005) observes, the constructivist paradigm seeks meaning which actors use to 
make sense of their world, and does not search for an objective meaning independent of those 
actors. So that when researchers are looking for meaning (Lilleker, 2003; Richards, 1996), the 
semi-structured or unstructured interview method is a valid technique (Sarantakos, 2005). 
McEvoy (2006) also argues that the identity of the interviewer can represent an important 
dynamic in the interview, where the interviewee makes assumptions about the researcher’s 
identity and tailor responses accordingly. The researcher’s actual or perceived membership of 
the interviewee’s group provides a specific framework for data collection and analysis; for 
example the basis of the researcher being a ‘complete member’ of the study settings in which 
they are already members (Adler and Adler, 1987).  
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provided the philosophical perspective for the research based on the concepts of 
reality, truth, knowledge and theory, using the phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty, and pragmatist philosophy. The critical theory and constructivist paradigms 
were described in terms of their associated ontologies and epistemologies. The chapter then 
considered methodologies in more detail, with focus on phenomenology and grounded theory.  
The rationale for using a constructivist grounded theory methodology was then set out, based 
on the match between the socially constructed nature of corporate governance and the 
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underlying combination of pragmatic and symbolic interactionist position of grounded theory. 
As Charmaz (2006) notes “the world is very complex, with events being the results of multiple 
factors coming together and interacting in complex and often unanticipated ways. Therefore, 
any methodology that attempts to understand experience and explain situations will have to be 
complex” (pp. 6-7). 
The use of the constructivist paradigm to underpin the research methodology was then justified 
on the basis of these characteristics, the research problem and the complexity of the 
phenomenon being investigated. It was argued that constructivism shares the same 
philosophical assumption as this research, in leaning towards the subjective meanings of 
socially constructed phenomena. The basic processes for inductively developing a grounded 
theory were then described, through the constant comparison method and various coding 
processes. The qualitative methods of data collection: participatory observation and 
interviewing were discussed. Specific emphasis was placed on dealing with ‘elites’, who are 
the main research subjects.  
Flexibility in approach is emphasised by Charmaz in constructivist grounded theory approach 
and by Patton (1999), who noted that in choice of methods “the issue is the appropriateness of 
methods for the specific evaluation research purpose and question, not adherence to some 
absolute orthodoxy that declares one or the other approach to be inherently preferred” (p. 
1206). 
The following chapter describes the data collection, coding and analysis based on the 




CHAPTER 6: Data Collection, Coding and Analysis 
This chapter describes the iterative processes used to collect and analyse data using grounded 
theory processes and to develop a substantive theory. These processes comprise: 
- data collection, which allows advantage to be taken of emergent themes; 
- analysis using; open codes to develop concepts, categories, axial coding to develop 
connections between categories and sub-categories, and selective coding to integrate 
categories to build a theoretical framework; and 
- theoretical sampling which confirms, extends and sharpens the theoretical framework 
until theoretical saturation is achieved.  
These processes include reference to existing literature in order to improve the internal validity 
through definition of constructs and external validity by establishing the domain to which the 
research findings can be generalised (Pandit, 1996). 
This chapter is divided into sections which describe:  
(i) the ethnographic methods used in the data collection and coding;  
(ii) the theoretical basis of open coding and how the initial open codes were generated;  
(iii) the generation of concepts from the open codes;  
(iv) the development of open categories and sub-categories; 
(v) the inter-relationships between categories and sub-categories to yield suggested 
propositions;  
(vi) axial coding process;  
(vii) two related models of nonprofit corporate governance which identity five axial codes; 
(viii) the analysis of these axial codes using the paradigm model;  
(ix) the identification and interpretation of the core category;  
Page 149 
 
(x) the development and testing of key concepts and categories through theoretical 
sampling, and their consolidation to provide the basis for the development of the 
substantive theory; and  
(xi) the chapter summary. 
6.1 Data Collection 
This section describes the methods used in the data collection and how this data was recorded 
and coded. Since the data collection was carried out using ethnographic methods, which are 
recognised to be subjective, the issue of subjectivity is considered in the first part of this section. 
The second part of this section then describes the data collections itself. The method of analysis 
of the data and the generation of open codes are discussed in Section 6.2. 
6.1.1 Subjectivity 
As discussed in Section 5.5.1, ethnographic research attempts to describe occurrences as they 
are experienced by the subject (Arnould and Wallendorf, 1994), thus there is lack of objectivity 
in most ethnographic research (Atkinson, 1992; Johnson, 1990). By acknowledging the 
subjective, partial, and local nature of the analysis, ethnography claims only to provide one 
interpretation of the phenomenon of interest; potentially one of many. The issue of subjectivity 
is addressed through the concept of reflexivity; two important aspects of which concern: 
researcher reflexivity as the means of purposely thinking about the researcher’s position in 
relation to his own research; and secondly as a way for social actors to consider their social 
positions, potentially provoking habitus and field change (Bourdieu, 1990). Researcher 
reflexivity is the reflective, interpretive and recursive process by which researchers consciously 
and continuously take into account how their assumptions, decisions and behaviours influence 
themselves and their work (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009; Haynes, 2012; Hibbert et al., 2010). 
Interpretation means that when engaging in such reflections, researchers probe deeper, seeking 
to establish possible reasons and implications of their (inter) actions (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 
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2009). Recursion means that researchers amend their research practice in the light of new 
insights gained through reflection and interpretation (Hibbert et al., 2010). 
Bourdieu (2003) spoke of “participant objectivation,” as “the objectification of the subject of 
objectification, [original emphasis] – in short of the researcher herself” (p. 282). It aims at 
objectivising the subjective relation to the object which, far from leading to a relativistic and 
more-or-less anti-scientific subjectivism, is one of the conditions of genuine scientific 
objectivity (Bourdieu, 2001).  
6.1.2 Data Collection 
Gaining access in order to carry out research directly within the ‘black box’ is traditionally 
regarded as being difficult (Gay, 2001; Long et al., 2005; Pettigrew, 1992). The “secrecy in 
which matters of the board room are conducted make corporate boards ‘black boxes’, which 
have public effects but whose inner workings are never publicly known” (McAlmon, 1981, p. 
26). Direct access is however important to an understanding of board processes. These 
processes include the roles of the board of directors, how directors relate to one another as a 
group, how the board interacts with management, and how decisions are made, both inside and 
outside the boardroom (Leblanc and Schwartz, 2007). 
The data was collected using participatory observations, in the researcher’s role as non-
executive board member. There was a total of thirty six separate ethnographic participatory 
observations comprising: twelve board meetings, ten board committee meetings; five ad hoc 
board appointed working groups; and nine large meetings or conferences of practitioners. An 
analysis of the sources of the data is provided in appendix 1.  
Contemporaneous written notes were made at each meeting. After the meeting, these notes 
were analysed against each item on the meeting agenda as well as overall observations, where 
appropriate. The meetings were analysed under the headings of: observations; comments; key 
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issues; and open coding. The observation provides a short description of the item under 
consideration, and the commentary provides initial reflections relating to the observation and 
a discussion of the item. The statement of the key issue extracts the analytical point, which is 
then carried forward into one or more a uniquely referenced open codes. This process is 
described in more detail in appendix 2. 
6.2 Open Coding 
Open coding refers to that part of analysis that deals with the labelling and categorising of 
phenomena as indicated by the data as described in Section 5.3.2. Open coding requires 
application of 'the comparative method' where data are compared, and similar incidents are 
grouped together and given the same conceptual label.  
As the data collection progressed through the participatory observations, as described in 
Section 6.1 above, additional open codes were identified. The iterative nature of data collection 
meant that previous data were then reanalysed. This led to the generation of new key issues 
and new matchings of existing key issues and open codes. The open codes were assigned by 
reviewing the key issue against all existing open codes, and where found to be relevant the 
existing code was assigned to that key issue. Further, the existing open code could be added to, 
or amended as the result of this matching exercise. A new open code was created when one did 
not exist, or the key issue provided a nuance for existing codes. In any one data collection, 
there were also several key issues which related to the same point and so were assigned the 
same open code – thus it is possible to have fewer open codes than key points. The last few 
data collections generated one or no new open codes, which provided an indication that 
theoretical saturation had been achieved. The full list of open codes is presented in Table 1. 




6.3 Concepts and Open Categories 
The product of labelling and categorising are concepts, which are the basic building blocks in 
grounded theory construction. Strauss and Corbin (1998) define a concept as an “abstract 
representation of an event, object, or action or interaction that a researcher identifies as being 
significant in the data” (p.103). Concepts which accurately capture thoughts and meanings of 
participants are thus developed under the groupings of:  
(i) Political, regulatory and ethical environment;  
(ii) board functions, structures and processes;  
(iii) challenge; 
(iv) relationships; and  
(v) motivations.  
These concepts, which are presented in Table 2 ‘Concepts and Categories’, are now considered 
in terms of their components with examples from the participatory observations and interviews. 
6.3.1 Political, Regulatory and Ethical Environment 
This environment conceptual code grouping is described in terms of: (i) political and regulatory 
issues which derive from the neoliberal ideology; (ii) social purpose, values and moral duty; 
and (iii) interactions between these two elements. 
(i) Political and regularity issues 
The political environment defines the regularity regimes which are key drivers for the nonprofit 
sector. The government delivers its priorities and statutory duties through these regimes.  
A National Housing Federation (NHF) director provided a background briefing on the 
political situation and the priorities of the NHF to a meeting of chairs, chief executives 
and non-executive directors. He emphasised that the general political environment is a 
key driver for the sector. Another NHF senior official then argued that this environment 
Page 153 
 
and its general political attitudes drove the creation of policies which directly affected 
all sector organisations. 
Although each nonprofit sub-sector has its own regulatory regime, the concept concerns the 
regulatory environments generally and the responses of those who are regulated.  
At a board meeting, a director of the regulatory authority stated that the regulator is “the 
delivery vehicle, it does what the government wants”. He continued that, “one of its 
roles is to ensure that the sector is efficient. However, the sector continues to have a 
bad reputation for inefficiency. There are no real commercial market mechanisms in 
the sector which will drive efficiency, neither can the government control the sector 
directly by cutting budgets.”  
The regulatory and wider value regime builds a culture of conformity which provides a means 
of ensuring the delivery of government policy through compliance, along with the acceptance 
of good corporate governance practice.  
A training session for school governors was based on a National Governors Association 
(NGA) document in which it was stated, that it was intended to set the culture and 
values for governance in the state education sector.  
The Department for Education (DfE) Handbook on Governance sets out the 
responsibilities of governors, using accepted corporate governance best practice and 
applies that to the sector. The guidance sets out the view of the government department 
on the best way that governance should be carried out by the very large number of 
school governors. It also provides the basis for the checking compliance against 
departmental guidance is part of the regulatory regime (OFSTED). 
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The regulator drives compliance through enforcement mechanisms, such as inspections, which 
are aimed at strengthening the culture of ‘conformity’ and ‘encouraging’ non-executives to 
understand the sector. 
At a board meeting, a background paper on welfare reform was presented as the 
executive director said, because “for the In-Depth Assessment (IDA) it is necessary to 
demonstrate that we are aware” of the relevant legislative issues. 
The response to regulation is, however, ultimately built on the public view of nonprofit sector 
ethos and values. These values include collaboration as opposed to competition as a core 
nonprofit belief (orthodoxy), which opposes the perceived individualism of neoliberalism.  
At a county wide governors’ conference; a chair of school governors, and a nonprofit 
non-executive director, stated his belief that while schools are distinguished by their 
specific values and ethos, there was a tension between the system which encourages 
competition between schools and of the principle of collaboration. The point is 
summarised by the statement made by the meeting chairman that “collaboration is a 
core belief which opposes the individualism of neoliberalism”. The meeting agreed 
with this view.  
(ii) Social Purpose, Values and Moral Duty  
Social purpose is central to all nonprofit organisations which act in accordance with an ethical 
stance of providing for its clients, with an antipathy towards the private sector.  
An inspector from the Care Quality Commission (CQC) stated at a regional school 
governors meeting that: “our central purpose is to make a difference to the life chances 
of children and young people”. 
There may not be a single interpretation of social purpose within an organisation or sector.  
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At a board task and finish meeting the emphasis and interpretation of the organisation’s 
social purpose were debated. The non-executives emphasised the provision of as much 
housing as possible to help alleviate the national housing crisis, while the executive 
directors focus was on providing a good service to existing service users. The board 
subsequently agreed, as part of its strategic review, that the organisation must “provide 
the best possible service to its existing tenants as well as ‘doing its bit’ towards solving 
the housing crisis by building as many houses as it could while maintaining financial 
viability”. 
The board has a responsibility to set the values of the organisation, but these are grounded in 
those of the sector as a whole. 
In an unstructured interview, an ex-chief executive of several nonprofit organisations 
commented on the importance of commitment to the values of the organisation, such 
as its community focus, and the range of services to help and support residents. He also 
stated that the board is responsible for “setting and ensuring compliance with strategic 
objectives and values, financial risk and risk management and ensuring a proper 
framework of delegation and internal controls.” 
The ethical concept of moral obligation underlies the sector.  
At a regional Multi-Academy Trust (MAT) meeting, a school chairman and non-
executive director stressed the need for schools to collaborate to develop and to achieve 
their objective of providing the best possible education for children. He stated his belief 






(iii) Interactions Between the Political / Regularity Regimes and Nonprofit Sector 
The interactions between the political environment, regularity regimes, and the social and 
morality based ethos of the nonprofit sector are important factors in the ways in which boards 
and organisations operate. These interactions may be broadly summarised as: the regulatory 
regimes seeking to ensure sector conformity and compliance; and nonprofit organisations 
complying, reacting, and seeking to influence the regulatory regime. 
The government recognises that it must deliver its policies through boards and professional 
groups which do not necessarily agree with those policies. It therefore seeks to create regulatory 
regimes which are based on legal, moral, and intellectual authority. 
Guidance is created which aims both to set the culture and values for governance, based on 
agency theory as the accepted corporate governance best practice, with specific application to 
the relevant sub-sector. 
Education sector guidance on governance, used in sector training, is produced by an 
independent organisation with the aim of improving the effectiveness of governance to 
the benefit of the social purpose.  
The board acts to maintain the skills of its members in support of its role as an effective board, 
which is also evidence of good governance for the regulator.  
At a board committee which had the remit to oversee governance processes, a paper 
was presented on the result of the detailed cyclical review of governance documents 
carried out by the company secretary. The committee considered the changes 
specifically in terms of a review of best practice and for regulatory evidence. The anti-
fraud and corruption policy was similarly reviewed at the audit committee. 
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The aim of promoting the professionalisation of boards is intended to achieve the goal of 
increased efficiency. This professionalisation can also be seen as an attempt to exert indirect, 
cultural control, which is required because direct government control is not possible.  
An official from the regulator presented an update to the board on the effects of 
deregulation. He observed that deregulation lessens government control, and will give 
greater autonomy to individual organisations and their boards. However, it also will 
affect the attitudes of [bank] lenders, since they rely heavily on the implied support the 
sector receives from government control of the sector. 
Government policy, as interpreted and agreed by the board, is implemented by sector 
professional managers, members of the professions (such as accountants), and the SMT in 
accordance with sector norms and tradition. That is, the government must deliver its policies 
through professional groups which do not necessarily agree with it. 
At a meeting organised to promote professional support for the reorganisation of 
schools into academies, many education professionals spoke against the principle, but 
as one head teacher said: “we are law abiding and will implement the law”. 
These professional groups have a strong influence on boards, but the regulatory authorities 
seek to counter this. 
A director of the housing regulator argued at a board of a regulated organisation that: 
“In fact, the state does have significant levels of control”. 
For example, funding mechanisms are used as a means of driving the implementation of 
government policy.  
At a meeting of educational leaders convened to encourage schools to become 
academies, a representative of the Regional Schools Agency (RSA) observed that “the 
government delivers its education policies through regulation and funding rules.” 
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The creation of inspection regimes is required because boards have greater autonomy and 
professionalism, which lessens the government’s ability to directly control organisations. 
Inspections may result in publication of results, ‘league tables, and ‘naming and shaming’. 
Nonprofit organisations recognise the legitimacy of political environment and regulatory 
regimes; and regulatory compliance is upmost in the minds of both the board members and the 
executive. However, this does not necessarily mean that practitioners agree or support the 
underlying politics. Boards are populated by people who have a world view dominated by a 
public service ethos, even though they may have roles in the for-profit sector which require a 
different view. This public service ethos affects the decisions made by the board and the way 
in which they function.  
This world view affects the decisions made by the board convened for the purpose of 
reviewing the organisation’s strategy, a member said: “I understand how we provide 
services which are beyond our core business, but we need to be clear why we provide 
them”. In the ensuing discussion it was agreed that the organisation provides them 
because it fits within the board’s and executive view of ‘wider social purpose’.  
6.3.2 Board Structures and Processes 
The board structures and process conceptual grouping identifies issues relating to the: 
interactions of structures and processes. The concept is discussed in terms of: (i) nonprofit 
board structure and action; (ii) trust, (iii) decision making.; and (iv) the SMT as a sector norm.   
(i) Structure and Action 
The composition of nonprofit boards range from comprising only non-executive trustees 
through to having a majority of trustees plus executive directors.  
In an unstructured interview with a person who is both an NHS non-executive director 
(NED) and a non-executive director of a charity in the care sector; the interviewee 
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observed that the “board roles of directors were dependent upon formal structure”, ie 
the number of non-executives and executives. He explained the point in more detail. 
“NHS Foundation Trusts (FT) boards are unitary boards, where executives are party to 
the decisions alongside NEDs. This requires a well-developed sense of the respective 
roles and the ability to switch seamlessly from challenging and supporting them to 
simultaneously performance managing them. In the charity sector, where, generally 
speaking, executives report to, rather than being part of the board, the relationships are 
different in subtle but important ways.” 
Boards conduct most of their business in meetings on the basis of papers prepared by the SMT, 
and these meetings have their own protocols, formality, rituals, management, and (formal and 
informal) codes of conducts. While the board structure is defined, its operation depends upon 
the actions and interactions of its directors and supporting staff.  
The participatory observations of board and committee meetings determined that: 
meetings are properly planned, and the agenda items reflect those items which are 
important; the chair seeks always to ensure the full and relevant participation of 
members, while at the same time, attempting to ensure that the meeting progresses 
according to the planned time; there is an appropriate level of, and response to, 
challenge; and decisions are made. 
The observations of meetings also concluded that: there was a wide range of 
participation in meetings by board members; and that some members were clearly 
dominant in the sense that their views were generally well regarded. 
 
(ii) Trust 
Board processes are reliant upon trust between its own members and the executive to properly 
fulfil the board’s responsibilities.  
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At a confidential board session, the board entrusted a small task and finish group to 
conduct sensitive negotiations on behalf of the board. 
The board trusts its committees and ad hoc groups to carry out detail work and make proposals; 
but retains the power of formal ratification of the proposals made by the groups. 
The board delegated a task and finish group to formulate a major development bid, 
trusting the experience of the non-executives and the executives on the group. Although 
the bid was subject to formal ratification by the board, the bid deadlines effectively 
gave the task and finish the power of decision. 
The board must also put its trust in executive colleagues and information provided by them. 
(This trust however does not extend to uncritical acceptance). 
In an unstructured interview, an ex-chairman stated that “in practice there was no option 
but to trust the chief executive and executive directors”.  
(iii) Decisions 
Both strategic and operational decisions are made by the board on the basis of formal papers 
presented to it at its meetings, and the political context as assessed by the board. However, 
decision making is not a single event, rather the board decision is the final part of a process. 
This process always includes the SMT and may also involve the board during the development 
of the recommended decision. 
A discussion paper concerning strategy was presented to the board by the chief 
executive to provide an opportunity for formal board input to the strategic planning 
process. 
(iv) The SMT as a Sector Norm 
The legally constituted board is responsible for the organisation, but the existence of the SMT 
is a sector norm. It which has power over the organisation and has great influence on the board, 
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thereby effectively operating as a part of the board with power but no legal responsibility, 
which can be argued to represent a de facto dual board. 
6.3.3 Challenge, Oversight and Assurance 
A challenge is a: call to someone to participate in a competitive situation or fight to decide who 
is superior in terms of ability or strength; or to prove or justify; or to dispute the truth or validity 
of something.  
Oversight is achieved through challenge and assurance. Challenge is accepted as a key function 
in corporate governance generally. The concept is expressed as an interactive process and as a 
potential, takings place in various arenas and forms.  
The meaning of ‘challenge’ was discussed in an unstructured interview with a chief 
executive, who said that it should be seen as: “querying, clarifying, seeking justification, 
and arguing.” 
At a MAT conference, the regional lead for educational contractors argued the vital 
importance of the challenge role of governors through consistently following up on 
priorities and promises of the executive. This meant consistency in following up on 
priorities and promises, openness in discussing significant issues, the quality of 
engagement and responding to feedback.  
Challenge is an interaction which is associated with power relationships. Thus, while non-
executives challenge executives, there is less ‘challenge back’ from the executive, and no 
executive to executive challenge.  
At an unstructured interview with a number of chief executives, executives, and 
chairmen, it was agreed that the board must challenge. One chief executive 
differentiated challenge to that between: non-executive to executive; executive to 
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executive; and non-executive to non-executive. In discussion it was noted that non-
executive to executive challenge is normal practice.  
Board member understanding of issues is often dependent on information from the executive 
in the first instance, and then interpreted by board members using their experience and 
professional backgrounds. Board challenge often relies upon board members with the specific 
expertise when querying technical papers. This challenge is often isolated and uncoordinated 
and of little effect. 
At a board meeting a pattern of isolated challenge was observed on a financial matter 
when one non-executive challenged the finance director on a matter, without support 
from the other non-executives. 
Providing support to the executive and exhibiting critical challenge are not mutually exclusive. 
The board and its chair can act as a ‘critical friend’ to the executive. 
In an unstructured interview, a chief executive saw the relationship of the chair with 
the chief executive as sharing a common objective and acting as a ‘critical friend’ who 
provides continued support and encouragement.  
Assurance is obtained from both internal and external sources such as the auditors. 
The audit committee received a report from the company secretary which provided 
assurance that the terms and conditions of the chief executive and executive comply 
with all the principles of the NHF Governance Code and expectations.  
6.3.4 Relationships 
The relationships between board members, the executive and the organisation, are important 
drivers for the ways in which boards operate. The concept describes these relationships in terms 
of: social groups; personal relationships; and the key relationship between the chair and the 
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chief executive; For the nonprofit sector, the issues of identification and socialisation; with the 
organisation and with stakeholders are salient. 
Social groups exist and as part of them, ingroups and outgroups on the board. This is indicated 
by the different levels of participation of members at board, committee and task and finish 
groups, and the weight attributed by the meeting to the contribution of individuals. 
While the relationships between the chief executive, executive directors and board members 
are important, that between the chair and the chief executive is particularly so. The main way 
in which the board oversees the organisation is through oversight of the chief executive by the 
chair.  
In an unstructured interview a chair noted that he had regular meetings with the chief 
executive for reasons which included this purpose; and emphasised the importance of 
a constructive working relationship between the board and the chief executive, 
particularly for good governance and the delivery of results. 
6.3.5 Motivations 
The final concept brings together open codes relating to the motivations of the chair, non-
executive directors, executive directors. The subject of motivation in nonprofits was discussed 
in Section 3.11.3 above, and is now developed here with a focus on: (i) altruistic values; (ii) 
moral duty; (iii) public spirited values; (iv) egoistic purposes; and (v) self-esteem. The 
motivations of the regulator are then discussed in terms of (vi) professionalisation of the board; 
(vii) power; and (viii) both career and moral motivations of the executive. 
(i) Altruistic Values 




A meeting of the board remuneration committee considered board remuneration policy. 
The meeting agreed that remuneration was not a real issue and was not currently 
affecting board member recruitment. The chair of committee noted that “when I first 
joined the board, members were not paid at all.”  
Commitment to social purpose is the key to the recruitment of board members.  
When the board was discussing strategy at a board awayday it was noted that board 
members agreed the organisation’s ‘wider social purpose’. 
(ii) Moral Duty 
Non-executives seem to be driven substantially by moral duty.  
In a meeting of chairs and chief executives it was agreed that “the most important values 
related to social purposes of helping the disadvantaged”, and that “this was common to 
the health, social services and housing sectors”. 
(iii) Public Spirited Values 
There appears to be a link between the reasons why executives are employed in the nonprofit 
sector, and their motivations and beliefs.  
An NHS NED observed in an unstructured interview that “NHS chief executives 
receive well below anything that they could receive in the private sector. NHS trusts 
are very large and complex organisations and probably more difficulty to manage than 
comparably sized companies, but an NHS chief executive who was paid say £350k 
would get well over a million [in the private sector]”.   
It can be argued that this is due principally to the public sector culture and ethos, and public 
attitudes to public sector pay. It seems reasonable to assume that there is some link between 
the intrinsic motivation of executive and their choice to work in the public sector. It seems that 
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this may be brought on through socialisation into sector norms or basis belief (or through some 
predisposition).  
(iv) Egoistic Purposes 
The instrumental motive of personal betterment, that is the use of nonprofit non-executive 
positions to further an individual’s career as an executive by strengthening the CV, is not 
unknown. 
In an unstructured interview, a chairman observed that this [instrumental motive] is 
unusual, but recounted that a board member had been recruited for specific skills, but 
during the recruitment interview had stated that their main aim to gain experience to 
future their career. The chair stated that he “saw no problem with this statement”.  
(v)  Self-esteem 
Self-esteem is an intrinsic motivation, not confined to the nonprofit sector. It seems however 
to be associated in some way with moral duty.  
In an unstructured interview with a vice-chair of nonprofit organisation, (who is also a 
director of a property company, and an ex NHS NED), the interviewee stated that “I have 
always given a lot of my time to charities, it is important to me …[but] I have decided that 
I will not serve on charity boards which do not pay. … It is not for the money, but a 
recognition that my services are valued.”  
 (vi) Professionalisation of the board 
Boards are created with greater autonomy and professionalism through NPM, but this lessens 
the ability of the government to directly control a sector. This thesis conjectures that the 
concomitant professionalisation of boards is viewed as a way of exerting indirect (or cultural) 
control, which is lessened by the felt ‘moral obligation’ of those professionals to sector ‘clients’. 
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The external political emphasis on ‘efficiency’ is a key driver to activity but does not override 
social purpose.  
(vii) Power 
The concept of power has been discussed previously in this thesis. Power and self-interest are 
motivations common to both the nonprofit and for-profit sectors. There are power relationships 
between the board, chief executive, and the executive directors. The power of the chief 
executive over the executive is manifest at every meeting, and the executive directors always 
defer to the chief executive. At each meeting the authority of the chair to direct and obtain 
consensus is clear, but the chief executive, by virtue of having: the ability to control the detail 
of the board papers; the status of position; knowledge; authority over the executive; and 
influence over the chair carries a significant weight on the board. 
(viii) Motivations of the Executive, Including the Sense of Moral Duty 
The executive directors are also motivated by social purpose. 
At a task and finish group, the executive arguing in a principled manner for the delivery 
of high standards of provision to the organisation’s current clients.  
These motivations are tempered by considerations of the political environment and need for 
financial prudence.  
The chief executive reported to the board that the housing minister believed that 
“there is a moral obligation for us to ensure that everyone has access to a decent 
home”, and that this would be reflected in the housing white paper. 
6.4 Open Categories 
The open codes with common characteristics have been grouped into concepts. These concepts 
have been further analysed and these put together as open categories by an iterative approach 
which sought to bring together common characteristics and properties. The categories and sub-
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categories, which are summarised along with their links to their related categories in Table 3 
‘Categories’, are listed below.  
1. Political, regulatory, and ethical environments. 
(i) The regulatory and political environments. 
(ii) Values and culture of the nonprofit sector. 
(iii) Social purpose of the organisation. 
(iv) Identification with the client not the ‘owner’ or regulator. 
(v) Nonprofit sector collective bodies. 
2 The individual director. 
(i) Motivations of the individual to become a board member. 
(ii) Motivations for the board to recruit an individual non-executive as a member. 
(iii) Personal credibility and integrity. 
(iv) Prestige, ritual, formality and respect. 
(v) Socialisation. 
3 Nonprofit board structures. 
 (i) The formally appointed Board. 
 (ii) The senior management team (SMT). 
4 Actions of the board. 
 (i) Social groups and the conduct of business. 
(ii) Challenge. 
(iii) Assurance. 
5 Power and influence. 
(i) Power of the political and regularity environment. 
(ii) Power of, and within, the board. 
(iii) The SMT and the de facto dual board 
These categories and sub-categories are now discussed, with examples from the data. 
6.4.1 The Political, Regulatory and Ethical Environments. 
This category is concerned with the neoliberally based political and regulatory environments 
through which the state seeks to transfer the concepts, ethos, and processes of the for-profit 
sector into the UK nonprofit sector. Accountability and legitimacy are important issues in this 
context. The neoliberal ideology is argued to be in contradiction with the values and ethos of 
the nonprofit sector. 
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This category comprises five sub-categories: (i) the regulatory and political environments; (ii) 
values and culture of the nonprofit sector; (iii) the social purpose of the nonprofit organisation; 
(iv) the identification of the board with the ‘client’ not the ‘owner’ or the regulator; and (v) 
nonprofit sector collective bodies. These are now discussed under sub-category headings. 
 
(i) The Regulatory and Political Environments  
The regulatory environment affects board’s and director’s views and actions, which are 
dependent upon the prevailing political context and historical sources of corporate governance.  
At a meeting to discuss the creation of MATs it was argued that Government sets its 
policies [on education in this instance] based on its ideological stance and the mandate 
which has been obtained through the democratic process. 
The nonprofit boards, being studied in this research, are essentially commissioned directly or 
indirectly by government to deliver the latter’s statutory duties and policies, and so are 
effectively accountable to the regulator and government agency.  
The regulatory environment is substantially based on neoliberal concepts implemented 
ultimately through NPM. This feeds through to the accepted standards of good practice 
implemented in the nonprofit sector. 
The audit committee considered the value for money (VFM) statement, which is a 
regulatory requirement. The committee discussed the outturn of the current year’s VFM 
ambitions, and made suggestions for future ambitions and their strategic priorities. It 
was agreed that, while there was prioritisation in the strategies and operations plans, 




However, the professional groups in the regulated sectors (for example, teachers, medical staff, 
social housing professionals) generally have a different world view and a different tradition, 
with a more community and collective, ‘left’ view. There is therefore a tension between the 
direction of policy and the beliefs of those entrusted to implementing those policies. 
The implementation of neoliberaI principles encourages people from outside the nonprofit 
sector to be non-executives on boards in the sector. This can be argued to be for two main 
purposes of: bringing in people with a for-profit sector outlook to promote nonprofit sector 
efficiency or value for money; and weakening the nonprofit ethos and values which oppose the 
general thrust of neoliberalism. 
(ii) Values and Culture of the Nonprofit Sector.  
The values / ethos of the nonprofit focus on social purpose, which is combined with an 
antipathy to the profit motive. Ethos is a significant issue for the people who choose or are 
chosen to become directors in the nonprofit sector. There is a clear sense of commitment to 
‘public sector’ or charitable values and often an associated antipathy to the for-profit / capitalist 
system / private sector. The values are more than those codified by the Nolan Principles, and 
include the high expectations of the general public for the standards of behaviour expected of 
directors in the nonprofit sector.  
In an unstructured interview, an ex-chief executive observed that there must be a 
commitment to the receivers of the organisation’s services, and to the organisation’s 
social purpose. He stated, that there is a need for commitment to the values of the 
organisation, such as its community focus and the provision of range of services to help 
and support residents. He further identified a tension between ‘social purpose’ and 
‘profit’, but accepted ‘profit’ to be necessary, but argued that it should be viewed as 
‘profit for a purpose’. 
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Individuals who are both executive directors in the for-profit sector and non-executives in the 
nonprofit sector can be assumed to act in accordance with the different ethical bases in these 
two environments. In for-profit organisations, the purpose is increasing shareholder wealth, 
while in the nonprofit it relates to the delivery of social purpose. 
(iii) Social Purpose of the Organisation 
Nonprofit organisations are defined and characterised by having a social purpose rather than 
existing to increase shareholder value. The organisational social purpose drives decision 
making and uses an ethical rationality to deliver that purpose. Resource considerations are 
enablers or constraints rather than being drivers in the delivery of that social purpose. Further, 
there is a sense of collaboration and of community existing between organisations in sub-
sectors populated by organisations with the same social purpose; rather than one of commercial 
competition. 
In a board discussion on support services, which are non-core business, the board 
strongly supported the view that these services should continue to be provided as part 
of the organisation’s ‘wider social purpose’. But they should be provided on the basis 
that there is no cross subsidy from the other areas of the business.  
Board members recognise their legal obligations and accountability to the relevant regulator 
and funding agency, but also feel a moral obligation to ensure that the organisation fulfils its 
social purpose to the people for whom they provide their services. The board thus seeks to 
create a broader sense of accountability than to the funder, although it may struggle to 
implement them (Tacon et al., 2017). 
(iv) Identification with the ‘Client’ Not the ‘Owner’ or Regulator  
Identification is a psychological orientation of the self to something (as a person or group) with 
a resulting feeling of close emotional association. It is a largely unconscious process whereby 
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individuals model their thoughts, feelings, and actions after those attributed to an object that 
has been incorporated as a mental image (Merriam-Webster.com). It is thus closely associated 
with group membership, and is an intrinsic part of the socialisation process. The individual 
board member identifies with the board, the organisation, its social purpose, and the sector 
orthodoxy. This identification means that boards generally do not act for, nor identify with, the 
regulator and the government world view. That is, board members are socialised into the public 
service, collectivist ethic as opposed to neoliberal individualism. 
The creation of boards: in the style of the for-profit sector; recruitment of members of the for-
profit elites into nonprofit governance; and the ‘imposition’ of the accepted ways of doing 
things (good corporate governance practice), can all be argued to be an attempt of the political 
orthodoxy to create an identification in the nonprofit sector with the neoliberal orthodoxy (that 
is, through emotional control).  
There is however, a substantial degree of self-selection by aspirants to be nonprofit board 
members. People who already hold pro-civic and pro-democratic attitudes are more likely to 
join organisations in the first place and less likely to leave, and these attitudes are not enhanced 
by the length of their membership (Rainsford and Maloney, 2017; van Ingen and van der Meer, 
2015). The socialisation process leads to identification with the world views of the nonprofit 
sector. This identification acts against the inferred neoliberal purpose of seeking to place for-
profit outsiders onto nonprofit boards, thereby reinforcing opposition to that aim. 
(v) Nonprofit Sector Collective Bodies 
The nonprofit sector as defined in this thesis comprises various ‘sub-sectors’ such as the NHS, 
state education, social housing, and charities. These sub-sectors operate within their own quasi-
markets created through NPM. Each sub-sector has its ‘trade association’ or associations 
founded and funded by organisations which operate in a specific sub-sector. Nonprofit 
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organisations act through their various sector-specific representative (trade) organisations to 
influence government directly by lobbying and indirectly through attempting to change public 
attitudes. The aim of these activities is principally to promote the social purposes of the sector. 
At a conference of practitioners and academics it was argued that there was an erosion 
of the four goals of social housing: security; affordability; need; and quality; and that 
“social housing is politically driven, with its opponents coming from very different 
world views [to us]”. 
6.4.2 The Individual Director  
This thesis argues that it is reasonable to assume that nonprofit non-executive directors choose 
to act in these roles from a mixture of intrinsic motivations. While it is not possible to attribute 
specific motivations to individuals, the analysis suggests that since there is little or no material 
reward, the extrinsic motivation is weak. Further, these motivations will cause the individual 
to seek to join and remain on a board and for the board to appoint and retain the individual. 
Motivation also influences the ways in which directors operate and interact. The individual 
non-executive becomes socialised into the ethos and values of the organisation and sector. This 
socialisation brings with it an identification with the sector, organisation, and clientele; which 
then affects the ways in which they act. 
This category is discussed under the five sub-categories: (i) motivations of the individual to 
become a board member; (ii) motivations for the board to recruit an individual non-executive 
as a member; (iii) personal credibility and integrity; (iv) prestige, ritual, formality and respect; 
and (v) socialisation.  
(i) Motivations of the Individual to Become a Board Member  
The analysis provides a view on the importance of intrinsic motivation for directors to operate 
in the sector. This motivation seems to dominate, but does not exclude other forms of 
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motivation. Motivations of non-executive directors include: moral duty, personal interest eg 
helping own children, self-satisfaction; self-esteem; career advancement; and the feeling of 
‘making a difference’. These motivations include the psychological dispositions of altruism, 
empathy and sense of duty. 
In a meeting of chairs and chief executives it was agreed that “the most important values 
related to social purposes of helping the disadvantaged”, and that “this was common to 
the health, social services and housing sectors.” 
The desire to make a difference to the client can only be achieved through direct power, 
influence and being a provider of advice. If this cannot be realised, then the director may suffer 
frustration and disenchantment. 
(ii) Motivations for the Board to Recruit an Individual Non-Executive 
Board recruitment processes vary across the nonprofit sector, ranging from total board control 
of selection in charities and social housing, elections and external nominations in education, 
and sector wide standard processes in the NHS. However, in all these processes the board itself 
has the major role, and is only part of the organisation which recruits itself. In that sense it is 
self-perpetuating. It therefore defines its own plans and criteria for selection, which may be 
strongly influenced by the regulator along with professional and sector norms and standards. 
Board recruitment and retention processes include the definition of a mix of skills required of 
the non-executives on the board, both now and in the future, as a part of succession planning. 
Individuals are recruited onto the board according to whether they: meet the skill criteria; 
demonstrate skills and knowledge, particularly being able to bring the ‘out-of–sector’ view; are 
able to demonstrate an affinity or empathy with the social purpose, values and ethos of the 
organisation; are able to convince the recruitment panel feel that their ‘face fits’ with the 
existing board; and are able to demonstrate personal credibility and integrity. 
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The nominations committee considered a report on board succession planning which 
included: the terms and end dates for each director to ensure that there was a regular 
turnover of non-executives; the composition of the board committees; and the board 
skills profile against need. 
(iii) Personal Credibility and Integrity  
Credibility and integrity are the bedrock upon which the board rests. Board members must feel 
able to trust each other in all their dealings. They must also be able to trust the executive and 
feel that they are acting in the best interests of the organisation and its clients. This trust can 
then strengthen the ability of the executive to creatively support the board without feeling 
threatened themselves. The board must also feel able to place their trust in their fellow members 
for similar reasons. 
In an unstructured interview, a chief executive stated that the board expects the chief 
executive to have challenged board papers at SMT before they are brought to the board. 
Notwithstanding that, ‘very draft’ papers have been presented to the audit committee to 
obtain members comments as part of the drafting process. This enhances executive 
credibility by demonstrating engagement and openness. 
(iv) Prestige, Ritual, Formality and Respect 
Power from prestige is displayed through the protocols, formalities and rituals of the board 
meetings, and in particular, the respect required to be shown to the board and its members. 
There is also a general respect for people who are directors of nonprofit organisations, which 
may be demonstrated through ways in which members of an organisation act towards its 
directors.  
Board meetings in the NHS are held in public (but are not public meetings) and held 




Socialisation into the board as a social group, the organisation, and sector ways of doing things 
is an important aspect of group member membership. It is a way in which the individual comes 
to accept or strengthen their agreement with the ‘charitable, public service’ world view, ethos 
and values of the sector on the one hand, while also accepting the processes and structures of 
the board derived from the for-profit sector. Socialisation comes about through a number of 
processes, and is a prerequisite to becoming a member of the ingroup. The regulatory and wider 
value regime builds in cultural acceptance of good corporate governance practice (derived 
ultimately from the private sector). 
6.4.3 Nonprofit Board Structures 
The key formal and informal structures of the nonprofit board are now considered under the 
headings: (i) the formally appointed board; and (ii) the senior management team. 
(i) The Formally Appointed Board 
The structures of nonprofit board are determined in the public sector through statute and 
regulation, for example, in the NHS and state education. In other parts of the nonprofit sector 
boards determine their own structure, subject to regulatory frameworks and sector norms. 
Despite these differences the formal structures of nonprofit boards generally comprise either 
totally, or at least a majority of non-executive members. In all cases the chair is a non-executive. 
The chief executive is either an ex-officio board member or just attends the board. The boards 
appoint board committees to discharge many of its duties, which are chaired by a non-executive 
director. In many cases ‘task and finish groups’ (that is, ad hoc working parties) are created for 
specific purposes comprising both non-executive and executive directors. These ad hoc groups 
are also generally chaired by a non-executive director. If executives are not formally appointed 
board directors, they will in any event be present as non-voting attendees.  
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The board is formally responsible and accountable to the regulator. The key roles of the board 
are formally to: define and maintain the social purpose of the organisation; provide the public 
face of the organisation; provide (at least symbolic) leadership; provide strategic direction; 
make key decisions; hold the executive to account (obtain assurance); and provide support to 
the executive. The formally appointed board governs, and the management manages as directed 
by the board. 
(ii) The Senior Management Team (SMT) 
The management of the organisation is intertwined with the board as described above. The 
chief executive always attends the board and may be ex-officio a director and other executive 
directors may be board members, but generally just attend the board. 
The executive directors, however, operate as a team (SMT) under the control of the chief 
executive, who determines its structure and its actions. The key roles of the SMT are to: manage 
the organisation as directed by the board; and support the board in its roles. 
6.4.4 Actions of the Board 
The ways in which the board conducts its affairs within the formality of its structures is now 
considered. The key issues which define this are: (i) social groups and the conduct of business; 
(ii) challenge; and (iii) assurance. The decision-making actions of the board are discussed in 
the sections concerning power. 
(i) Social Groups and the Conduct of Business 
While the board conducts most of its business at formal board and board committee meetings, 
it comprises various formal and informal groupings. The groups are the board, board 
committees, and the SMT. The informal groups comprise ingroups and outgroups of both 
executive and non-executive directors. These informal groups are bound together by personal 
friendships and the like.  
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The SMT generally acts as a cohesive group at a board and committee meetings. Executives 
support the chief executive and their fellow executive directors, even though there may be 
tensions between its ingroup and outgroups. Executive directors generally speak only to 
summarise and support board papers for which they are the author or responsible official, or 
when called upon to do so; as opposed to non-executives who are expected to contribute widely. 
The chief executive, through the SMT, largely controls the: executive directors; flow of 
information to the board; and the decision structures. 
(ii) Challenge 
Challenge is one of the generally accepted core functions of the board, and arising naturally 
from the agency theoretical view of the board which acts in the interests of shareholders and 
holds the executive to account.  
Non-executive board members challenge the formal papers presented to them by the executive 
(with the authority of the chief executive). The nature of the challenge to the executive ranges 
from agreement, through seeking clarification, to disputing recommendations (if any) made in 
those papers. The form of challenge for nonprofits is modified by the context and culture within 
which it operates. The participatory observations provided evidence that:  
a) there may be a more ‘charitable view’ taken by non-executives which lessens the force 
and effectiveness of challenge;  
b) the common agreement of social purpose and individual sense of moral duty between 
executives and non-executive provides a more supportive environment, and favours a 
stewardship theoretic approach;  
c) the structure of the de facto dual board where the SMT act as a coherent and support 
group at board meetings effectively diminishes the force and effectiveness of board 
challenge by non-executives; and 
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d) executives, even if they are formal board members, do not always act as full members, 
that is they do not challenge their executive colleagues.  
The concept of challenge is developed in this thesis to that of an interactive ‘challenge and 
response’. The interactive challenge process may be used: positively to strengthen or validate 
any arguments; negatively by the executive to defend themselves or their proposals; or simply 
to resist any comments. Executive resistance to challenge can be argued to be: ‘valid’, where 
it forces the non-executives to define their challenge more clearly; ‘negative’, where it is simply 
resisted or ignored; or ‘passive’, that is simply acquiescing to non-executive challenge.  
‘Challenge-back’ by the chief executive and executive is an important component of challenge, 
but is not often used because executive directors are not full board members, and / or do not 
wish to be seen as actively or passively resistant to the will of the board. Moreover; the 
identification of the non-executive directors with social purpose which is being delivered 
through the executive; and the presentation of ‘a united front’ against the regulator, diminishes 
the force of board challenge.  
The chair may be challenged by non-executive directors. However, the chair is accepted 
generally as the dominant person, so the instinct of the board may be to support the chair rather 
than be too critical. This position of dominant person can also mute challenge of ideas put 
forward or supported by the chair.  
The recommendations made in board papers are generally agreed after discussion. However, 
this thesis argues that: the possibility of board challenge; and the prospect of rejection of an 
executive produced board paper, provides a mechanism which helps to ensure that papers 





The board must be assured that the organisation is acting appropriately in pursuit of its goals. 
It obtains these assurances on the appropriateness of management actions, internal controls and 
risk management from a variety of sources, such as: internal and external auditors; regulators; 
other independent sources; and most importantly, the management (chief executive and SMT). 
This assurance is one of the products of challenge. 
6.4.5 Power and Influence 
The concept of power is used in this section to describe and analyse relationships between the: 
state, organisation; board; SMT; and wider organisation. This section considers: (i) the power 
aspects of the political and regulatory environment and the effect on nonprofit corporate 
governance; (ii) the power of the board and power within the board; and (iii) the power aspects 
of the SMT which creates a de facto dual board. 
(i) Power Aspects of the Political and Regularity Environment 
Power in the political and regularity environment exists through the: acceptance of social norms 
and ways of thinking; accepted forms of legitimacy; political control of state apparatus; 
bureaucratic power of the delivery of political policy; legal authority; and governmental 
regulators and funding agencies (Flyvbjerg, 1998). The latter formally determine, through 
regulation and funding, the activities and governance structures and practices of the nonprofit 
organisations.   
There is the problem of what might be termed political trust, and particularly the perception 
among politicians that the civil service is unwilling to enact policies it may disagree with. Lack 
of political trust can be corrosive, particularly if it results in toxic relationships between 
ministers and the officials responsible for enacting their policies (Wright, 2017). This 
resistance is manifest throughout the whole system. 
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(ii) Power of, and Within, the Board 
The realities of boardroom power and influence affect critically the board, senior management 
and beyond. The analysis of board processes through the lens of power and politics provides 
the means to examine the micro-processes through studies of, for example, trusting, influencing 
and problem solving. Understanding power and influence requires the development of a 
dynamic and holistic view of the conduct and behaviour of a board. It is these interactions and 
behavioural processes among and between actors in and around the boardroom rather than on 
the performance of boards which is the focus of a behavioural theory of boards (Van Ees et al., 
2009). 
The relationships between the chief executive, executives, non-executives and chair represent 
important elements of this view of board dynamics. The chair occupies the most powerful 
formal role in the board, and their style, energy and personality represent important factors in 
the dynamic of the board. Challenge by the board, and the ‘threat of board challenge’ are means 
by which the board exercises its authority and power. Regardless of whether the chief executive 
is an ex-officio member of the board or simply attends, that person plays a pivotal and powerful 
role in board deliberations.  
 
(iii) The SMT and the de facto Dual Board  
The board expects the executive to be professional and well organised. The ways in which the 
executive organise themselves (that is, as organised by the chief executive) is very much 
determined by sector norms. The SMT as a group exerts power through the control of: the 
organisation; and information provided to the board; interpretation of information based on 
detailed knowledge and their world view. The SMT also influences the board by demonstrating 
its credibility and integrity and through the position of chief executive. The chief executive acts 
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in the dual (and potentially conflicting) roles of board member and leader of the SMT, and also 
controls the SMT, and through its members, the organisation. 
6.5 Relationships between Categories and Sub-Categories 
The relationships between sub-categories are now reviewed in more detail, with examples from 
the data to yield suggested propositions. The relationships describe the effects which the: 
(i) political, regulatory and ethical environments have on - the individual director, the 
structures of nonprofit boards, the actions of the nonprofit board, and on the concepts 
of power and influence; 
(ii) individual director has on - the political regulatory and ethical environments, nonprofit 
board structures, actions of the board, and power and influence; 
(iii) nonprofit board structures have on - the individual director; actions of the board, and 
power and influence; 
(iv) actions of the board have on the – political, regulatory and ethical environments, 
individual director, and the nonprofit board structures, and power and influence; and 
(v) effects of power and influence have on - the political, regulatory and ethical 
environments, the individual director, the nonprofit board structures, and the actions of 
the board.  
 
6.5.1 The Effects of the Political, Regulatory and Ethical Environments  
This section discusses the effects the political and ethical environments have on the (i) 
individual director, (ii) structures of nonprofit boards, (iii) actions of nonprofit boards, and (iv) 
concepts of power and influence 
(i) The Individual Director 
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The political and regulatory environment is of great importance in the nonprofit sector, since 
it creates the governance structures within which the individual operates as a director. The 
ethical environment influences the individual to become a board member through the creation 
of board structures, based on professionalisation. This provides a forum for the individual to 
express their motivations; and defines affects the culture within which non-executives operate.  
Professionalisation of the board builds in a cultural acceptance of ‘good corporate governance’ 
practices and provides the opportunity for people with professional skills to be engaged in the 
sector for their own intrinsic motivations. The concept of the professional board, derived from 
the for-profit sector, can however stand culturally in opposition to the traditional view of as a 
director being a representative on a democratically constructed board. 
The motivations of individual directors were not found to be related to the state’s intention that 
boards and board members are there to deliver the state’s responsibilities efficiently. Thus, the 
motivation of the individual to become a board member may be odds with the requirements of 
the neoliberal environment. Further, the regulatory requirements and good practice guides 
encourage a board to appoint people on a skills basis, but the selection processes for board 
members also take into account the appointee’s: empathy with the social aims of the 
organisation; ‘fit’ with the remainder of the board; personal credibility and integrity; and 
embracing the public service ethos. 
 
(ii) The Structures of Nonprofit Boards 
The environments directly affect the formal and informal structures of the nonprofit board; 
with formal structures determined by: legislation; regulation; codes of practice; and sector 




The formal structures of the board are provided by the statutory and regulatory frameworks in 
areas of the public and quasi-public sectors. The charity sub-sector has discretion but rests on 
charity law. Thus, these frameworks are based on: specific legislation relating to areas; charity 
law; the specific sector codes built on this foundation; and the core duties of directors under 
the Companies Act 2006. Under this legislation, the company, as a legal entity, is subject to 
statutory controls, and its directors are responsible for ensuring that the company complies with 
those statutory controls. The Companies Act 2006 also sets out the statutory duties of directors: 
to act within the powers set out in the memorandum; promote the success of the company; 
exercise independent judgement; exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence; avoid conflicts 
of interest; not accept benefits from third parties; and to declare interests in any proposed 
transactions or arrangements. 
Statute is reinforced or developed through specific guidance relevant to different parts of the 
nonprofit sector. For instance the directors (trustees) of exempt charities must comply with 
CC23 of the Charity Commission regulations which require them to: act reasonably and 
prudently in all matters; always act in the best interests of the charity; apply the income and 
property of the charity only for the purposes set out in the governing document; protect all the 
property of the charity; invest the funds of the charity only in accordance with the powers of 
investment; and regularly review the effectiveness of the charity. In the nonprofit, social 
housing area for example, organisations generally adopt the NHF Code of Conduct and Code 
of Governance. The NHF Code of Conduct describes the generic responsibilities of boards 
regarding probity, loyalty and conflicts of interest, remuneration of directors, personal benefit, 
prevention of bribery and corruption, and respect (boardroom behaviours). The NHF Code of 
Governance describes the purposes of the board as: determining strategy directing, control, 
scrutinising and evaluating the organisation’s affairs; and delegating operational management 
to the organisation’s staff. It provides that all members of the board share the same legal status 
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and have equal responsibility for decision making. The regulator (HCA) seeks to protect the 
state’s investment in social housing through regulatory assessment. The HCA does this by 
seeking assurance that boards understand: the links between their non-social and social housing 
activities; and potential risks posed by non-social housing activities to the social housing assets. 
The political, regulatory and ethical environment thus provides a strong framework for the 
standards of board behaviour and probity. While the behaviours and processes are based on 
sector values, culture and the aims of achieving social purpose, they must fit into this regulatory 
framework. There can be a tension between these because the boards are populated by members 
who identify with the sector rather than the regulator, but compliance with regulation is of 
paramount importance to them. 
Many executive directors in the nonprofit sector are not directors under the legal definitions, 
but attend the board as members of the SMT. These directors, as well as being in operational 
control of the organisation, are imbued with the values, moral and social purposes of the sector 
within which they work. They are totally socialised into identifying with the sector, but must 
conform to regularity requirements for personal career objectives. Since they are not legally 
directors they have not legally responsibility for the organisation.  
(iii) Actions of Nonprofit Boards 
Regulatory authorities require boards to demonstrate their competence and conformity with the 
principles laid out in various guidance documents. Thus, board business such as the 
determining strategy, directing, controlling, scrutinising and evaluating the organisation’s 
affairs, is conducted formally on the basis of papers prepared by the executive. There is 
discussion of these papers, based on challenge, as the expected core board function, and by 
seeking assurance from a range of internal and external sources.  
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The usual sector structure of formal board and the SMT means that group interactions dominate, 
with great power resting with the chief executive and SMT.  
The ways in which the executive directors (whether or not they are formal members of the 
board) acted as a group was discussed in a group session. Comments of board and SMT 
members are reproduced below. 
An NHS NED (and governance consultant in the social housing sector) observed that 
in her experience the executive directors always supported the chief executive and 
never challenged each other at board meetings; stating that “everything was always 
‘sown up’ before the meeting”.  
A former NHS NED (and chair of another nonprofit organisation) said that his 
experience was similar, but that the executive directors, after much effort by the chair 
of that NHS trust, acted more like ‘full directors’, but never acted fully in the role. 
Another non-executive director, and ex NHS trust chair, concurred with the original 
point about executive members on the board not acting as ‘full directors’. She stated 
that her view that this may be because NHS boards are held in public.  
The analysis of the data demonstrated that common values and ethos dominated in the actual 
conduct of board business through the focus on social purpose. This culture means that 
challenge is heavily moderated by the context of sector ‘charitability’, ‘public service’ culture, 
and the observation that ‘challenge is challenging’. Further, challenge is moderated by the 
context that the non-executives who challenge, share the social purpose with the executive who 
are being challenged.  
The external challenge of a regulatory inspection brings the formal board and SMT together in 
a united front, identifying with the organisation. The state structure arising from the neoliberal 
framework requires the existence of a regulatory body, which operates the regulatory regime. 
The nonprofit organisations operating within this regime see themselves as subject to the power 
Page 186 
 
of the regulator, which is a major outside constraint on their freedom of action and as a key 
external threat. They thus pay great attention to regulatory compliance. This unites the formal 
board and the SMT in defining their actions which demonstrate compliance. That is, the 
organisation complies formally to the extent of being able to withstand an inspection by the 
regulator. The board thus seeks to carry out its business of delivering social purpose despite 
the regularity constraints placed upon it. This provides a context for the concept of non-
executive directors and the SMT being ‘critical friends’.  
(iv) Power and Influence 
The power of the state and regulator dominates the nonprofit sector through: legal frameworks; 
funding; and regularity regimes. However, the formal power structure does not necessarily 
correspond to the actual power structures within the organisation and the board. In particular, 
the legal frameworks focus on the powers and responsibilities of the directors of the 
organisation. The chief executive and SMT who may not sit within this framework are assumed 
to be controlled by the board, but the analysis of the data produces questions about the power 
relationships between the board, and the SMT as a dominant coalition (Cyert and March, 1963; 
Desai, 2016; Gavetti et al., 2012; March,  1962; Pearce, 1995).  
The values of the nonprofit sector are generally opposed to those on which the political and 
regularity environment is based. This is reflected in many cases by the collectivist, anti-
competitive ethos within the sector, and an over-riding sense of community of purpose within 
the various nonprofit sub-sectors. Thus, the formal structure of quasi-markets is negated since 
members of those ‘markets’ often do not wish to compete. This world view is generally shared 
between the non-executive and executive directors. This over-riding sense of social purpose 
provides the basis for the sector to seek to affect this environment through political action and 
influencing the regulator, and thereby counteract the prevailing state view. This process is 
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supported by the board through a process of identification with the sector and organisation 
against the political and regulatory stakeholders (that is, the state and regulator).   
6.5.2 The Effects of the Individual Director 
Individual directors are not passive agents carrying out the duties ascribed to them. Their 
motivations and qualities, the motivations of the board to recruit them, and their socialisation 
affect what they do and the ways in which they do it. These elements are considered as the 
effects that the individual director has on the sub-categories of the (i) political, regulatory and 
ethical environments; (ii) nonprofit board structures; (iii) actions of the board; and (iv) concepts 
of power and influence. 
(i) Political, Regulatory and Ethical Environment 
Individual directors affect the political, regularity and ethical environments by their individual 
and collective responses and interactions. As individuals they are generally motivated to 
become non-executive directors through moral duty or to achieve social purpose. This means 
boards, as groups of similarly motivated people, along with ‘trade’ bodies promote the ‘anti-
neoliberal’ view through ‘opposing while conforming’. The ethical environment is generally 
reinforced through identification and socialisation. 
The analysis indicates that the intrinsic motivations of an individual to become a board member 
(non-executive director) exist before the person enters the sector (although the analysis of the 
data did not seek to provide a specific identification of these motivations). The creation of the 
idea of the professional board promotes the idea that professionals in the nonprofit and for-
profit sectors can use their skills for a social purpose. The concept also plays down the idea of 
the representative board, thereby supporting the culture change. It is possible to argue that the 
motivation of ‘the state’ is to change the nonprofit sector to conform to the neoliberal 
worldview rather than a collectivist ethos. This appears to reflect the tension between 
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‘efficiency’ and ‘social purpose’ motivations. The ‘efficiency’ aspect is supported by 
regulatory authority and the ‘social purpose’ through socialisation and identification processes. 
The individual director has multiple and potentially conflicting identities. One of the identities 
is that of a nonprofit director, which means that the person acts according to a set of values and 
norms associated with the nonprofit sector. Other identities may, for example, derive from the 
for-profit sector, such as that of the professional, manager, or executive director; or as an 
executive within a different nonprofit organisation. The nonprofit non-executive director 
identity is developed or reinforced through socialisation processes leading to identification with 
the social purpose of the organisation and of the position of the ‘client’.  
(ii) Board Structures 
The individual director affects the formal and informal board structures through their 
motivations and experiences. While formal structures are defined in law, regulation, and sector 
guidance based on these; the board itself has the freedom to define its own specific structures 
within those frameworks. These formal board structures comprise committees, sub-committees, 
ad hoc working groups and other specific arrangements. These structures are influenced by the: 
background, experience and views of board members and the executive; and the values and 
culture of the sector. The SMT is heavily influenced by sector cultures and norms since this is 
the environment into which executive directors have been socialised, which in turn was often 
a necessary condition for career advancement. Similarly, the board recruits its own members, 
according to the motivations of existing members and the skills and attributes required by the 
board. Those requirements often include the desire to recruit professionals with the skills and 





(iii) Actions of the Board 
The board, although a social group, comprises individuals. The individual director, through 
interaction with fellow non-executives and the executive affects the actions of the board. These 
interactions are grounded in the: professional and social skills, experience, and motivations of 
the individual; and the group dynamic of the board itself. 
The motivation, a sense of moral duty for example, to become a board member in the first 
instance can affect how the member interacts with social groups on the board. This thereby 
affects such things as decision making and challenge. The board may often recruit a new 
member on the bases of credibility, skills and motivation, thus strengthening the group 
motivation. The core board functions of challenge, seeking assurance, and decision making are 
strongly influenced by the individual and group motivations.  
(iv) Power and Influence 
The individual director affects the structure and action of power and influence: through 
personal skills and connections; motivations; as part of the board as a group; into the 
organisation; and externally out to sector and the political and regulatory environments. 
Individual directors are recruited, in part, because of their personal skills, experience and wider 
connections. The data indicated that the board, through its recruitment practices, seeks to 
demonstrate compliance to the regulator in term of having a skilled and professional 
membership.  
As part of a recruitment process, an individual director was found to be motivated to ‘make a 
difference’ to the clients of the relevant service. There were however no cases which supported 
the view that the director was motivated to be a nonprofit board member to influence 
government or a regulator, or to control the executive in an organisation. 
The board, as a group, seeks to enhance its power and authority by recruiting people with 
relevant skills and experience both to help it deliver its social purpose and to challenge the 
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SMT. The power of the board is evidenced through the respect and formality shown to it by 
the SMT. However, the SMT itself is a powerful group which controls the organisation and 
works closely with the board to help it shape strategy. The existence and power of the SMT is 
an accepted norm within the nonprofit sector. 
The individual director may also have the skills and connections to influence the: sector; the 
regulator; or the political establishment directly. 
6.5.3 The Effects of NonProfit Board Structures 
This section discusses the effects of nonprofit board structures on the: (i) individual director; 
(ii) actions of the board, and (iii) concepts of power and influence. 
(i) Individual Director 
The formal and informal structures of the board provide the theatre and framework for the 
actors to inhabit (Goffman, 1959). The formal board structures can provide a theatre of 
formality and respect in which people can act out their motivations ranging from self-esteem 
to altruism, and act as the focal point of the acts for the informal processes of socialisation to 
common values of the board and organisation.  
(ii) Actions of the Board 
The board operates within its formal structures, and its actions and itsaccountability must be 
transparently demonstrable through these formal mechanisms. Business is conducted at board 
meetings, board committees or ad hoc working groups with terms of reference determined by 
the board.  
The SMT, as a structure, heavily influences the conduct of business through: involvement in 
agenda setting; information provision; a source of assurance; and providing advice and 
argument at the board. Moreover, SMT members are not simply passive recipients of board 
challenge. They may respond in a wide range of ways which include: passive acceptance and 
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agreement of the points made by the board; engaging in robust, but positive debate with the 
board and challenging back; resisting challenges in a range of different ways.  
(iii) Power and Influence 
The board is responsible and accountable for the organisation; and has legitimacy through its 
legal structures to achieve this. Governance structures dictate the conduct of business and shape 
the theatre for the existence of social groups on and around the board. In particular, the 
structures provide the context within which board functions of challenge, seeking assurance 
and decision making operate. The governance structures thus form the basis for creating and 
using power and influence: (a) by interacting with the CEO and the SMT and within the 
organisation, through the SMT; externally, (b) by direct interaction with stakeholders, 
including regulators; and (c) collectively through trade organisations. 
(a) Internal Interactions with the CEO, SMT, and The Organisation 
The board provides the strategic direction for the organisation and directs the SMT to deliver 
its decisions in the organisation. It is also advised, assisted, and influenced by the SMT when 
making decisions. The SMT thus represents a major non-statutory but formal component of the 
board with its power position as chief advisor and influencer to the board. The board retains its 
ultimate power of decision along with, the sanction of power to dismiss the chief executive. 
The SMT operates with a similar degree of formality and ritual as the board, although in private, 
with no non-executives present at its meetings. It may however request assistance from the 
board in the form of non-executive skills, which the SMT does not possess. In any case the 
SMT ensures its underlying power by promoting and supporting the socialisation of all board 
members into the world views of the sector.  
(b) Direct Interactions With Stakeholders 
While the board has the formal power to interact with the organisation’s stakeholders; these 
interactions are however generally carried out by and through the SMT and the chief executive. 
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The chief executive is then seen by stakeholders as the representative of the organisation, while 
the chair of the board is the ‘public face’ of the board. These external perceptions vary 
according to the dynamic of the individual board. 
(c) Collective Power Through Trade Organisations 
Formally appointed boards can act individually, but mainly do so collectively through sector 
organisations, to resist or change the political and regulatory environment. While the SMT does 
not have the legal authority of the board, it is the main driver of these collectives for the same 
reasons that it holds its power on individual boards. This process is rooted in the world view 
and social purpose of that collective.  
6.5.4 The Effects of the Actions of the Board  
This section discusses the effects of the actions of the board have on the: (i) political, regularity 
and ethical environments; (ii) individual director; (iii) nonprofit board structures; and (iv) 
concepts of power and influence. 
(i) Political and Ethical Environment 
Individual nonprofit organisations are generally too small to affect the political and ethical 
environments directly. However, they can have an effect on government and regulatory bodies 
through combining their views through their ‘trade organisations’ (for example, the NHF for 
social housing providers and NHS Confederation). The ethical environment can also be 
affected by scandals (for example, Kids Company), which can lead to changes in both the 
regulatory regime and public expectations of nonprofit governance. 
The analysis of the data shows that the board believes that one of its key functions is the 
definition, maintenance and direction of the delivery of the organisation’s social purpose. This 
focus on social purpose places the client as the main concern, with the funder and regulator as 
constraints. Board challenge is moderated in the context of identification with the client, but 
with over-riding concern for providing evidence to the regulator of effective challenge; as a 
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key component of governance expected by the norms of corporate governance. For example, 
evidence of effective challenge is taken as an indication of effective governance by the HCA; 
and its absence will lead to a downgrading of the organisation in respect of governance. 
However, the research did not seek to determine any link between evidence of challenge and 
its real effectiveness. 
While the board seeks assurance from sources such as internal and external audit, the weight 
of assurance comes from the executive and a high degree of trust in the executive is necessary. 
The sources and extent to which these assurances are received and acted upon are themselves 
indicators of effective governance as judged by the regulatory authority.  
Positive assurances serve to build trust and strengthen identification between the board, the 
SMT and the organisation, and give the regulatory authorities confidence in the governance 
arrangements. The regulator is particularly concerned when issues relate to their regulated 
sector as a whole. These may be evident through the regulatory mechanisms or issues raised 
by sector bodies.  
(ii) Individual Director 
Board actions can affect the individual director by providing a sense of achievement or worth 
through participating in board actions which satisfying a personal sense of moral duty, an 
expression of personal altruism, or other personal ambitions. This sense of satisfaction or 
achievement is based on: 
- personal objectives such as: altruism, empathy for a charitable cause, the opportunity 
for humanitarian leadership, responsible citizenship, and militant volunteering to 
support a cause which is important to them;  
- being a member of a social group, recruited and retained because of skill, experience, 
credibility and integrity; and 
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- self-interests such as personal well-being, personal betterment, personal satisfaction 
arising from enhancing the overall professionalism of the board, the prestige of 
association with an elite organisation, relationship with prominent people, and the 
importance of an organisation within a community. 
(iii) Board Structures 
While the actions of the board are dependent upon the structures in which they are enacted, 
they also affect those structures. The board members determine the governance arrangements 
such as committee structures, in line with accepted practice, legal and regulatory frameworks, 
and their interpretations of organisation’s specific needs. These locally determined structures 
provide the arena for challenge, assurance, and decision making. The SMT also acts to create 
and adapt its own membership and structures to meet the requirements of the board and of the 
organisation itself. In particular, it addresses the issues of the ‘threat’ and actual challenge 
through having an appropriately skilled membership and arrangement for obtaining other 
relevant advice and support. The SMT also works very closely with the sources of external 
assurance required by the board: for example, working with internal and external audit to 
ensure that the auditors present the management in the most favourable light possible.  
(iv) Power and Influence 
Finally, the actions of the board have a significant effect on the relationships of power and 
influence both externally and internally to the board. Power within the board depends on inter-
personal and inter-group dynamics which in turn depend on the formality and the interactions 
of individuals and groups. This applies also to the SMT and its relationship with the board. The 
power dynamic rests on the board’s ability to make decisions, challenge and to seek assurances. 




6.5.5 The Effects of Power and Influence 
This section considers the effects of power and influence on the: (i) political, regulatory and 
ethical environments; (ii) individual director; (iii) nonprofit board structures; and (iv) actions 
of the board. 
(i) Political, Regulatory and Ethical Environments 
Power and influence are important aspects of nonprofit governance. Financial and legislative 
power is seen by the nonprofit sector as a means by which the state imposes a neoliberal outlook 
and thus seeks change in the culture and values of the nonprofit sector. This power is used to 
seek to influence or control the ways in which the nonprofit sector delivers certain of the state’s 
legal responsibilities to its citizens. Boards collectively oppose this power by attempting to 
influence the political and regularity environments through lobbying and campaigning. 
The power of a board ultimately derives from its legal position; but that power is used to further 
its social purpose rather than further the aims of the state whose responsibilities it is delivering.  
Although a legal entity a board comprises contending formal and informal groups, the SMT 
represents a significant group associated with the board (although of no legal standing). It is an 
active agent in the propagation of sector values and culture to the board and organisation with 
a committed purpose of furthering the organisation’s social purpose as well as its own members’ 
executive interests.  
(ii) Individual Director 
The effects of the concepts of power and influence are felt by the individual director in terms 






(a) Power and Influence of ‘Others’ over the Director 
The director is subject to the power of: the regulator; the board; and high expectations of 
selfless behaviour. The political and regularity environment creates the governance structures 
and expected attitudes required of nonprofit board directors. Compliance with these are then 
checked by the regularity regime.  
Directors are recruited by the board, which uses its power to structure itself through the 
recruitment of new board members who meet a skills requirement but also ‘fit’ with the outlook 
of the current board. After members are recruited, a board exercises: ‘positive’ social control 
over its members through mentoring and support into normatively appropriate ways to 
participate in board activities; and ‘negative’ social control through social sanctions against 
group members who violate the collective interest. The power and influence of the board and 
of the sector are thus used to perpetuate the world view and shared rationality of the nonprofit 
sector. Directors are thus required to conform to board and sector norms, protocols rules, by 
doing ‘what is expected of them’ according to the social rules of accepted behaviour in the 
nonprofit sector.  
(b) Power and Influence Exercised by the Director 
Board membership is attractive to individuals since it offers the prospect of the power to be 
able to use skills and experience to ‘do something worthwhile’. This power is expressed 
through the board and the influence which the director has on the workings of the board. 
Membership of a board ingroup is important in influencing the board and thus satisfying the 
ambition to be of value or to contribute to achieving social purpose, or satisifying a sense of 
moral duty. 
(iii) Board Structures 
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The power and influence associated with the political and regularity environments impacts 
directly on boards, since they are required to act within regulation and are publicly judged on 
their efficiency and effectiveness as assessed by the regulator. Further, the regularity regime 
does not only seek to judge boards solely by what their organisation delivers; but also direct 
the ways in which they act through both governance structure and the ways in which the board 
acts within those structures. Good governance is regarded as central to the board’s ability to 
ensure that the nonprofit organisation delivers what is required of it by the funder.  
One way that political and regularity power is delivered is through inspection and the threat of 
inspection. Sector organisations are sensitive to adverse comment or regulatory ‘downgrading’. 
The SMT is particularly sensitive to this since significant degrees of organisational non-
compliance may adversely affect their careers. The SMT itself acts the main conduit of 
regularity power to the board since the SMT has a high level of power in the board. Thus, the 
SMT acts to reinforce political and regulatory power by strongly promoting compliance by the 
board. The control of the organisation by the SMT also ensures that the issue of regulatory 
compliance is transmitted to all parts of the organisation as part of its culture. 
6.5.6 Suggested Propositions 
The reflexive nature of the relationships shown in the preceding analysis, produces the 
followed suggested propositions. 
(i) The political, regulatory, and ethical environments act directly and indirectly on 
boards and on the executive. The expectations arising from these environments are at 
once both legal and normative. There is a clear tension between the world views and 
aims of the regulatory authorities and those of the regulated organisations. Individual 
nonprofit sub-sectors, acting collectively through their ‘trade organisations’ seek to 
change or affect these political and regulatory frameworks.  
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(ii) The nonprofit board structures are determined by regulation and by the views of the 
non-executive directors, supported by the SMT.  
(iii) Governance is enacted through these formal and power structures, and the structures 
themselves provide the theatre within which directors act and effect the governance 
processes. A non-executive director (and chief executive of a different organisation) 
observed that “it is all about power”. 
(iv) Governance is ultimately enacted by the individual director, who does not merely act 
as a passive transmitter of the requirements of the funder and the regulator; but is 
required to exercise judgement. This judgement is based on not just technical 
competence, skill, and experience; but also has an ethical basis, which is the ultimate 
motivation for being a non-executive director.  
6.6 Axial Coding Process 
As described in Section 5.3.2 ‘Coding’ above, axial coding refers to the process of developing 
main categories and their sub-categories, which Strauss (1987) argues build “a dense texture 
of relationships around an ‘axis’ of a category” (p. 64). The prime purpose of axial coding is 
to re-examine the categories identified in open coding to determine the linkages between them 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990). In axial coding, data are put together using a system of coding 
which seeks to: identify causal relationships between categories; make explicit connections 
between categories and sub-categories (Pandit, 1996); and to develop a conceptual model 
which explains the relationships between categories and thereby understand the phenomenon 
to which they relate.  
The axial coding process thus re-examines the data in detail, de-contextualising it from the 
specific data collection and considering it as part of a body of evidence seeking relationships 
which provide a better understanding of the properties. It further re-explores the relationship 
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of each phenomenon to the data, by using the paradigm model to explore the contexts, 
intervening conditions, actions and interactions, and consequences. 
Models of nonprofit governance are then provided in the next section, which are linked to axial 
codes, and lead to the construction of a core category. 
6.7 Models of Nonprofit Corporate Governance 
This section proposes and discusses two models which describe nonprofit corporate 
governance. The first model, shown in Figure 1 below, describes the ideological and 
motivational environment of nonprofit governance. The second model, shown in Figure 2 
below, provides a flow model which illustrates the interactions between the components of 
governance. 
6.7.1 Ideological and Motivational Environment of Nonprofit Governance 
The model, shown in Figure 1 below sets outs the dynamics in terms of power and tensions in 
terms of: the dialectic of power and resistance between neoliberalism and the public service 
ethos; differing motivations, rationalities, purposes; and accountabilities. These issues are then 
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ideologies are now discussed. This is followed by a description of the components of the 
‘nonprofit black box’. The relationship of the board to sector ‘trade bodies’ and the regulator 
is also noted as an important component in the power, resistance, and feedback process. 
(i) Ideology 
While the term ideology has many meanings, Eagleton (1991) proposes that these include: the 
social determination of thought; ideas and beliefs (whether true or false) which symbolise the 
conditions and life experiences of a specific, socially significant group or class; and the 
promotion and legitimisation of the interests of such social groups in the face of opposing 
interests. 
The legitimisation of the power of a dominant social group or class is achieved by: promoting 
‘naturalising and universalising’ its beliefs thereby making them appear self-evident and 
inevitable; denigrating opposing ideas; and excluding rival forms of thought, perhaps by some 
unspoken but systematic logic (Eagleton, 1991; van Dijk , 1998). While not every ideology is 
associated with a dominant group, the “force of the term ideology lies in its capacity to 
discriminate between those power struggles which are somehow central to a whole form of 
social life and those which are not” (Eagleton, 1991, p.8). 
 
(ii) The Dialectic of Power and Resistance  
Van Dijk (1991) argues that both power and domination, as relations between groups, need to 
be based on ideologies so that such relations can be reproduced in the everyday life and 
practices of group members. That is, ideologies are developed socially to make sure that group 
members think, believe and act in such a way that their actions are in the interests of themselves 
and of the group as a whole. 
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Van Dijk (1991) also argues that domination usually leads to resistance and struggle, but that 
resistance needs a socio-cognitive basis in terms of group-relevant values, principles, 
ideologies and its more specific knowledge and attitudes. 
The model in Figure 1 portrays the nonprofit environment in terms of the interplay of the 
neoliberal ideology and structures implemented through NPM, and that of the public service 
ethos which resists it. 
This is now considered in terms of the: concept of ‘background ideas’; its application to concept 
of power and resistance; and the factors which describe the resilience of neoliberalism. 
(a) Background Ideas 
Both the public service ethos and neoliberalism are argued to be ideologies in terms described 
above and are thus ‘background ideas’ which consist of unquestioned assumptions, 
philosophical approaches which serve to guide action, and unconscious frames or lenses 
through which people see the world.  
The public service ethos appears to have a strong tradition in the UK. However, the background 
ideas of neoliberalism had all but disappeared from public consciousness and debate before the 
2008 financial crisis (Amable, 2011; Harvey, 2005; Hay, 2004; Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009; 
Peck, 2010; Schmidt and Thatcher, 2013; Steger and Roy, 2010).  
They were however challenged after that event (Schmidt, 2016). McGimpsey (2017) argues 
that after the financial crisis of 2008, austerity initially threatened the “self-evident quality of 
the market-state … [and] the largely quasi-marketised public service apparatus” (p. 70). An 
important resolution to the contradictions exposed by austerity included a greater role for civil 
society in providing public services as the state infrastructure was reduced or withdrawn 





(b) Power and Resistance 
The model describes the dialectical interactions of the power of the state and regulators acting 
on the nonprofit sector, and the countervailing power of, and resistance by, the nonprofit sector. 
Barbalet (1985) argues that “[p]ower relations imply acceptance on the part of those subject to 
them. They also imply resistance. This has been regarded as paradoxical, if not contradictory. 
But acceptance by social actors of the legitimacy of power over them does not imply that they 
cannot attempt to moderate its effects. That is, an acceptance of power does not preclude 
resistance” (p. 531).  
McKay and Warren (2018) argue that power is ‘countervailing’ when it exists outside the 
control of decision-makers, and yet must be anticipated when they make decisions and develop 
policies. Fung and Wright (2003, p. 260) present the concept of countervailing power as “a 
variety of mechanisms that reduce, and perhaps even neutralise, the power-advantages of 
ordinarily powerful actors”, which in adversarial arenas can appear as “interest groups, public 
interest litigators, social movements, or perhaps crosscutting networks of professionals and 
officials. They further argue that the forms and consequences of countervailing power depend 
upon: the extent to which decision making is primarily adversarial, where interest groups seek 
to maximize their interests; or collaborative, where the central effort is to solve problems rather 
than to win victories; and whether the governance process is primarily top-down or 
participatory.  
The model is predicated on the assumption that the nonprofit sector has countervailing power, 
but accepts the law, regulation and required norms of good practice. However, its members do 
not necessarily agree with the philosophical or moral bases under which they operate and, may 




(c) Resilience of Neoliberalism 
Neoliberalism is able, as a concept and as a set of practices, to resist challenges because it is 
dynamic, and changes in response to events. This dynamism creates resilience, through 
processes which include: ‘bricolage’ - grafting new elements onto older ideas (Campbell, 2004; 
Carstensen, 2012; Swidler, 1986); ‘conversion’ - old ideas being used in new ways (Streeck 
and Thelen, 2005); and diffusion - the spread of neoliberal ideas, and translation - adaptation 
of such ideas to new contexts (Campbell 2004). 
Ultimately, the resilience of neoliberalism rests on its nature as a normative philosophy. 
Schmidt and Thatcher (2013) argue that since this is the case, crises and shortcomings can be 
argued to be the result of failures of compliance rather than that the theory was wrong. 
 
(iii) The Struggle Between Competing Ideologies 
The model in Figure 1 assumes that the nonprofit sector is at odds with neoliberalism in respect 
of: (a) ideology; (b) motivations; (c) rationalities; (d) purposes; and (e) accountabilities.  
(a) Ideology 
Geuss (1981) suggests that, in a sense, ideologies are belief systems characteristic of certain 
social groups or classes, composed of both discursive and non-discursive elements. This 
approaches the notion of ‘world view’, in the sense of a relatively well-systematised set of 
categories which provide a ‘frame’ for the belief, perception and conduct of a body of 
individuals. The interplay between these frames is shown in divergent public expectations of 
the nonprofit sector: which can be argued to be ‘inefficient but caring’. The neoliberal approach 






The model illustrates two aspects of motivation. The first is the opposition between: the 
neoliberal ideological motivations of seeking economic efficiency, and the primacy of 
individualism; and second, the nonprofit social purpose motivation, supported by the individual 
director’s sense of moral duty, which is combined with a collectivistic view of providing 
services. 
The model shows the importance of this intrinsic motivation of directors and their socialisation 
into the cultures and values of the nonprofit sector, regardless of any other identities they have. 
Socialisation processes strengthen a director’s identification with nonprofit board social 
groups, and conformity to sector values. A key aspect of this is the resulting unity in resisting 
while conforming to the power of the regulator. 
 
(c) Rationalities 
Brown (2015) argues that neoliberalism “developed over three decades into a widely and 
disseminated governing rationality, neoliberalism transmogrifies every human domain and 
endeavour, along with humans themselves, according to the specific image of the economic” 
(pp. 9-10). Governance has been criticised as the political rationality of neoliberalism (Haus, 
2018).  
The model displays the tension between the economic rationality required by the regulator and 
the ethical rationality used by the nonprofit sector. The economic rationality, derived from the 
for-profit sector is intended to deliver efficiency and ‘value for money’. Ethical rationality is 






The self-stated purpose of the regulatory regime is to ensure that the nonprofit sector delivers 
the state’s responsibilities economically and effectively; while that of the nonprofit sector is to 
deliver social purpose. These purposes may be opposition, but the nonprofit provider aims to 
deliver its social purpose using state funding while complying with regulatory requirements, 
which are viewed as constraints rather than drivers for that delivery. 
(e) The Issues of Accountability 
The board is formally accountable to its regulators and funders to demonstrate the lawful, 
economic and prudent discharge of its responsibilities. Boards however are motivated by their 
social purpose and directors feel a moral accountability to the people who are the intended 
beneficiaries of the organisation’s social purpose. This tension reflects the dialectic of power 
and resistance, where state power directs but the board may resist, while complying, in pursuit 
of its moral accountability to its clients.  
(iv) Internal Structure of the ‘Black Box’ and Trade Bodies 
The model presents the two key components of the ‘nonprofit black box’ as the legally 
appointed board and the SMT. The degree of overlap between these two groups depends upon 
the norms of the relevant sub-sector. In any event, as a minimum, the chief executive will be 
present at the board, whether or not they are a formally appointed director. The interplay 
between these two groups and their varying interests, provides a key dynamic to the ways in 
which the board operates. 
The model also shows the relationship of board to sector ‘trade bodies’ and to the regulator. 
The trade bodies represent the interests and views of their organisations to the regulator, 
government and the general public. These bodies also provide guidance to their members on 
‘best practice’ and other practical advice, which includes interpreting regulation. The trade 




6.7.2 Flow Model of Corporate Governance 
Figure 2 describes the interactions of the components of nonprofit governance which were 
identified in Figure 1 in terms of power and tensions. The ‘flow model’, which is shown in 
Figure 2 below, is followed by a discussion of the interactions (marked as numbered arrows) 
between the proposed components of governance (shown as green blocks). 
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The ‘flow model’ is now described under the headings of the axial codes: clash of orthodoxies; 
clash of motivations; regularity versus board power; clash of rationalities; and effective board 
duality. 
(i) Clash of Orthodoxies 
This model proposes that nonprofit corporate governance operates within the context of a clash 
of public service and neoliberal ethos. The public service ethos accords with the intrinsic 
motivation and sense of moral duty, which drives a person to be and remain a non-executive 
(arrow 1). The model then illustrates the proposal that the public service ethos is an important 
component of how the nonprofit sector views the world (arrow 2).  
The neoliberal ethos, through NPM, leads to the creation of nonprofit sector organisations and 
structures governed by autonomous boards, which are expected to operate professionally and 
in accordance with agency theory and the shareholder value view of corporate governance 
(arrow 3). This construction is a means of promoting the ideological and policy objectives of 
efficient delivery of services (arrow 4). The shareholder view emphasises the role of principal 
/ agency theory in nonprofit governance; which is reinforced through ‘good practice guidance’ 
produced for example in the NHF Governance Code (2015).  
(ii) Clash of Motivations 
The public service ethos provides a motivation for both executive and non-executive directors 
of nonprofit organisations (arrow 5). In the neoliberal ideology, people with professional skills 
are expected to be appointed to nonprofit boards to use their skills to govern in the same way 
as for-profit organisations, focusing on efficiency, rather than social purpose (arrow 6). 
(iii) Regulatory Versus Board Collective Power 
Since no true markets exist, quasi-market structures are created which require a regulatory body 
of some description for each nonprofit sub-sector (arrow 7). However, the same orthodoxy 
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which created independent boards allowed them to create ‘trade bodies’ in a similar manner to 
for-profit organisations. (arrow 8). These trade bodies represent the interests of the nonprofit 
organisations in interactions (arrow 9 with the regulator (as well as the wider political scene). 
(iv) Clash of Rationalities 
The board dynamic and its actions have, at their heart, the clash of rationalities. The public 
service ethos leads to a nonprofit rationality, based on social purpose (arrow 10), while the 
neoliberal ethos generates an economic based rationality (arrow 11). These two competing 
rationalities are evident in: board deliberations (arrows 12 and 13); the power and influence of 
the regulator (arrow 14); sector norms and values (arrow 15); interactions with trade bodies 
(arrow 16); and the motivations of the individual director (arrow 17).  
(v) Effective Board Duality 
The two loci of power on the board are the legally constituted board itself and the SMT. The 
membership of these two groups may overlap, but they remain distinct groups. The interaction 
between the two groups is represented by arrow 18. The SMT embraces the nonprofit 
rationality (arrow 19) to drive the social purpose of the organisation, but also uses the for-profit 
economic rationality to deliver regulatory requirements and support the economics based 
decisions necessary to support social purpose (arrow 20). The SMT is also the organisation’s 
main link with trade bodies; and develops organisation to organisation links to promote a 
collective approach (arrow 21). 
The axial codes identified in this model are now discussed in detail in Section 6.8. 
6.8. Axial Codes 
The processes set out in the previous sections led to the construction of axial codes, which are 
now considered using the structure defined by the paradigm method, as described in Section 
5.3.3 above. For each axial code, the phenomenon is considered, and relevant literature is 
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considered. While the axial coding process de-contextualises the analysis from the specific data 
as part of a body of evidence to establish relationships which provide a better understanding of 
the properties; the following sections which discuss the axial coded contain a number examples 
from the data. This is to ensure that the developing theory remains ‘grounded in the data’.  
This section considers the axial codes established in Figure 2, as the: (i) clash of orthodoxies; 
(ii) clash of motivations; (iii) regularity versus board power; (iv) clash of rationalities; and (v) 
effective board duality; which is followed by (vi) a consideration of the relationship between 
axial codes and categories.  
6.8.1 Clash of Orthodoxies 
There is a conflict between the orthodoxy of shareholder value which stems ultimately from 
the Anglo-American private sector, and that of the UK public service culture. As discussed in 
Figure 1 above, private sector based corporate governance culture gives rise to the structure of 
governance in the nonprofit sector through ideology and NPM; while nonprofit governance is 
enacted under the dominance of the public service culture. The phenomenon is thus the conflict 
between the ultimate purpose of governance as seen by the nonprofit sector and by the political 
and regulatory environment. The causal condition and context are the historically based 
introduction of corporate governance and the traditions embodied in the public service ethos. 
This dialectical struggle of these opposites synthesises into the way the nonprofit sector 
corporate governance operates within the legal structures. 
The literature review on social groups demonstrated how and why orthodoxies occur. The 
political and power structures, which reinforce each of these orthodoxies; arise from the 
different historical path dependent ways which were discussed in Chapter Four. The analysis 
of the data identified a clear tension between: the way in which directors of nonprofit 
organisations viewed what they did; and the requirements of the regulatory environment, which 
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stem from the tenets of neoliberalism and processes of neoliberalisation. Five examples from 
the data are presented below. 
(i) At a school governance workshop attended by a range of executive and non-executive 
school leaders, there was general agreement with the belief expressed: that while 
schools are very similar they are distinguished by their specific values and ethos, where 
collaboration featured prominently. It was agreed in further discussion that 
collaboration is a ‘belief set’ of practitioners, and that these practitioners, in general, do 
not appear to agree with the neoliberal concepts of the quasi-market embodied in the 
education system. Further, that in view of maintained education sector practioners, 
governance is grounded in a belief in collectivity, mutual support and co-operation; 
rather than an individual organisation (school) focus.  
(ii) At a conference of social housing practitioners and academics, it was agreed that the 
UK government’s housing reforms seem to be designed to undermine social housing 
through measures aimed at moving tenants from rented to starter homes (home 
ownership). This is an example of practitioners believing that the provision of social 
housing is politically driven. Further, at this conference, practitioners demonstrated a 
general antipathy towards the private rental sector, which it associated with exploitation 
of tenants under the general neoliberal world view.  
(iii) The board discussed the issue of building homes for sale under a government scheme, 
with which it disagreed in principle. However it decided that it was important to bid (or 
rather not - not bid) for funds to deliver this government initiative because the 
organisation should be seen to be ‘making an effort’ to support government policy, and 
that failure to do this may risk a regulatory response. 
(iv) The historical culture of the nonprofit social housing sector is based on the belief in the 
principle of tenant involvement, manifested by the orthodoxy of tenant democracy. A 
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board paper on tenant involvement stated that its purpose was to “strengthen 
compliance with the HCA regulation”, but the board was unanimous in its view that it 
wanted to improve tenant involvement and engagement on ethical grounds, not to 
satisfy the regulator.  
(v) This clash of cultures was manifested at a board working party comprising non-
executive and executive directors. There was a clear tension between the views of the 
executive directors who were immersed in the sector orthodoxy and those of the non-
executives who had had contrasting experience in other parts of the public sector and 
of the private sector. At a full board meeting this basic tension was exhibited in a 
discussion of contending business objectives of the main nonprofit board and one of its 
commercial subsidiaries. 
This phenomenon is caused by the structure and ideology of neoliberalism where many of the 
responsibilities of the state are delivered through the nonprofit sector. The state (through its 
funding and regulatory agencies) is the ‘principal’ in agency theory terms. The state seeks to 
discharge its responsibilities using boards as the mechanisms of the regulated quasi-market. 
The nonprofit board sees itself as delivering social purpose, but is not necessarily restricted to 
conforming to the state’s objectives. The ultimate purposes can thus be at odds with each other. 
The social purpose is the reason for the existence of the organisation and the sector and is the 
thing which binds its members together. 
Nonprofit organisations operate within a culture of service, where the needs of recipients of 
the service are judged as paramount. They operate with a social purpose, rather than a profit 
motive, but they do so within the framework where the state funds them to deliver the former’s 
responsibilities to deliver services based within a charitable framework. The conflict of 
purposes arises directly from the market approach to the reform of public services. Structures 
have been created where services are delivered through regulated quasi-markets. This structure 
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sets up conflicts of purpose between the funding / regulatory authorities and those delivering 
the services. 
The regularity framework is principally concerned with ensuring delivery of services according 
to the commissioner’s requirement concerned with value for money and the achievement of its 
political aims. The pressure from public expectations, and the ‘collectivist’ views of the 
nonprofit sector itself promote a focus on the delivery of social purpose. However, government 
emphasis on demands for improved delivery efficiency, through quasi-markets and regulation, 
places a continuing strain on the delivery of this social purpose. The state continually adjusts 
its regulatory frameworks in response to this contradiction. The nonprofit sector continues to 
hold to its social purpose; but complies with regulation. As a consequence of the NPM reforms, 
the state cannot simply instruct the nonprofit sector to ‘do as it is told’.  
This was demonstrated by the reclassification of the social housing sector as part of the 
public sector by the ONS in 2016 because of the high degree of government control. 
The government changed some of the regulations in 2017 to reduce this level of control, 
which has allowed the ONS to take the social housing sector out of the public sector.  
Since organisations in the same nonprofit sub-sector have a commonality of purpose, they band 
together in ‘trade associations’ of various forms to lobby to influence government as funder 
and regulator to vary their approaches. The nonprofit sector seeks to deliver the social purpose 
‘despite’ the regulator / funder, and both passively and actively resists regulation while 
complying with the law. The regulatory authorities are administrative bodies acting under 
statute and must fulfil their remit impartially, according to policy, and within their own funding 
constraints. Policy changes are in turn made by government in response to ‘resistance’ through 
lobbying by organisations and their collective representative bodies.  
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As an intervening condition, there is a strong acceptance of both the law and the general moral 
climate. This means that the for-profit and nonprofit orthodoxies are altered through changing 
context of external pressures of public expectations, government finances, and government 
policy changes. Nonprofit organisations recognise that to deliver social purpose, they must 
conform to regularity requirements and take account of the public and sector effects of league 
tables and public down gradings.  
6.8.2 Clash of Motivations 
The phenomenon is dialectical struggle between the different motivations for directors to act. 
On the one-hand the governance structures and expected methods of action are ultimately based 
on an extrinsically motivated for-profit sector. This motivation is concerned with issues of 
efficiency in the disposition of public resources, through the professionalisation of boards in 
the image of the for-profit sector. The political establishment, through NPM, seeks to allow 
people who are motived to use their technical skills to govern the nonprofit sector. On the other 
hand, nonprofit non-executive directors are generally intrinsically motivated by a sense of duty 
and a wish to deliver the social purpose of the organisation. They have internal drives or 
feelings such as moral duty, altruism and the conviction to aid society or societal groups, which 
cause them to volunteer to serve as board members. That is, they have opportunities to use their 
skills for an accepted good social purpose in an arena where there is a public expectation and 
acceptance of the concept of public service.  
This section considers: (i) the motivations of directors of nonprofit organisations; (ii) the 
imputed motivations of the political and regulatory authorities; and (iii) the phenomenon which 





(i) Motivations of Directors of Nonprofit Organisations 
Intrinsic motivation is proposed as: a key driver for the non-executive decisions, actions and 
commitment; and the main reason why non-executives serve on board in unremunerated or 
poorly remunerated positions. The specific intrinsic motivation differs from person to person, 
and can be described, as discussed in Section 3.11.3 above, by using deontology, teleology, 
and virtue ethics.  
Appointments to certain public and quasi-public bodies are made by local authorities and other 
public bodies, therefore it is reasonable to assume some element of political partisanship in 
appointments in these cases.  
Political parties encourage their activists to apply for directorships in public bodies to 
strengthen the world view of those parties on such bodies and hence the delivery of 
public services according to their political priorities. The organisation 
‘ConservativeHome’ passes on a published monthly list of such vacancies to its 
subscribers.  
This approach supports, at least an intuitive level, a perspective that the world view of board 
members is a key element in any decision making, rather than just a rational choice or even a 
satisficing approach. 
There is also potentially self-esteem and status associated with being a board member 
particularly in a substantial organisation, which includes the prestige associated with the 
formality and ritual of office. 
Since a nonprofit organisation’s aims represent its central purpose, the people recruiting a new 
board member must be convinced of that the applicant understands and sympathises with those 
aims. Sympathy with those aims represents an important reason for the wish to serve and 
continue to serve on the board. While the applicant may simply wish to be a member for other 
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reasons, there must be a demonstration of empathy for the social purpose of the organisation 
when applying and joining the board. Further it is important to believe that as a board member 
it is possible to make some sort of contribution towards the delivery of the organisation’s social 
purpose. Once recruited this identification and sympathy is reinforced by the interactions with 
the organisation and the remainder of the board. There are extrinsic and intrinsic motivations 
for executive directors. However, to become an executive director, it is necessary to be 
socialised into the ethos and culture of the sector and organisation.  
It is possible to summarise the motivations of people to become and remain nonprofit directors 
as: extrinsic - by gaining a track record for curriculum vitae purposes, and building actual 
experience to increase effectiveness in other work; and intrinsically - by obtaining personal 
satisfaction arising from being able to use personal and professional skills, and self-esteem, 
and sense of ‘making a difference’. The social group issues such as personal bonding, sense of 
loyalty to other board members, and feeling being a part of a board community can be argued 
to apply to both for-profit and nonprofit boards.  
The causal condition of the contradiction between the two motivational bases is the historical, 
path dependent introduction of neoliberal concepts and structures within the context of a strong 
UK tradition of public service. This tradition applies to both executives who work in the sector 
and non-executives who may have one ethos in their for-profit jobs and another in their 
nonprofit roles. Executives, as paid officials, do not necessary have to have these feelings of 
moral duty, but their chances of rising to become directors are slim if they do not or have not 
become socialised into this. These intervening conditions allow for nonprofit corporate 
governance to enacted under the main motivation of moral duty, but in a continuing 




(ii) Motivations of the Political and Regulatory Authorities  
The political motivation is derived from the neoliberal world view, whereby the state seeks to 
introduce for-profit skills and values to increase the efficiency of the nonprofit sector. This 
exists within the context of a general societal acceptance of selflessness as a motive of the 
leaders of nonprofit organisations; high expectations by society of probity and high ethical 
standard of non-executives and executives; and the frameworks for boards in the nonprofit 
sector as established in legislation. 
Four examples from the data are provided to support the view from the sector of the motivation 
of the political and regulatory authorities. 
(a) An education sector meeting of trustees was organised by the Regional Schools 
Commissioner (RSC) to gain the support of the educational establishment (both the 
professional teaching staff and members of governing bodies) for the policy of 
academisation and to induce the school leaders to form MATs. (Education policy and its 
continuing reforms is at the heart of political ideology and debate (Pickerden et al., 2015)). 
The meeting reflected the significant levels of resistance within the sector to this policy, 
due to the underlying world views of the profession being at odds with neoliberalism; 
and reluctance to change generally. Thus, while the educational establishment has 
different political views generally to the government, it must implement policies even 
when it disagrees with them. The government, through its departments and agencies, will 
deliver its policies through regulation, funding rules, and through ‘marketing’ its policy 
ideas to those who must implement them. 
(b) At a meeting of trustees of a MAT, it was recognised that while there was general 
opposition in the past to the government’s ‘ideologically based’ policy of academisation, 
it is a key driver in education. It was argued that while the organisation had to accept this, 
it should be based on the specific co-operative values of its core founding members. 
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(c) As shown in a paper on the strategic vision presented to a board it was argued that: the 
regulator is a key audience for the plan; government policy is a key driver for the sector; 
and also the main risk for public and quasi-public sector organisations. At a further board 
meeting it was re-stated that the top risks for the organisation were the effects of various 
government policies.  
(d) In a health charity, financial pressures caused by systematic reductions in government 
funding and the effects of competitive tendering in this environment posed serious risks 
to the organisation due to its almost total dependence on government contracts.  
(iii) The Phenomenon.  
The structures of nonprofit boards are determined politically or administratively, founded on 
the underlying governance and political theories interpreted by corporate elites (Price, 2016). 
Miliband (1969) argues that while “this looks like an avoidance of politics and ideology: it is 
in fact their clandestine importation into public affairs” (pp. 52-53). Governance theories are 
transmitted to boards by such mechanisms as ‘sector good practice guidance’. While the 
guidance is based on accepted principles, the form and emphasis of this guidance is rooted both 
in the tradition of the particular sub-sector and the nature of the governance experience of its 
audience.  
For example, the various guidance documents for the NHS and social housing are 
designed for relatively small numbers of professional directors. The DfE provides 
guidance representing the view of the government department on the best way that 
governance should be carried out by the very large number of non-professional school 
governors. Guidance is also produced by independent organisations such as the NGA 
with the aim of improving the effectiveness of governance based substantially on 
agency theory to the benefit of the social purpose.  
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Boards prepare for inspections and may use external consultants to assist them to prepare for 
inspection. This assistance includes detailed project timetable for the collation of documents 
and last-minute preparation for the relevant board members, so the board can present the best 
picture of governance in the organisation to the inspector. Thus, formal compliance, as 
determined through inspection, does not necessarily link to the actual effectiveness of 
governance.  
Board members are regarded by regulators as ‘voluntary but not amateur’, and guidance is 
intended to promote professionalism. For example, governors of schools may not be 
experienced in holding effective meetings and need to be advised in guidance how to do so. 
While the weight of inspection falls on the chairs of the board and of the audit committee, and 
the chief executive, it also weighs heavily on the minds of all the executives and non-executives. 
The regulatory inspection would seem however to achieve one of its intended purposes of 
driving the non-executives to obtain a good knowledge of their organisation. 
The intervening conditions are framed around the explicit drive for the professionalisation of 
boards, which has the aim of ensuring that organisations are properly and effectively governed 
and managed. This seeks to ensure the effective and efficient delivery of government priorities 
and ensuring public confidence in the nonprofit sector generally. This also can be argued to 
carry through the for-profit ethos and professional practices into the nonprofit sector, which is 
moving away from representative democracy in the provision of services. 
Once appointed, the non-executive board member operates within the protocols and norms of 
the board, and become socialised into the culture of the sector and the organisation. There may 
however be clashes of culture (particularly for board members from the private sector) at this 
level between the norms of the nonprofit sector and those of the for-profit sector. 
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The consequence is that the intrinsic motivation of the non-executive guides them to see the 
recipients of the organisation’s services as the people for whom they must operate. As opposed 
to the for-profit sector where, in theory at least, the shareholders’ interests are paramount. 
6.8.3 Regulatory Versus Board Collective Power 
The phenomenon is the conflict and interaction between the power of board and the sector with 
that of the regulator. The main actors in this relationship are the boards of the organisation, 
collective groupings of sub-sector organisations, and the sub-sector regulators. The 
phenomenon is thus the subject of power and the ways in which the key actors use their power 
to achieve their aims and seek to counter the power of other actors. 
This section considers the (i) application of concept of power, (ii) its relationship with 
governance and accountability, and (iii) regulatory theories in the context of the nonprofit 
sector. The phenomenon is described in section (iv) in terms of the responses to regulation by 
the regulated, including the causal condition, context, intervening conditions, 
actions/interactions strategies and consequences.  
(i) Application of the Concept of Power 
Power is exhibited in a number of forms: the political and economic power of government; the 
power of regulators who seek to ensure that nonprofit providers deliver services in line with 
political priorities; ‘emotional’ power of what is expected by the general public (public 
expectations of morality); ‘personal / interpersonal’ interactions of the board where actors are 
able to deliver their own views; power of the CEO / SMT over the board; board control over 
the organisation; and the organisation’s control over the recipients of services. 
(ii) Relationship with Governance and Accountability 
The structures, practices and language of corporate governance brought about through NPM 
have become commonplace in many parts of the public sector (Cornforth and Chambers, 2010). 
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This however can cause difficulties in the way in which board members see themselves 
fulfilling their roles as shown in the following three examples from the literature. 
(a) The Audit Commission (2003) notes that “[m]any councillors involved in scrutiny are 
less clear about their roles than those in the cabinet. Many believe that scrutiny is less 
effective than the previous system and are concerned about the effect that this may have 
on the quality of decisions made. Non-executive councillors are struggling with their 
role in ‘scrutiny’, whereby they hold their executive colleagues and other organisations 
to account, develop policy proposals and review services” (p. 10).  
(b) In the NHS, early reforms involved bringing outsiders into the boardroom of NHS 
bodies, in particular hospitals, for the purpose of providing guidance on commercial 
practice (‘service’) and to foster internal, non-clinical challenge (‘control’) to NHS 
managers. The ICSA (2011) argue that evidence suggests that non-executives have had 
an impact on monitoring the executives, the ‘control’ function, while attention to 
strategic issues, the ‘service’ function, faltered. In a sense, therefore, these reforms 
seem to have focused on adding extrinsic motivations of targets and budget, while 
potentially disrupting intrinsic ones (Nordberg, 2013).  
(c) In the social housing sector, despite the differing funding and participative requirements 
of public bodies, the adoption of corporate governance structures drawn from the 
private sector has been common (Brennan and Solomon, 2008). These changes reflect 
a focus on professional management by housing regulators and a more commercial 
approach by many providers (McDermont, 2007). Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) 
are expected to adopt private sector governance principles as defined in the guidance 
provided by the NHF. Malpass (2000) argued that because the performance of social 
housing sector is monitored by the regulator, combined with the employment of full 
time professional staff, means that board members have very little real work to do; they 
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are not in control of strategy in any real sense; and probably delude themselves if they 
believe that they make much difference or represent anyone but themselves.  
(iii) Regulatory Theories in the Nonprofit Context 
While organisations and people subject to regulation, comply with regulation; they do not 
necessarily have to accept the validity or world view on which it is based. Ashworth et al. (2002) 
identify a common set of problems in the operation of regulatory regimes such as: resistance 
by regulatees; ritualistic compliance; regulatory capture; performance ambiguity; and data 
problems. They are however, unable to “locate any comprehensive theoretical framework on 
the reasons for variations in the severity of regulatory problems” (p. 197). They further observe 
that “regulation was found to be most problematic in local authority services (especially direct 
service organisations and housing departments), and least problematic in other sectors 
(particularly universities and housing associations)” (p. 209).  
The importance of the regulator cannot be understated for bodies in the public and quasi-public 
sectors. The analysis of the data developed the construct that boards are very concerned to 
comply with the regulatory framework, in order not to incur sanctions or public opprobrium. 
Thus, while there is no overt resistance to the regulator, this compliance can be categorised as 
‘ritualistic’ in that processes are observed, and decisions recorded as evidence of compliance. 
In the social housing sector, for example, the board believes that it must evidence its 
compliance and the effectiveness of its governance to the regulator through its board minutes. 
The board and the executive are concerned not to do anything, or refrain from doing anything 
which could cause the regulator to ‘downgrade’ the organisation’s public viability and 
governance grades.  
When a task and finish group was considering a bid for HCA capital an executive 
director remarked that “failure to at least make a token gesture in these areas was seen 
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to be prompting an IDA (a regulatory inspection) with possible governance 
downgrading for ‘not trying hard enough’”.  
The prospect of a regulatory inspection weighs heavily for the board, the executives and the 
organisation. One of the outcomes of an inspection is the published report and / or grades, 
which is a major consideration as an outcome of an inspection. Therefore, the organisation 
prepares intensively for these inspections. The ‘threat’ of an inspection being triggered makes 
boards ensure that its awareness of the external political and regulatory environment is 
evidenced through presenting papers to the board to note, which set out these issues. This 
generates forms of compliance which are not necessarily linked to actual performance. 
Similarly, in the education sector, many activities are carried out to comply with OFSTED 
requirements.  
At a governors’ committee meeting, a governor stated that they would be “carrying out 
‘necessary’ school visits to check the development plan in the following week”: - 
necessary - as required by OFSTED.  
Operational performance reporting is also carried out to conform to the requirements of the 
regulatory regime, even if this is not considered as ‘accurate or useful’.  
On one education board, the chief executive was able ‘explain away’ reported 
underperformance in terms that the reporting required by OFSTED is not appropriate 
for the school.  
It appears that while a regulatory body seeks to drive compliance through their enforcement 
mechanisms, the aim is to strengthen the culture of ‘conformity’. This reflects the view of 




(iv) The Phenomenon  
The interactions between the power of the state operating though the regularity regimes and 
the power of boards thus represent the phenomenon. This interaction operates in a cycle with 
policy driving funding and regulation; the response by boards is to deliver their own agenda 
within the regulatory context. The boards through their sector organisations seek to change 
policy. The causal condition for this power struggle is the structure of the quasi-market itself, 
which operates within the tension between the neoliberal ideology and the public service values. 
However, the impact of these conditions is mitigated by the law-abiding culture of members of 
the board. As a consequence of this struggle, the deliverers of public services do not passively 
transmit government policy; but will always operate within the law to deliver what they believe 
to be the social value ‘despite policy’. 
6.8.4 Clash of Rationalities 
The concept of different rationalities was discussed in Section 4.1. The phenomenon is the 
contradiction between the rationality which underlies social purpose driven nonprofit 
governance and the different rationality which underpins the neoliberal approach. While 
conforming to the legal requirements of the state, board actors use rationales which are based 
on: its nature as a small social group with group emotions; and the public service ethos. The 
rationale for action or decision is based on achieving social purpose as an organisation, and the 
board member’s morality based motivation. That is, the contradiction relates to the interaction 
between this rationality and the politically constructed quasi-market structures which define 
the arenas within which boards act. 
A basic rationale for the creation of the quasi-market is to bring ‘greater efficiency’ into the 
public service through ‘commercially based’ management techniques which use a more 
financially based investment approach. That is, the public service ethos focuses on social 
purpose, the ‘client’, and has a collectivist and anti-market approach, while the neoliberal ethos 
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elevates “market-based principles and techniques of evaluation to the level of state-endorsed 
norms” (Davies, 2013, p. 37). 
This phenomenon exists in the context of board members who are largely intrinsically 
motivated and have also become socialised into the world view of the sector. This provides the 
rational basis for all actions such as decision making, challenge, and strategic direction, which 
is directly counter to the neoliberal rationality ‘thought collective’ (Brenner et al., 2010b; 
Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009), upon which corporate governance norms are based. This effect 
is mitigated by a continuing regulatory drive to influence not just what boards do – but how 
they think. This is achieved through ‘best practice – how to guides’, and the increasing 
professionalisation of boards required and expected by those guides. 
Thus, while the board focuses its strategic decisions on the delivery of the organisation’s social 
purpose, rather than economics, the funding and regulatory regimes seek to direct actions 
towards delivery of policy and of achieving ‘value for money’ as a key measure of that delivery. 
The sector continues to self-reinforce its social purpose(s), while both carrying out lobbying 
and conforming to regulation. 
The consequence of this tension is that nonprofit boards act formally and informally in the 
pursuit of social purpose; against the ‘threat’ posed by the funders and regulators. The 
rationality based on social purpose drives actions, while economic rationality is used as a 
tactical investment tool and as a demonstration of compliance to the regulator.  
6.8.5 Effective Board Duality 
The phenomenon is the tension and dynamic caused by the existence of the legally appointed 
board and the SMT within the boundary of the corporate ‘black box’. The former has legal 
responsibility for the organisation and ultimate authority, while the SMT has power and 
authority in the organisation but no legal responsibility. The power and influence of the SMT 
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exists by virtue of: the formal structure of trustee boards; the board’s non-operational 
governance role; the sector norm of the existence of an SMT; and the expectation of the sector 
that the roles of this body should be to both advise the board and implement its decisions.  
Senior managers have an important role and impact on organisational outcomes because of the 
decisions they are empowered to make for the organisation, which are consistent with their 
personal values and experiences (Smith et al., 1994). The respective roles and powers of the 
legal board and of the SMT means that there is conflict in decision making which is argued 
may improve nonprofit organisational decision making (Schwenk,  1990).  
The phenomenon is caused by the neoliberal driven governance structure which created boards 
with either all, or a majority of, non-executives, who are totally reliant on the executive 
directors. The historical and political context for this structure arises from the neoliberal 
ideology and the historical structures of public boards comprising only trustees. The operation 
of boards acting in this context is an interplay between non-executives who meet only 
intermittently and the SMT as an organised group of executives under the direct control of the 
chief executive.  
This structure can be argued to give the legally constituted board the responsibility for the 
organisation without power, and the SMT the power without legal responsibility. This is 
mitigated through sanctions, or the threat of sanction, by the board. The board has the power 
of challenge and the potential for challenge. The executive directors take this power seriously, 
because of: professional pride; reputation; and career progression, which relies on them 
effectively serving the board by anticipating and responding to the board’s needs. In the last 
instance, the board has the power to remove the chief executive if that officer does not perform 
adequately or appropriately. This power of sanction is set against the socialised commonality 
of world views and identification with the sector and organisation. As a consequence of the 
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existence of this structure, it is necessary for the chief executive to organise the executive into 
a non-statutory formal committee in order to fulfil the functions the board expects. These 
functions include giving full considered the items put before the board for monitoring, decision 
or ratification, under the express authority of the CEO. Similarly, the SMT makes efforts to 
understand the wishes of the board so that it can prepare papers which support the board’s 
strategic direction. It expects challenge from the board and prepares accordingly. It is these two 
aspects which play a significant role in establishing the dynamics between the SMT and the 
board. 
As a consequence of these factors, the sector wide structural response is for the chief executive 
to create an SMT. This arose historically, and it seems reasonable to believe that it persists 
because chief executives who come from the sector were inevitably members of an SMT 
themselves before they became chief executives. The power of the chief executive, whether or 
not a member of the legally constituted board, is reinforced by the existence of the SMT, and 
the direct power which the chief executive has over individual members of the SMT. The 
effective duality arises from the governance processes which depend heavily on SMT 
participation in all aspects of the board functions. 
6.8.6 Relationships between Axial Codes and Categories 
The axial coding process reorganises and de-contextualises the categories and sub-categories. 
As part of this process, the complex relationships between the categories, sub-categories and 
the axial codes, are iteratively considered. The axial coding model illustrated the relationships 
constructed between the categories, identifying the five axial codes: clash of orthodoxies; 
clash of motivations; regularity versus the board collective power; clash of rationalities; and 
effective board duality. The relationships are now summarised. 
(i) The ‘political, regulatory and ethical environments’ category provides the background 
for the conflict between neoliberal driven state structures and the ways in which boards 
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act to achieve social purpose. The political and regulatory sub-category represents the 
interests and views of the neoliberal state which include the motivation to improve 
efficiency, which are in contradiction with the orthodoxies of the nonprofit sector which 
rest on the values and culture of social purpose and public service. 
(ii) The individual director is intrinsically motivated to join a board and is further socialised 
into the norms of the organisation and sector. This category supports the clash of 
orthodoxies, clash of motivations, and clash of rationalities. The orthodoxies of the 
regulatory state are based on for-profit governance practice, which are at odds to the 
intrinsic motivation of the individual wishing to become a nonprofit director. The board 
recruits according to the need to comply with regulation and accepted good practice as 
well as the commitment of the director to the organisation’s social purpose. 
(iii) The ‘nonprofit board structures’ category is reflected in the axial codes concerning 
clash of orthodoxies and board power. The statutory bases of board structures provide 
the frame for the demonstration of professional board practice; but does not cover the 
existence of the SMT as a sector norm structure. 
(iv) The ‘actions of the board’ category reflect actions as social groups with the key issues 
of challenge and assurance is concerned variously with all the axial codes. While the 
board acts within its formal powers and the expectations the regulatory authority, it does 
not necessarily agree with the world views of the state and regulators. Boards act to 
achieve the organisation’s social purpose, rather than merely complying with 
government regulatory requirement. These actions are based both on economic and 
nonprofit sector rationalities. 
(v) The ‘power and influence’ category plays a key determining role, principally in the 
regularity versus board power axial code. The main power relationships are between: 
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the regulator and board / organisation; and between the formally appointed board and 
the SMT and chief executive. 
6.9 Core Category 
A core category is the central category used to connect all other sub-categories (Howell, 2000), 
which best enables and facilitates the creation of orderly systematic relationships (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990). The paradigm model is used to explain the core category in relation to its causal 
conditions, context, intervening conditions, action/interaction strategies and consequences. 
This section integrates the categories generated during open and axial coding and develops a 
phenomenon which gives explanatory power to the relationships among the categories. The 
propositions suggested in Section 6.5.6 are then used to indicate the generalised relationships 
between the categories. A core category is then constructed and interpreted, using the paradigm 
model, and its relationship to the axial codes considered.  
6.9.1 Principal Contradiction 
The coding process generated the model described in Figure 2, Section 6.7.2, which identified 
that all five axial codes. Subsequent discussions argued that these were all ‘clashes’ between 
the contradictory elements of: orthodoxies; motivations; powers; rationalities and elements of 
the board. The struggle between these contradictory elements is the fundamental cause of the 
development; and leads to the dialectical construction of the principal aspect of the 
contradiction as the ‘clash of neoliberal and public service world views which exists at every 
level of the nonprofit sector’. This contradiction is thus the same as the core category.  
6.9.2 Interpretation Using the Paradigm Model 
The paradigm model is now used to interpret the core category as the interaction between the 
state, which imposes and promotes the view of corporate governance derived from the for-
profit sector, and the opposing world views of the nonprofit which although legally compliant, 
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opposes the neoliberal view by applying a public service world view to its actions. That is, 
while nonprofit governance operates within the neoliberal framework of quasi-markets and 
regulatory frameworks, this framework is opposed by the public service orthodoxy espoused 
by many in the nonprofit sector, particularly those in positions of power within the sector. 
In summary, this core category is connected to all other sub-categories: the five axial codes, 
discussed in Section 6.8, deal with the struggles or contradictions between various world views 
and their applications to practice. The central phenomenon then a dialectical struggle of 
opposites; that is the principal aspect of the contradiction. 
The causal condition of the core category arises historically from the success of neoliberal 
ideology in changing the political climate and the consequential imposition of quasi-markets 
and for-profit style governance and structures onto the nonprofit sector. Counter-posing this, 
the UK nonprofit sector has a long tradition of public service values which reject the neoliberal 
world view. 
This clash of world views exists within the context of: legal frameworks; nonprofit norms and 
structures; and collective action by nonprofit organisations. Individual directors respond to this 
contradiction through their individual board and their collective organisations. The political 
and regulatory environment seeks to exert its power: politically through policy; legally 
throughs laws and regulation; structurally, through the creation of quasi-markets and boards; 
and ideologically, for example by casting the nonprofit sectors as inefficient and wasteful. The 
nonprofit sector operates within the structures and the law ‘operate within the system’. The 
board however makes decisions in pursuit of delivery of its social purpose, which may not be 
as required by government policy. Sub-sectors collectively seek to lobby and otherwise 
influence the government, regulatory authorities and the public to support this. 
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The main intervening condition which mitigates or otherwise alters the impact of causal 
condition on this phenomenon is the individual director’s intrinsic motivation. That is, moral 
duty or altruism as the main motivations to act as a nonprofit director guides all board activities. 
Further, the actions of the board are based on the interpersonal, intergroup and intragroup 
dynamics. These interactions are particularly important between the legally appointed board 
and members of the SMT. The career success of SMT members is reliant on both regulatory 
compliance and success in delivering social purpose. This, combined with the regulatory 
requirement for a professional board, means that board decisions and actions must take into 
account both the neoliberal and public service aspects. Nietzsche (1908/1996) understood that 
keeping contradictory forces in tension can be a source of strength. Thus, in nonprofit 
governance these unresolved tensions where neither party can fully attain their objectives act 
to drive the sector forward, which in turn create further contradictions.  
6.9.3 Conclusion 
The core category (and principal aspect of the contradiction) is the ‘clash of neoliberal and 
public service world views which exists at every level of the nonprofit sector’. The concepts 
and categories underlying the identification of this category are further tested in the Section 
6.10, theoretical sampling. This leads to a consolidation in Section 6.11, which forms the basis 
for the substantive theory in Chapter 7. 
6.10 Theoretical Sampling 
Theoretical sampling is inherent in the grounded theory method by which data gathering is 
driven by concepts derived from the evolving theory, and by constant comparisons to other 
sources of information or events which will help to develop variations in the concepts (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998). 
This sampling was carried during and after the ethnographic data collections by means of: (i) 
two board workshops which considered board effectiveness and dynamics, with three board 
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chairs, three current or retired chief executives, four executive directors, and four non-
executive directors participating; (ii) a regional meeting of housing sector chairs and chief 
executives; and (iii) separate unstructured interviews with a board chairman, chief executive, 
company secretary, and a member of an SMT.  
This theoretical sampling was carried out to test and develop the key concepts concerning:  
(i) non-executive director motivations;  
(ii) socialisation;  
(iv) values;  
(v) wider social purpose;  
(iv) interactions with the regulatory environment;  
(v) perceptions of board effectiveness; and  
(vi) involvement of the SMT in board decision making. 
This sampling is now discussed under those headings. 
6.10.1 Non-Executive Director Motivations 
Many highly paid professionals give of their time willingly to nonprofit organisations as unpaid 
non-executive directors; driven essentially by a sense of moral duty to support a vulnerable 
segment of the population. The theoretical sampling sought to clarify the issue of intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation by considering the perceived effects of payments to non-executives. The 
sampling found that there are varying norms in different nonprofit sub-sectors regarding 
payment. For example, payment of non-executives is: the norm in NHS trusts; a disputed area 
in social housing, where some organisations pay while others do not; state education where it 
is anathema; and simply not expected in charities. Payment can be regarded as a motivation 




In an unstructured interview, a chairman stated that for many years he had willingly 
given freely of his time to various nonprofit organisations, but now only accepts such 
posts if they are remunerated. The amount of the remuneration is not relevant and small, 
but the fact of payment demonstrates that the organisation values and respects its 
directors.  
Another chairman commented that while generally the question of payment to non-
executives is not an issue of any importance, there have been occasions when it was 
raised. The chairman had to discuss the issue with the non-executive act to ensure that 
that person understood the accepted norms of the sector.  
The theoretical sampling therefore confirmed the primacy of intrinsic motivation. 
6.10.2 Socialisation 
The effectiveness of boards is founded on the people who are recruited on the basis that their 
skills match the current and future requirements of the board. To be effective, directors need 
to act as a coherent group. 
A board workshop agreed that new members should become socialised into the norms 
of the organisation and the sector. Board member appraisal processes were agreed to 
be good practice and to provide a strong basis for training and development of board 
members. This process also provides a formal basis for socialisation. 
The chairman of a commercial subsidiary of a nonprofit organisation was appointed 
specifically for their experience as an executive director in a for-profit organisation and 
knowledge of the commercial marketplace. This chairman expressed frustration at 
having to operate within the nonprofit culture, and not able to make decisions in the 
same way as in the for-profit sector. This person was unwilling or unable to overcome 
this ‘culture shock’ and thereby be socialised into the nonprofit culture and values. He 
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subsequently resigned and was replaced by a main board non-executive director, who 
although was from the for-profit sector had become socialised into the nonprofit culture.  
6.10.3 Values 
Sector values and ethical views are an important driver for the way decisions are made. 
In an unstructured interview, a social housing chief executive emphasised the 
importance of organisational values, which relate to community focus and the provision 
of range of services which help and support residents. He argued that resources must 
be tightly controlled to ensure the long-term viability of the organisation; but reflected 
on the antipathy of the nonprofit sector to the concept of profit by developing the theme 
of ‘profit for purpose’.  
This tension between ‘social purpose’ and the concept of ‘profit’ is allied to the antagonism of 
social housing sector professionals to private sector landlords specifically and the private sector 
generally.  
6.10.4 Wider Social Purpose 
Board members have a sense of ‘wider social purpose’ in which they express their empathy 
and sympathy through directing their organisations to deliver services which are of a wider 
scope than its strictly defined social purpose.  
A board level workshop reflected on visits by board members made to operational sites 
which provided services which were not directly within the social purpose of their 
organisation. One member commented that the visit “showed a real mix of services 
provided”, and another that “the visits gave a real insight into what staff do and how 
uplifting it was to hear what the team is doing there”. A third board member commented 
on the difficulty of evaluating the worth of providing these services financially or with 
a social value methodology. 
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6.10.5 Interaction with the Political Environment 
Nonprofit organisations understand that they operate within the power, influence of 
government and the regulatory authorities. However, they recognise that sector organisations 
operate primarily for the benefit of the organisations’ clients. 
At a regional meeting of chairmen and chief executives it was agreed in discussion that 
while the political environment is a key driver for the sector it affects the way that the 
social purpose is delivered; but does not define or change the social purpose itself. 
6.10.6 Perceptions of Board Effectiveness 
Section 6.3.2 considered the structure and action of nonprofit boards, based on participatory 
observations. This theoretical sample develops this in terms of participation, tone, and 
interaction; using separate meetings of non-executives and the SMT to discuss the effectiveness 
of meetings. This consideration is concerned only with the meetings themselves and not how 
the board meeting actions translated into action and outcomes in the organisation. 
At a board workshop, the question of whether everyone contributed and whether anyone 
dominated was posed. A non-executive director of the main board commented that there 
were “mixed levels of involvement – perhaps a bit too civilised and polite with each 
other”. A member of a commercial subsidiary said their meetings had “fewer papers 
and were ‘more feisty’”. The SMT group, which contained the chief executive, 
commented that “the chief executive puts her case quite strongly!”.  
This exemplifies the culture of nonprofit boards and the dual position of the chief executive, 
along with the relationships between the board and SMT.  
In an unstructured interview, a member of another SMT commented: “I write the papers 
for the … [board] member … He does not know anything about the area and so relies 
entirely on me”. 
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At a board effectiveness workshop, a board member questioned whether the balance 
between strategic discussion and discussion about detail was correct. The question was 
founded on the observation by the non-executive director, that the agenda and papers, 
prepared by the executive, drew the board into discussion of detail rather than at the 
strategic overview. In the discussion, a non-executive director opined that they should 
challenge the executive more. This belief was developed through discussion into the 
idea that the board should require the executive to say: “this is the issue, these are the 
options we’ve considered, what do you think?” This brings out the importance of the 
subject of board challenge.  
The time commitment and focus of board members is of importance since members meet for 
only a short time a few times a year.  
At the board workshop, a non-executive director asked rhetorically, whether there were 
“some papers that we, as a board, do not need to see at all”. That is, whether board time 
is being taken up by papers which could either be considered by board committee or by 
executive decision. Another non-executive director commented that he gets far more 
out of an informal discussion day than from formal board meetings and wondered 
whether there was a balance to strike. The chair suggested one way is to have more 
informal sessions more frequently. 
6.10.7 Involvement of the SMT in Board Decision Making 
Decisions are made by the board by considering papers presented to it, which are prepared by 
the SMT.  
In an unstructured interview, a company secretary stated that “the SMT really tries to 
understand what the board wants and then deliver papers which achieve those”.  
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At a board workshop, a board member commented on the time commitment required 
of the SMT in the preparation of these papers. A board member (who is a retired chief 
executive) stated that before the SMT get to the stage of writing detailed papers, 
“perhaps they should ask the board for guidance on how they would want them written”, 
through for example, a discussion paper a couple of months before a decision needed 
to be made.  
This provides an example of the formal decision-making process and the ways in which 
members believe they should have more influence through timely interventions in those 
processes.  
An executive director commented that “sometimes writing a paper for others helps 
focus your thinking”.   
6.10.8 Consolidating the Data Analysis and Theoretical Sampling 
This section consolidates the data analysis and theoretical sampling shown in the previous 
section, and provides a basis for the development of the substantive theory. The issues are 
presented under the headings of the suggested propositions shown in Section 6.5.6, which are 
summarised below. 
(i) The political, regulatory, and ethical environment act directly and indirectly on boards 
and on the executive. 
(ii) The nonprofit board structures are determined by regulation and by the views of the 
non-executive directors, supported by the SMT. 
(iii) Governance is enacted through these formal and power structures. 






(i) Political, Regulatory and Ethical Environments 
This section discusses the ways in which these environments act on boards and the executive, 
under the headings: (a) frameworks; (b) professionalisation of the board; (c) the ethical 
environment; and (d) accountability;  
(a) Frameworks 
The analysis identified that while nonprofit governance operates within the neoliberal 
framework of quasi-markets and regulatory frameworks, this is opposed by the public service 
orthodoxy espoused by many in the nonprofit sector, particularly those in positions of power. 
The theoretical sampling, discussed in Section 6.10.1, confirmed this opposition, but noted that 
it is mitigated through the individual director’s intrinsic motivation of moral duty or altruism. 
(b) Professionalisation of the Board 
The analysis of the relationships between categories, in Section 6.5.1, determined that 
environment influences the individual to become a board member through the creation of board 
structures based on professionalisation. This professionalisation of the board builds in a cultural 
acceptance of ‘good corporate governance’ practices expected by the regulator. Section 6.10.6 
affirms that this professionalism is reflected in the ways which boards consider their own 
effectiveness and seek to improve their professionalism. 
(c) The Ethical Environment 
Participation on nonprofit boards takes place in the context of the nonprofit ethical environment. 
The axial coding analysis in Section 6.8.2 (ii), proposed that participation takes place within 
the context of: a general societal acceptance of selflessness as a motive of the leaders of 
nonprofit organisations; high expectations by society of probity; and high ethical standards of 
non-executives and executives as a norm. Nonprofit values and ethos, however also includes 
an antipathy towards the profit motive as stated in Section 6.4.2. The theoretical sampling in 
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Section 6.10.3 confirmed that sector values and ethical views are important drivers for the way 
decisions are made. 
(d) Accountability 
In Section 6.4.2 (iii), it was stated that board members recognise their legal obligations and 
accountability to the relevant regulator and funding agency, but also feel a moral obligation to 
ensure that the organisation fulfils its social purpose to the people for whom they provide their 
services. The theoretical sampling in Section 6.10.5, confirmed the view that nonprofit 
organisations understand that they operate within the power, influence of government and the 
regulatory authorities. 
(ii) Structure and Operation of the ‘Black Box’ 
The two suggested propositions set out in Section 6.5.6: ‘nonprofit board structures are 
determined by regulation and by the views of the non-executive directors, supported by the 
SMT’; and ‘governance is enacted through these formal and power structures’ are considered 
together.  
This section concerns the sector specific structures and operation of the nonprofit board; and 
discusses: (a) the SMT; (b) board practices; (c) challenge; (d) decision making; and (e) 
rationality.  
(a) SMT 
The data analysis developed the concept of the environment in Section 6.3.1 (iii); and 
recognised the existence of an SMT is a norm in the nonprofit sector. This body, which is under 
the control of the chief executive, both controls the organisation and is heavily engaged with 
all the processes of the formal board. The theoretical sampling identified the requirement of 
the SMT to be fully engaged with the board in order to ensure it delivers what the board wants 




(c) Board Practices and Rituals  
The ‘prestige, ritual, formality and respect’ sub-category, identified that all the meetings of the 
board, committees and task and finish groups have their own protocols, formality, rituals, 
management, and conducts. These formalities set the frame for respect and authority of the 
board. In Section 6.5.3 it was argued that the SMT operates with a similar degree of formality 
and ritual as the board, although in private. 
The analysis in Section 6.4.2 argued that the board operates in a professional manner, with 
formal agendas with supporting papers generally prepared by the SMT, with the authority of 
the chief executive. Members always try to operate in accordance with accepted standards and 
norms of public service, such as the Nolan principles. This analysis was developed in Section 
6.10.6 of the theoretical sampling demonstrating a reflexive approach to improving the 
professional standards of the board. 
(d) The Concept and Practice of Challenge at Board Level. 
Challenge is accepted as one of the core functions of the board, but the form of challenge for 
nonprofit organisation is modified by the context and culture within which it operates, as 
analysed in Section 6.4.5. The challenge exists firstly, as the non-executive challenge of the 
executive, and secondly the challenge posed by the regulatory authority on the board and 
organisation. 
The theoretical sampling in Section 6.10.6 discusses the importance of the issue challenge as 
required by an effective board. In Section 6.10.7 the involvement of the SMT in board decisions, 
and the strength of the SMT’s position is implied. 
(e) Decision Making Processes 
It was proposed in Section 6.3.2 that decision making is not a single event, rather it is the final 
part of a process. This process generally includes the SMT and may also involve the board 
during the development of the recommended decision by the SMT. The theoretical sampling 
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in Section 6.10.7 showed that decisions are made by the board on the basis of papers prepared 
by the SMT, but also that the board can be involved in the process, and that the sector regulator 
to be a defining influence in the board decision making process. 
(f) Rationality 
Axial coding in Section 6.8.4 proposed that nonprofit rationality is founded on social purpose, 
while using economic rationality is used as a tactical investment tool and as a demonstration 
of compliance to the regulator. This conforms to a sense of ‘wider social purpose’ as the basis 
for certain strategic decisions in the theoretical sampling in Section 6.10.4.  
(iii) Governance is Ultimately Enacted by the Individual Director  
This section consolidates the issues associated with the individual director under the headings: 
(a) motivations; (b) moral duty and the commitment to social purpose; (c) identification; and 
(d) trust. 
(a) Motivations. 
Intrinsic motivation is identified, in Section 6.3.4, as a reason why people choose to become, 
and to remain as a non-executive director. This motivation can include self-satisfaction in 
serving a ‘good cause’, altruism, a sense of moral duty, self-satisfaction of being able to apply 
professional skills, self-esteem and personal prestige. Remuneration is not a motivation. 
The motivation of the executive directors (whether board members or not) can include those 
identified for the non-executive, but also includes extrinsic motivation associated with 
remuneration and power. The theoretical sampling in Section 6.10.1 provided an example of 
this. 
(b) Moral Duty and the Commitment to Social Purpose. 
The sense of an individual’s moral duty, which has been identified as one of the main 
motivations for the nonprofit director, is supported in the theoretical sampling in Section 6.10.1. 
The sense of moral duty is directed towards supporting the social purpose, which is central to 
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all nonprofit organisations, as argued in Section 6.3.1 (ii). The nonprofit organisations act in 
accordance with an ethical stance of providing for its clients. While the detailed interpretation 
of social purpose may be subject to debate in an organisation, there is a clear overriding 
commitment to the concept of social purpose by both executive and non-executive directors, 
the organisation and specific nonprofit sub-sector.  
Section 6.10.4 of the theoretical sampling also confirmed that board members have a sense of 
‘wider social purpose’, which is extends the core social and legal purpose of the organisation 
into broader areas means that organisations are directed to deliver services which are of wider 
scope that its strictly defined social purpose. 
(c) Identification with the Organisation and Service Recipients (Clients). 
Social identification occurs where the individual defines themselves in terms of his 
membership of a particular organisation or social group. The concept of identification arose as 
a category in Section 6.4.2 (iv), as identification with: the client rather with the regulator, which 
is seen as an external threat; and the organisation which delivers the social purpose. For the 
nonprofit sector the issues of identification and socialisation; with the organisation and with 
stakeholders are salient in discussed in Section 6.3.4. Evidence for socialisation was obtained 
in Section 6.10.2 of the theoretical sampling. 
(d) Trust 
Section 6.4.3 argued that credibility and integrity are the bedrocks upon which the board rests. 
Board members must feel able to trust each other in all their dealings. They must also be able 
to trust the executive and feel that they are acting in the best interests of the organisation and 
its clients. The involvement of the SMT in decision making, as discussed in Section 6.10.7, 




Seeking assurance is compatible with trust; and serves to strengthen identification between the 
board, the SMT and the organisation. It also gives the regulatory authorities confidence in the 
governance arrangements, as argued in Section 6.5.4.  
6.11 Conclusion 
This chapter described the data collection and analysis processes. Data collection using 
participatory observations were described in Section One, and the generation of open codes 
described in Section Two. These codes were then used in Section Three to create concepts of: 
political, regulatory and ethical environment; board functions, structures and processes; 
challenge; relationships; and motivations. These were then discussed in detail. These concepts 
were then put together in Section Four as open categories of: political, regulatory, and ethical 
environments; the individual director; nonprofit board structures; actions of the board; and 
power and influence. These categories and their sub-categories were then discussed, with 
examples from the data.  
The relationships between sub-categories were reviewed in Section Five to yield suggested 
propositions, summarised as: the political, regulatory, and ethical environments act directly 
and indirectly on boards and on the executive; the nonprofit board structures are determined by 
regulation and by the views of the non-executive directors, supported by the SMT; governance 
is enacted through these formal and power structures, and the structures themselves provide 
the theatre within which directors act; and governance is ultimately enacted by the individual 
director, who acts on an ethical basis, which is the ultimate motivation for being a non-
executive director. 
Two related models for nonprofit governance were presented and described in Section Seven. 
The second model identified five axial codes: the clash of orthodoxies; clash of motivations; 
regulatory versus board collective power; clash of rationalities; and effective board duality.  
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These axial codes were then considered in Section Eight, and the connections between the axial 
codes and sub-categories established; and described using the paradigm model. This analysis 
identified that all five axial codes were ‘clashes’ between the contradictory elements of: 
orthodoxies; motivations; powers; rationalities and elements of the board. That is, the axial 
codes have in common the concept of contradiction, which forms the core phenomenon, and 
the basis of the substantive theory. 
Section Nine then brought together these dialectical relationships together in the principal 
contradiction of the ‘clash of neoliberal and public service world views which exists at every 
level of the nonprofit sector’. This principal contradiction is thus the grounded theory core 
category. This section then discussed the core category using the paradigm model, to connect 
to the other sub-categories. Section Ten described the theoretical sampling used to test and 





CHAPTER 7: Substantive Theory and Conclusion 
This concluding chapter is divided into three sections. Section One presents the substantive 
theory, which is based on the core category (and principal contradiction) of ‘the clash of 
neoliberal and public service world views which exists at every level of the nonprofit sector’. 
The substantive theory is then discussed in terms of the three subordinate contradictions which 
flow from this at the: environmental; board; and individual levels. The substantive theory is 
then reviewed, in Section Two, to determine its relationships to behavioural, governance and 
corporate governance theories. 
Section Three then sets out the contributions made by this thesis in terms of: methodology, 
through the application of a combination of ethnography and grounded theory; and the 
theoretical outcomes of that methodology. Finally, three areas for further research are proposed.  
7.1 The Substantive Grounded Theory 
Howell (2013) states that “theory is concerned with building substantive understanding, 
normativism and ideational simplification. Substantive models are built on the basis of data 
collected and normativism which determines theoretical frameworks that have an ethical or 
moral dimension. Theories entail different understandings of knowledge and truth, knowledge 
development as well as acquisition, application evaluation and critique” (p. 24). This means 
that theory can be understood as relating to distinct paradigms of inquiry.  
The substantive theory is situated within the realms of social psychological, governance, and 
corporate governance theories. It describes the mutual interactions between the individual, the 
board, and the environment as interconnected systems. It defines the board sub-system, or 
‘black box’, as encompassing both the boardroom, and senior management. The relationships 
within the ‘black box’ and interactions with the external environment are theorised in terms of 
individual, social group and power issues. These relationships are theorised, as argued by Pye 
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and Pettigrew (2005), through the analytical lens of power and politics, together with a more 
micro-process focus on trusting, influencing and problem solving.  
Epistemologically, the substantive theory accepts that the path dependent historical contexts 
and values influence the inquiry. This means the recognition that the actors in nonprofit 
governance act within the frames set by generally accepted formal theories such as deontology 
and teleology, the meso-theories of corporate governance, and public value. 
The substantive theory is based on the grounded theory core category, along with the 
subordinate categories which expand upon it. This core category is supported by the process of 
relating the axial codes to the core category using the paradigm model. The axial codes: (i) the 
clash of orthodoxies; (ii) clash of motivations; (iii) regularity versus board power, (iv) clash of 
rationalities; and (v) effective board duality, have in common the concept of contradiction.  
The theory uses a dialectical approach which equates the principal contradiction with the 
grounded theory core category, which emerged from an analysis of the data. The nature of 
nonprofit governance is defined by the principal aspect of a contradiction, which determines or 
influences the existence and development of the other contradictions.  
The principal contradiction is the ‘the clash of neoliberal and public service world views which 
exists at every level of the nonprofit sector’. The principal contradiction drives the creation of 
different expressions of corporate governance in the various sub-sectors, which are determined 
through contingent, path dependent mechanisms. 
That is, neoliberal orthodoxy, which is realised in the structure of the nonprofit sector is 
opposed in principle by the public service orthodoxy of the nonprofit sector. The thesis and 
antithesis are synthesised into the governance practices of the UK nonprofit sector which, while 
being within these structures operates in opposition to them with the aim of delivering a service 
to its clients ‘despite the regulatory frameworks’. 
The subordinate contradictions which flow from this are:  
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(i) at an environmental level, regulatory power versus sector power;  
(ii) at board level, effective board duality (the formal board versus the SMT), decision 
making, power, and rationalities; and 
(iii) at the individual level, the motivations (individual and a sense of duty).  
These are now discussed in more detail.  
7.1.1 Environmental Level Contradictions 
The neoliberal ideology created the structures and governance frameworks within which the 
nonprofit sector operates. The concept that a regulatory authority is necessary to ensure that 
the state’s policy objectives are delivered effectively and efficiently by nonprofit organisations 
is embedded within these structures and frameworks. Thus, the ‘regularity state’ is dependent 
upon the nonprofit sector to deliver its responsibilities to its citizens. The nonprofit sector is 
dependent on state frameworks and funding to fulfil its responsibilities and social objectives. 
This is at once, a power and dependency relationship for both parties who have different aims 
and rationalities. The state and its regulatory authorities focus on efficiency and cost 
effectiveness, while the nonprofit sector focuses on delivering social purpose within the 
resources available and conformity to the regulatory environment. 
In this relationship, state power is derived from: 
-  a prevailing, but contested, neoliberal view of the role of the state which creates 
structures of independent (and professional) boards and quasi-markets;  
- democratic legitimacy of the government which provides it the ability to set policy to 
create quasi-markets;  
- the power to determine overall funding levels; and 
- its administration, which commissions, allocates financial resources according to policy, 
and acts as regulators. 
The power of the nonprofit sector and its organisations is derived from: 
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- its role of being the actual deliverer of services, which affects the practicality of policy 
implementation;  
- recruiting and socialising new board members into the collectivist, public service view 
in opposition to the neoliberal view; and 
- collective political influence, principally delivered through sector ‘trade organisations’ 
which seek to shape and reshape politics and regulation within which they operate. 
The neoliberal ideology requires regulatory compliance by the nonprofit organisation, which 
constrains the freedom of action of boards, but this also creates nonprofit board independence. 
The board therefore must therefore balance the basis of its decisions making between: a 
collectivist the public service view, ethically orientated to deliver social purpose; and one 
driven by the regulatory need for efficiency and economy. Thus, the nonprofit sector is 
dependent on the state but in many respects, opposes the view of the ‘hand that pays it’. 
This relationship fundamentally rests on the changing relative power of the political and 
regulatory authority, and the sector. The result of this struggle between opposites is the ever-
developing political environment in which: regulatory authorities regularly change their 
approaches to regulation; policies are changed as the result of lobbying and campaigning by 
the sector; and boards recognise and adapt to the principal risk to their organisation being 
changes of government policy. 
In summary, the nonprofit sector operates within an ideological framework with which its 
members do not necessarily agree. The political and regulatory frameworks seek to transform 
this sector view through the structures of regulation, quasi-markets and professionalised boards.  
7.1.2 Board Level Contradictions 
The contradictions at board level are discussed below, under the headings of: accountability; 





Nonprofit sector organisations do not have shareholders who have invested for a return. The 
state, through its regulatory and funding agencies, invests in, revenue funds, and directs the 
sector to achieve the government’s policy aims. Sector organisations are effectively 
accountable to the state through the relevant regulatory authority.  
Nonprofit boards are formally constituted according to specific legislation and have the same 
general responsibilities and accountabilities as for-profit boards. The neoliberal model for the 
nonprofit board is based on the for-profit board, populated by skilled professionals who do not 
represent the organisation’s client group. However, nonprofit boards are focused on the 
delivery of social purpose; and use their professional skills for the benefit of the ‘client’; and 
feel morally accountable them, rather than to the regulator. 
(ii) SMT 
As an historical and sector-based norm, the board operates as a legally constituted trustee board, 
supported by an SMT. The latter exists because the trustee board has only a non-operational 
governance role, and the expectation of the sector that the SMT should both advise the board 
and implement its decisions. However, the SMT is far more than a passive subject of the board, 
and seeks to guide, influence, and support the board in its strategy and decision making. In 
effect, the legally constituted board has ultimate authority and responsibility, but has little 
direct power. The SMT has no legal authority; but has great organisational power and influence 
over the board. 
(iii) Board Practices and Rituals 
The formal processes and rituals of the board shape: how it sees itself; how others see it; and 
its authority. The formality of board meetings provides: (a) a framework within which to 
conduct business professionally; (b) actual and symbolic authority for its decisions; (c) a theatre 
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where the actors play out their authority over the SMT and the organisation; and (d) a 
demonstration of ethical standards, probity and transparency.  
(a) Professional Framework 
The board is expected, by the regulator in particular, to operate in a professional manner, in 
accordance with generally expected standards of corporate governance. Board members are 
similarly expected to be sufficiently skilled and experienced to fulfil their roles as directors. 
This professional framework includes the use of: formal meeting agendas, supporting papers 
generally prepared by the SMT with the authority of the chief executive; and their proper 
consideration by board members using their independent professional judgement.  
(b) Actual and Symbolic Authority 
The board has actual authority over the organisation and its management through its legal 
powers. The board governs, and the management manages as directed by the board. The board 
expresses it authority through its leadership by: defining the organisation’s social purpose; 
providing strategic direction; making key decisions; and holding the executive to account.  
The board also provides symbolic leadership. This leadership can be expressed through being 
a public face of the organisation. However, it also be little more than a ‘rubber stamp’ for 
management’s decisions giving legitimacy to managerial decisions. 
(c) The Board Meeting as Theatre 
Governance structures provide the forum for the conduct of business, as a theatre of formality 
and respect which directors inhabit. This theatre provides the means for people to demonstrate 
power, convictions, and motivations ranging from self-esteem to altruism. It also acts as the 
focal point for the informal processes of socialisation to common values of the board and 
organisation. 
The players in this theatre are all the participants of the board meeting in their different formal 
and informal roles. There are both internal and external audiences for this theatre. The internal 
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audiences comprise: non-executives in their interactions with each other in debate or in creating 
atmosphere; non-executives as the audience to the executive in demonstrating their skill, 
knowledge, support or resistance to the board; and the executives, where the non-executives 
act out their power, criticality or supportive roles. 
The external audiences are the: general public or public media, where the non-confidential parts 
of meetings held in public, such as in NHS trusts and state schools; regulator, through formal 
minutes or as part of an inspection; and organisation through (privileged) staff invitees and 
reports of the meetings.  
The concept of the board as theatre thus provides the model where the meeting is 
‘choreographed’ to achieve the results and impressions desired by the chair or by the dominant 
coalition. 
(d) Ethical Standards, Probity and Transparency 
There is a general societal acceptance of selflessness as a motive of the leaders of nonprofit 
organisations. The high expectations by society of probity; and high ethical standards of non-
executives and executives are taken as a norm. The nonprofit non-executive is expected, and 
expects to, act in accordance with the common threads of public service ethos of: impartiality, 
accountability, trust, equity, probity and service. 
The political, regulatory and ethical environment provides a strong framework for the standards 
of board behaviour and probity. Members are expected, by both the general public and the 
regulator, to adhere to the highest standards of probity in accordance with accepted standards 
and norms of public service, such as the Nolan principles. 
The board operates within its formal structures, and its accountability must be transparently 
demonstrable to the regulator and the general public. The concept of theatre however, provides 
for the ‘illusion of transparency’ where decisions are effectively made ‘behind the scenes’, and 




Challenge is generally accepted as a key function of corporate governance; and as one of the 
core functions of the board. The substantive theory extends the concept of challenge from that 
of ‘querying, clarifying, seeking justification, and arguing’; by proposing that it should be 
viewed in terms of the following interactions. 
(a) Challenge is an expression of power relations between groups within the organisation, 
particularly between non-executives and executives. The balance of power between 
these two groups can define an organisation and the way in which the board effects 
governance. 
(b) All the groups in the organisation unite in response to the external challenge of 
regulatory inspection. 
(c) The response of the person or group challenged to that challenge may have either 
positive of negative results. That is challenge may be a creative force which develops a 
proposal or may the challenge may be resisted. 
(d) The possibility of board challenge; and the prospect of rejection of an executive 
produced board paper, provides a mechanism which helps to ensure that papers are 
contain coherent arguments, so that the recommendations may be accepted by the board. 
(v) Rationality and Decision Making 
There is a contradiction between rationality which underlies social purpose driven nonprofit 
governance and that which underpins the neoliberal approach. The nonprofit board actors use 
rationales which are based on: its nature as a small social group with group emotions; the public 
service ethos; while conforming to the legal requirements of the state. Thus, nonprofit boards 
tend to take decisions using rationalities founded on social purpose; and use economic 
rationalities to support tactical investment decisions and as a demonstration of compliance to 
the regulator.   
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7.1.3 Contradictions at the Level of the Individual 
The individual faces a number of contradictions associated the role of nonprofit director, which 
are to do with: motivations; moral duty and social purpose; social group membership; 
identification; and confidence, credibility and trust.  
(i) Motivations 
Non-executive directors are recruited from both inside and outside the nonprofit sector. Non-
executive directors are generally driven by intrinsic motivations. However, a person’s 
motivations are context dependent. For example, people who have (or have had) roles in the 
for-profit sector act in one way in the for-profit role and another for the nonprofit role, based 
on motivations relevant to the sector.  
(ii) Moral Duty and Social Purpose 
An individual is intrinsically motivated to become a nonprofit director, because of moral duty 
or altruism. (This however does not rule out certain extrinsic motivations such as career 
development through building experience on a board, but this is not the principal motivation). 
One motivation not found in the nonprofit sector is that of supporting the government or 
regulatory objective of increasing efficiency, which is a key ideological reason for bringing 
professionals onto the nonprofit board.  
(iii) Social Group Membership 
The individual non-executive director takes pride in using professional skills and judgement in 
the service of the social purpose of the organisation, but also acts as a member of the social 
group of nonprofit directors in upholding the interests of the organisation’s clients, if necessary, 
against those of the regulatory authorities.  
(iv) Identification 
Non-executive and executive directors identify with the board, the nonprofit organisation and 
the sector. This identification represents a psychological attachment, which is the individual’s 
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commitment, resulting from identification with the attitudes, values, or goals of the 
organisation. It also has an emotional component, that is, a feeling of affective commitment to 
the board as a group, and thereby to the organisation. The sense of moral duty, altruism and 
identification provide a link between an individual’s voluntary participation and commitment 
to an organisation and to positive manifestations of altruism.  
The individual director enacts challenge within this context of identification. The nature of 
challenge by the individual non-executive director of the executive is overlaid by the 
identification with the challenger with those under challenge. 
(v) Confidence, Credibility and Trust 
The confidence which individual board members have in each other, and with the executive is 
the bedrock upon which the board rests. This means that members should be: credibility: that 
is can be trusted and believed in; and have personal integrity by virtue of being honest and 
having strong moral principles. These qualities provide members with the confidence to: trust 
each other and, the executive; and feel that they are all acting in the best interests of the 
organisation and its clients.  
7.2 Review of the Substantive Theory  
This section considers where the substantive theory is situated within the various theories of 
psychology, governance, and corporate governance. Theories of corporate governance have 
underlying assumptions about the nature and motivation of its actors and of society, which 
range from self-interest, as a strong theoretical basis particularly for economic and governance 
theories, through to altruism as the assumed motivations. Therefore, the psychological, or 
behavioural bases, of nonprofit corporate governance are considered in the first sub-section. 
The relationship of the substantive theory with the general governance environment is then 
highlighted in the second sub-section. The third and final sub-section then discusses the 
relationships between the substantive theory and the main theories of corporate governance. 
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7.2.1 Behavioural Bases 
The substantive theory is set within the behavioural ambit, which rests on the foundations of 
individual traits, and the interactions of social groups, underpinned by concepts of rationality, 
trust, and conformity. The most important aspects for the nonprofit sector are: social purpose-
based rationalities; trust in other members and the executive; conformity with societal and 
sector norms; altruism; moral duty; and collective values rather than those of self-interest. 
These are underpinned by theories of: identity; social identity; social groups; rationality; and 
motivation, which are important in the description of nonprofit governance.  
At an individual level, the substantive theory recognises identity as core to the ways in which 
structure and function are related to the behavioural roles played in society. These role-
identities are self-conceptions based on enduring, normative, reciprocal ongoing relationships 
with other people. Thus, identities based on positional roles provide the individual with a sense 
of who they are and how they ought to behave.  
Social identity is the individual's knowledge of belonging to a social group along with an 
emotional and value significance of group membership. The nonprofit sector has a distinctive 
social identity, unified, amongst other things, through common feelings of seeking to achieve 
social purposes, the community of empathy, and moral duty towards the clients of the sector. 
The way people act appears to depend on frame or context, which can be used to explain why 
the same person will act differently as an executive or non-executive director in the for-profit 
sector than as a non-executive director in a nonprofit organisation. This provides the logic 
which places reliance on the intrinsic ethical motivational basis in the nonprofit sector; 
accompanied by a specific rationality, which underlies much of nonprofit corporate governance.  
The substantive theory recognises the importance of morality, and specifically the public 
service ethos, as a basis of individual motivation; with the latter’s common threads of: 
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impartiality, accountability, trust, equity, probity and service. The belief in values and socially 
role of nonprofit organisation is also important to those who work and govern in those 
organisations. 
The substantive theory recognises nonprofit boards to have the same features as for-profit in 
terms of many of its dynamics, as discussed in Section 3.10 above. While the commonalities 
are grounded in the ways in which boards operate as elite groups responsible for the governance 
of an organisation; they are distinguished by the existence in the nonprofit sector of an SMT 
and their accountability.  
7.2.2 Governance 
The substantive theory is situated within the regulated and politicised environment of quasi-
markets created by neoliberalism through NPM. Neoliberalism is taken as a theory of political 
economic practices, where the role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional 
framework appropriate to such practices. The substantive theory is based on the idea that the 
socialised world view of nonprofit directors and managers is at odds with this ideology; and its 
main foci are regulation, and the principal-agent relationship. 
The dominant view of neoliberalism is as a form of state or a mode of regulation; which exist 
in all societies, with the objective of controlling activities of various markets, quasi-markets 
and the public sector. The regularity regimes mean that the boards of nonprofit organisations 
are often constrained in their ability to steer the organisation, because they are subject to a high 
degree of political direction and control from government.  
While governance remains political by nature, comprising formal and informal institutions, 
decisions, and influences, the political and regularity environment has been made more 
complex by the creation of principal–agent relations throughout much of the machinery of 
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government and the nonprofit sector. The agency relationship is replicated in the organisation 
itself as required by the regulator and ‘good governance principles’.  
7.2.3 Theories of Corporate Governance 
The relationship of the substantive theory, which is situated within the ‘black box’ field of 
behavioural theories of governance, is now considered in relation to: agency; shareholder and 
stakeholder; stewardship; institutional; resource dependence; and managerial hegemony 
theories. 
(i) Agency 
The behaviours of the board actors are based on the acceptance of agency theory as ‘good 
governance practice’. The substantive theory argues that this acceptance is implemented at the 
regulatory, board, and SMT levels, in ways which reflect power relationships. Agency theory 
is concerned with resolving the conflicting desires or goals of the principal and agent.  
In the clash of orthodoxies axial code, discussed in Section 6.8.1, the state (through its funding 
and regulatory agencies) is the ‘principal’ in agency theory terms. The state seeks to discharge 
its responsibilities using boards, as agents, as the mechanisms of the regulated quasi-market. 
The substantive theory proposes that the board is the agent in this respect because of its 
identification with the organisation’s social purpose, and the view of the regulator as a common 
‘threat’. However, the nonprofit board can be regarded as a principal and the executive the 
agent in the delivery of the organisation’s social purpose. 
(ii) Shareholder and Stakeholder Theories 
The scope of the substantive theory does not extend to for-profit organisations, where investors 
of capital expect a return. Some nonprofit organisations are incorporated as companies limited 
by guarantee or the equivalent and have shareholders; but there are no distributions of any kind 
to the shareholders. The capital invested in nonprofit organisations in the areas studied, is 
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ultimately derived from government; which requires only the delivery of the services for which 
the organisation was funded. The government is, in this respect, a stakeholder rather than a 
shareholder.  
The substantive theory recognises the contradictions which exist between the interests of key 
stakeholders: that is, the governmental focus on efficiency which are to be delivered by boards 
operating under regulation in quasi-markets; the organisation’s staff seeking to deliver social 
purpose; and the clients of the organisation receiving a service which they can regard as a right. 
The key challenges for stakeholder governance are thus the reconciliation of the competing 
claims of economic efficiency and those of social purpose. As O’Sullivan (2000) observed, the 
stakeholder perspective can be seen as more of a “political position than as an economic theory 
of governance” (p. 402).  
(iii) Stewardship Theory  
Stewardship theory has its roots in psychology and sociology, and was designed for situations 
in which executives as stewards are motivated to act in the best interests of their principals 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Davis et al. (1997) argue that in stewardship theory “the model 
of man is based on a steward whose behaviour is ordered such that pro-organisational, 
collectivistic behaviours have higher utility than individualistic, self-serving behaviours” (p. 
24). The substantive theory also makes significant use of psychological and sociological 
theories and, as with stewardship theory, is concerned with the issues of motivation, 
identification, power, and the cultural differences between individualism and collectivism.  
In stewardship theory Davis et al. (1997) argue that, in contrast to agency theory, stewards 
“believe their interests are aligned with that of the corporation and its owners. Thus, the 
steward's interests and utility motivations are directed to organisational rather than personal 
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objectives” (p. 25). The substantive theory broadens this organisational view to include the 
intrinsic duty-based motivations of the stewards through the concept of social purpose.  
The substantive theory applies the term ‘steward’ to both the board and to the management of 
the organisation and argues that identification occurs when these ‘stewards’ define themselves 
in terms of membership of social groups based on membership of: the board; the organisation; 
the sector; and those with a common world view. The substantive theory’s inclusion of the 
concept of identification aligns with the stewardship view, where individuals identify with their 
organisations, and thus become readier to engage in cooperative, altruistic, and spontaneous 
unrewarded citizenship behaviours (O'Reilly and Chatman, 1986; Smith et al., 1983). 
Davis et al. (1997) argue that power is an important aspect of the relationship between a 
principal and a manager; in that managers receive satisfaction from, and are motivated by, the 
use of power. The substantive theory extends this view of power into that of the dialectical 
relationship of power and resistance, and to the struggle between the stewards and the 
‘principals’. 
(iv) Institutional Governance 
The substantive theory places importance on the political and ethical environments, which 
accords with the concept that institutions are based on the existence of a set of normative 
systems which persist, in varying forms and content, in all societies. This nexus of norms, 
values, and taken-for-granted assumptions about what constitutes appropriate or acceptable 
economic behaviour is rooted in conformity and common understandings about what is 
appropriate behaviour.  
The substantive theory situates nonprofit governance specifically in power relationships 
between the government, regulator, board, and executive. This reflects the proposition that 
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institutions are inherently about the role of power (Stinchcombe, 1968), and always reflect 
political processes (Fiss, 2008).  
(v) Resource Dependence 
While resource dependence theory is set within the private sector, the issues of power, authority 
and leadership are applicable and more demanding in nonprofit organisations. As stated in 
Section 3.8.5, the three core ideas of resource dependency theory are that: (1) social context 
matters; (2) organisations have strategies to enhance their autonomy and pursue interests; and 
(3) power (not just rationality or efficiency) is important for understanding internal and external 
actions of nonprofit organisations.  
The substantive theory focuses on values, power and politics. As Anheier (2005) argues, 
“values in nonprofit organisations makes them intrinsically political institutions. Values do not 
exist in isolation but are imprinted in organisational cultures, enacted through day-to-day 
activities, and evoked on special occasions and during decision-making. The link between 
values, power, and politics is critical, and values form the basis of power” (p. 160). 
(vi) Managerial Hegemony  
The substantive theory argues from the premise that the study of boards should not be separated 
from that of power in institutions and society, nor from studies of the composition and attributes 
of top management teams (Pettigrew, 1992). It places an emphasis on the role and power of the 
SMT and its relationships with the formal board of the nonprofit organisation. This view is best 
described by managerial hegemony theory, but subject to the context of various constraints and 
the latent power of stakeholders such as external board members (Cornforth and Chambers, 
2010; Herman, 1981). From this perspective the board can be little more than a ‘rubber stamp’ 
for management’s decisions, its function becomes essentially symbolic, giving legitimacy to 
managerial decisions. The largely voluntary and lay nature of board involvement in the 
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nonprofit sector may mean that board members’ power is even more limited than in the private 
sector.  
The substantive theory places managerial hegemony in the context of struggle between the 
board, populated by a majority of  non-executives and the SMT under the leadership and control 
of the chief executive. That struggle is set in the arena defined by the neoliberal environment 
and represents a key dynamic of the board.  
7.2.4 Summary 
The substantive theory reflects aspects of all the main theories of corporate governance; and 
emphasises the issues of power and motivation, in the context of the regulated nonprofit sector. 
The main points are summarised below. 
- All the theories rely, implicitly or explicitly, on the concept of context and power in 
relationships, which are situated nexus of norms, values, and taken-for-granted 
assumptions.  
- Accountability to the regulator and government, and the absence of investing 
shareholders leads to a special application of agency theory. 
- The political nature of nonprofit governance is a central consideration. The competing 
priorities of the political and ethical environments are reflected in stakeholder theory. 
- The assumptions concerning motivations, while recognising the dominance of agency 
theory, emphasise the view of stewardship theory and identification of the board with 
the management and the client rather than with the state ‘as principal’.  
The substantive theory adds to these theories by identifying that the SMT as a key player in 
board relationships and governance, which is partially addressed only by managerial hegemony 
theory. The two models of nonprofit corporate governance, shown in section 6.7 above, 
indicate the close relationship between these the legally constituted board and SMT. They also 
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provide a basis for the SMT acting as a coherent group, in whatever formal structure the 
organisation adopts. 
The substantive theory also emphasised the linkages between concept of challenge, decision 
making, and board dynamics. Challenge is a core function, and McDonagh and Limbdenstock, 
(2006) found support for the view of the necessity for group cohesion and positive group 
dynamics for high performing boards, relating most closely to the stewardship theory of boards. 
Agency theory calls for the non-executives to challenge the executive, however Abbott et al. 
(2008) found that although it was part of their remit, board members often avoided a 
challenging style in their relationships with officers, typically acting as ‘critical friends’ rather 
than as scrutineers. They concluded that this behaviour accords with the stewardship and 
stakeholder models of boards rather than agency or managerial hegemony theories. 
7.3 Conclusion 
The thesis concludes by setting out its contributions in terms of: methodology, through the 
application of a combination of ethnography and grounded theory; the theoretical outcomes of 
that methodology; and suggestions for further research.  
7.3.1 Methodology 
The thesis provides an understanding of board processes, group interactions, and decision 
making, which are based on direct access gained to the inner workings of the board. This access 
is regarded in the literature as being both difficult and necessary for gaining this understanding. 
This access allowed the application of an ethnographic approach to provide: direct insights into 
the interactions and operation of boards and senior management, as they occurred in the 
boardroom; along with the social interactions between members. The use of ethnography 
thereby provided the thick description of useful data for grounded theory analysis; and provided 
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the means to gain a greater definition of the internal structures of the corporate governance 
‘black box’ in relation to its regulatory, political and ethical environments.  
The research also used elite interviews to obtain a richer insight into governance, based on the 
experience, motivations, opinions, values, attitudes and feelings of chairs, non-executive 
directors and chief executives.  
The thesis developed a connection between grounded theory and dialectical analysis; which 
equates the dialectical ‘principal contradiction’ with the grounded theory ‘core category’. The 
dialectical contradictions are proposed to provide an engine for the development of nonprofit 
governance, which is then expressed in its various forms though path dependent mechanism in 
the nonprofit sub-sectors. 
7.3.2 Theoretical Outcomes 
The thesis contributed to the development of an understanding of the ways in which nonprofit 
boards operate within the general political, regulatory, and ethical environments in the UK. 
This contribution is described below under the headings of: 
(i) the importance of ideology, politics, regulation, and ethics;  
(ii) linkage to theories of corporate governance; 
(iii) power; 
(iv) interactions with the regulatory, political and ethical environments; 
(v) the internal structure of the board and the importance of the SMT; 
(vi) models of nonprofit governance; and 
(vii) rationalities and emotions.  
(i) The Importance of Ideology, Politics, Regulation, and Ethics 
The substantive theory emphasises the importance of ideology and politics in the creation of 
the environment within which nonprofit corporate governance operates. The power of the 
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regulatory authorities, represents an overriding consideration for nonprofit boards. It also 
represents an internal contradiction, whereby the state and its regulatory authorities focus on 
efficiency and cost effectiveness, while the nonprofit sector focuses on delivering social 
purpose within the resources available and in conformity with the regulatory environment.  
(ii) Linking to Theories of Corporate Governance 
Regulatory environments affect boards and director’s views and actions; and are dependent 
upon the prevailing political context and historical sources of corporate governance. The thesis 
integrates the behavioural view of nonprofit corporate governance to aspects of the other main 
governance theories.  
Nonprofit corporate governance exists within a highly regulated environment; within which 
agency theory simultaneously places: the regulator as principal and the board as agent, when 
considering the quasi-market; and the board as principal and the SMT as agent when 
considering organisational matters. While accepting the dominance of agency theory; the 
substantive theory proposes that stewardship to be an appropriate theory to describe how they 
act as stewards in the delivery of social purpose: through the common cause which the trustee 
board has with the organisation, the sector, and those with a common world view. Both these 
approaches combine in the institutional governance view, which situates nonprofit governance 
specifically in power relationships between the government, regulator, board and executive. 
The thesis argues that the resource dependence view also places power relationships within the 
context of the regulatory environment, by focusing on values, power and politics. The 
dialectical approach then combines this with managerial hegemony, in the context of struggle 
between: the board, populated by a majority of non-executives; and the SMT under the 
leadership and control of the chief executive.  
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The thesis argues that nonprofit governance is placed within its historical, path-dependent 
context, in its development from its neoliberal roots, and its struggle with the public service 
ethos. This context provides the highly regulated environment within which the board exists. 
The research thereby identified and enlarged upon regulation from the point of view of the 
board as regulatee; and brought out this affected the governance of nonprofit organisations. 
(iii) Power 
The thesis argues for the importance of power in nonprofit governance. It proposes that the 
activities, governance structures and practices of the nonprofit organisations, are shaped by the 
power of the political, regularity and ethical environments through: social norms; conformity; 
accepted forms of legitimacy; political control of the state apparatus; regulatory frameworks; 
legal authority; and funding agencies. Power is exhibited: politically and economically by 
government; by regulators who seek to ensure that nonprofit providers deliver services in line 
with political priorities; in public expectations of morality; through the personal interactions of 
the board; the influence of the chief executive and SMT over the board; board control over the 
organisation; and the organisation’s control over the services delivered to its clients. 
(iv) Interaction with the Regulatory, Political and Ethical Environments 
The thesis developed the idea that governance is significantly influenced by the culture, and 
historical practices of ethically driven nonprofit sub-sectors, and of the regulatory environment. 
The nonprofit regulatory environment operates through: public funding regimes; regulatory 
control or oversight; and the operation of quasi-markets implemented through NPM. The 
regulatory and wider value regime is argued to build a culture of conformity which provides a 
means of ensuring the delivery of government policy, compliance with regulation, and the 
acceptance of good corporate governance practice. The regulator also drives compliance 
through its enforcement mechanisms, such as inspections, which are aimed at strengthening 
the culture of ‘conformity’.  
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The sector’s response to regulation is ultimately built on the public view of the nonprofit ethos 
and values. These values include collaboration as opposed to competition is a core nonprofit 
belief (orthodoxy), which opposes the perceived individualism of neoliberalism. 
(v) The Internal Structure of the Board and the Importance of the SMT 
The thesis provided a model of the internal structure of the nonprofit board, and defined that 
boundary to include the SMT. The research provided a more fine-grained view of the internal 
structure of the ‘black box’, which was considered through the lens of group and individual 
motivations such as power and influence, identification and socialisation.  
The identification of the legally constituted board and the SMT as major components of the 
board allowed the recognition that the interaction of these components is the key drivers of 
nonprofit governance. This provided an insight into what is a de facto dual board structure 
where, although the SMT does not have the legal authority of the board, it holds significant 
power on individual boards.  
(vi) Models of Nonprofit Corporate Governance 
The thesis proposed two models, or representations, of nonprofit corporate governance, as 
shown in Figures One and Two, as a conceptual framework. The first Figure framed the board 
‘black box’ in terms of the ideological, cultural, and motivational contexts, or environment. It 
regards the board as a sub-system or ‘black box’ of the environment, which encompasses both 
the trustee board and senior management. 
The second representation showed the interactions between the key elements of corporate 
governance. This allows the relationships within the ‘black box’ and interactions with the 
external environment to be theorised in terms of individual motivations, social groups, social 
purpose, ideology, power, and assumptions about rationality.  
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(vii) Rationalities and Emotions 
The thesis linked the concepts of rationality, emotion, power, and corporate governance. The 
substantive theory proposes that nonprofit board actors use rationalities which are based on 
group emotions, achieving social purpose, and the public service ethos. The contradiction 
between this rationality and the economics-based rationality which underpins the neoliberal 
constructed environment of quasi-markets, is proposed to be an important driver in nonprofit 
governance.  
The proposed inter-relationships between emotion, duty and rationality leads to the argument 
that moral duty, altruism and empathy are of importance to the nonprofit sector. Further, the 
close emotional association which is ‘identification’ with the client rather than with the ‘owner’ 
or regulator is a key affectation. It is closely associated with group membership; and is an 
intrinsic part of the socialisation process.  
7.3.3 Areas for Further Research 
The suggested areas for further research, which are discussed below, relate to: a comparison of 
corporate governance in the for-profit and nonprofit sectors; the application of the processes of 
challenge within the nonprofit culture; and a consideration of the SMT as a major player in 
governance. 
 
(i) Comparative Corporate Governance 
This research investigated corporate governance in the highly regulated UK nonprofit sector; 
and found that it was heavily influenced by the political, regulatory and ethical environments 
and by historical context.  
In the context of an international study of comparative corporate governance, Howell (2016) 
noted that local cultures and traditions exist and create tensions in relation to established codes 
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and regulations. Individuals however, adopted rationales to act through self-interest (egoism) 
and / or the common interest (altruism), which underpinned the ways they as agents behave 
when dealing with moral dilemmas and regulation. While, as Letza (2015) notes the 
“standardisation of corporate governance …. across many different countries may … seem like 
a sound approach” (p.191), the context or environment seems to play an important role. 
Historical context also means that corporate governance involves a reflection of political 
socioeconomic struggles in a particular environment rather than considerations of efficiency 
and agency relations between stakeholders and boards (Fligstein and Choo, 2005).  
Aguilera and Jackson (2010) argue that “institutions matter for corporate governance, but how 
they matter remains a hotly contested question. National systems of corporate governance 
differ in terms of their institutional arrangements, and those differences shape the possibilities 
for change or diffusion of practices from one country to another. Yet, most research stops short 
of spelling out what those key institutions might be and how they matter for corporate 
governance as a firm-level phenomenon” (p. 490). 
There appears to be a parallel between the search to understand corporate governance through 
international comparisons of different institutions, cultures and legal regimes; and a 
comparison of corporate governance in different cultural and legal regimes which exist side by 
side in the for-profit and nonprofit sectors of the same country. Such a comparison could add 
value to the approach to comparative corporate governance. This approach could be 
implemented directly by comparative studies of the boards in these sectors. 
(ii) Challenge 
The ethnographic investigation of nonprofit governance supported the generally accepted view 
of the centrality of ‘challenge’ to corporate governance. This thesis sought to extend the 
common understanding of the concept of the under-researched concept challenge in terms of 
interactions. There is scope for further research into this key concept and its associated 
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practices to deepen this understanding. The research would determine its various frames, 
modes, and methods in support of the main theories of governance in both the for-profit and 
nonprofit sectors. 
(iii) SMT 
This thesis identified the importance to corporate governance of the senior management team 
acting as a group. However, the nonprofit SMT has not been the subject of a significant research 
in terms of either its operation as an important component of management, or its corporate 
governance interaction with the board. Such research could be undertaken through in-depth 





Appendix 1  Analysis of Data Sources 
 
This appendix provides an analysis of the: 
i) data sources in terms of the sectors from which it was obtained; and 
ii) the background of the participating members of those boards. 
1. Analysis of Data Sources 
Data was collected through participatory observations of boards, board committees, ad hoc 
working groups of a total of 5 nonprofit organisations (1 social housing, 1 Local Authority (LA) 
controlled school, 1 Multi-Academy Trust and 2 charities), and sector practitioner meetings, as 
shown below. 
Analysis of Data Sources 
  Nonprofit sub-sector 







12 6 3 1 2 
Board Committee 
meetings 
10 7 3   
Ad hoc working groups 
 
5 4   1 
Practitioners’ meetings 
 
9 3 3 3  
Total 
 
36  22 9 4 3 
 
2. Backgrounds of the participating members 
While the data was collected from four nonprofit sub-sectors, the members of those boards 
have experience in other nonprofit sub-sectors as well as in for-profit organisations. It is argued 
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that these board participants bring with them experiences and norms from those other 
organisations into their membership of the nonprofit boards considered. 
Thus, the 54 non-executive and executive participants of the meetings analysed above have a 
breadth of personal skills, experience and backgrounds which constitute identities separate to 
those as participants in the participating organisations. These differing identities can be 
argued to influence the ways in which they enact governance. The analysis provided below 
and the commentary which follows it represents contextual information and does not seem to 
appropriate for statistical purposes.  

















Male 12 6 6 3 27 
Female 5 7 7 8 27 
Total 17 13 13 11 54 
Of which are:      
a) Retired 7  3 1 11 
b) Member of a profession 5  1 1 7 
c) Hold positions in other 
organisations as 
     
 Chair 4  5  9 
 CEO 5   1 6 
      
Background in other nonprofit 
sub-sectors 
     
a) NHS        
Non-exec director 3    3 
 Exec director 1    1 
 Non-board  1 1 1 3 
      
b) Local Government      
 Member 4    4 
 Officer 1  1  2 
c) Positions in the same 
nonprofit sub-sector 
     
 Non-exec 2   1 3 
 Officer 2 1 2 4 9 
d) Charities 2 1 1 2 6 
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Private Sector      
 Director 1   2 3 
 Owner   1 3 4 
 Non-board position  1    
 
Membership of the 5 boards in aggregate had an equal representation of men and women. While 
all the organisations have a stated commitment to equality and diversity, there is no evidence 
of ‘quotas’ being applied. 20% of the people on the boards were retired, which is comparable 
the 18% of the UK population which according to the Office for National Statistics 2017, is 
over 65 (“the traditional retirement age”). There is however a marked difference between the 
social housing board and LA controlled education, which possibly reflects the differing skills 
and backgrounds required by these boards. The sample is designed to support a qualitative 
approach and is inappropriate for the purpose of drawing statistically based conclusions. 
The analysis of individual participants does however indicate that there is a significant degree 
of ‘cross membership’ of boards. That is, board members in one nonprofit sub-sector are likely 
to be members of boards in either another nonprofit sub-sectors or in the for-profit sector.  
Although the data collection did not include an NHS or Local Authorities, they were strongly 
represented by 13 board members on the boards in the sample. There was also a significant 





Appendix 2  Data Collection and Analysis 
 
The first section of this appendix provides a description of the methods used in data collections. 
The second section provides a description and an example of the data and its analysis into open 
codes. In this analysis, elements of data of may comprise several discrete items, each of which 
produces a key issue. A single element may also generate several key issues and thus open 
codes.  
The resulting full list of open codes, shown in Table 1, also shows the number of such data 
elements supporting each open code as an indication of the possible importance of that code. 
 
1. Data Collection Method 
Data was collected by participatory observation of board, committee, and working group 
meetings.  
A formal agenda was produced by the executive for each meeting, and usually each item on 
the agenda was supported by a formal paper. These ‘board papers’ and agenda were circulated 
to the members about one week before the meeting. The meetings proceeded according to the 
agenda, with each item on the agenda supported by a board paper which was written and 
presented by an executive director, with the approval of the chief executive. The board then 
discussed the board paper, making whatever decisions it considered appropriate.  
The board papers usually comprised, in total, around 200 pages, and meetings lasted for 
approximately two hours. The board may delegate work to its committees, which operate using 
the same processes as the main board.  
The participatory observation process comprised: participation; contemporaneous note during 
meetings; and formal recording and review after the meeting. The review, with observations, 
Page 275 
 
comments, key issues and open codes recorded against each item on the agenda; as described 
in the following section by way of example. 
 
2. Description and an Example of the Data and its Analysis 
This section presents an example of the data and its analysis from one board meeting. The 
meeting agenda is presented first, along with stated purpose or recommendation of each item 
on the agenda. This is followed in the next section by the analysis used for the data obtained at 
this sample meeting. 
 
2.1 Agenda 
An example of a meeting agenda, shown below, lists the agenda items, with an indication of 
the purpose or recommendation made in the paper supporting each item.  
Item 
No. 
Agenda Item Purpose / Recommendations 
1 Apologies and Welcome 
 
 
2 Declarations of interest Board members declare whether they have 
any interest in any of the agenda items. 
Appropriate note or action is agreed for the 
relevant item. 
3 Confidential Session – board 
members only 
 
For board members to discuss any relevant 
confidential matter without the presence of 
staff. 
4 Minutes of the previous board 
meeting 
For approval 
5 Matters arising from the 
previous meeting 
To inform the board of the actions taken as 
the result of the previous meeting 
6 Chief Executive’s Report 
 
To highlight items on the board agenda of 
particular significance, and to raise other 
items of interest to members or that need 
board approval which are not covered 
elsewhere. 
7 Welfare Reform update 
 
Members are invited to discuss this paper and 




8 Development strategy outturn For the board to note. 
9 Financial assumptions for new 
build 
The board is requested to approve the 
assumptions. 
10 HCA programme The board is asked to approve the 
membership of a task and finish group, and to 
delegate that group to prepare a bid. 
11 Voluntary right to buy For the board to note the contents of the 
report and that further updates will be 
provided. 
12 Management accounts For the board to note. 
13 Regulatory self-assessment and 
update 
The board is asked to approve the self-
assessment and to note the remainder of the 
report. 
14 Treasury report For the board to note. 
15 NHF Governance and 
Standards Codes Compliance 
The board is asked to discuss the compliance 
updates and actions. 
16 Customer involvement and 
scrutiny: the way forward 
For the board to note the approach to 
customer engagement and to approve the 
changes to scrutiny and co-regulation, to 
strengthen compliance with HCA regulation. 
17 IDA Project plan and action 
plan 
For the board to discuss the project and action 
plans. 
18 Data return for the HCA For the board to note. 
19 Statistical data return for the 
HCA 
For the board to note. 
20 Nominations committee 
minutes 
For the board to note. 
21 Audit committee minutes For the board to note. 
22 Subsidiary board minutes For the board to note. 
 
2.2 Analysis of the Data 
Notes were taken during the meeting and analysed afterwards using a standard template 
shown. This template comprised four columns. 
- The first column reflects the agenda item number above. 
- The second column ‘Observation’ records an observation of the discussion of that 
agenda item. 
- The third column ‘Comments’ highlights the points arising from the board paper and 
the board discussion. 
- The fourth column ‘Key Issues’ identifies potential core categories arising from the 
consideration of the item. 
- The fifth column ‘Open Coding’ codes the key issues against codes, which are 
summarised in Table 1 
 
The analysis of this meeting is presented below in order to illustrate the coding procedure. 
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Item Observation (by Agenda Item) Comment Key Issues Open 
Code 
3 (Confidential) Board member only session 
The chair invited the chief executive to brief the 
board on the 4 items shown below. 
(i) Large overspend in an operational area 
This briefing pre-empted the management 
accounts paper later on the agenda. The board 
were asked not to raise questions on this item 
in open session since the chief executive stated 
that she had launched a formal investigation.  
 
(ii) The impending retirement of an 
executive was discussed 
 














The confidential session 
comprising updates by the chief 




















Update on the administrative 
process and sums involved. 
 
1. Pre-meeting management to ensure smooth 
running and no public questioning of the 








2. Succession Planning / risks of losing key 
executives 
 




4. Trust by board members in the Nominations 
Committee. 
5. Uninterest in recruitment of key board position 
by board members who are the sole 
shareholders. 
 



























6 Chief Executive’s Report 
Quite a lengthy report containing, amongst 
other things,  




The formal documentation and 
changes to the lending 
7. The formal approach of the board to the 
approval of (important) technical documents. 
This is based almost entirely on external/officer 







- Lending agreement revision required as a 
result of the reorganisation.  
- A statement on Modern Slavery, which is 










- Risk map update 
 
 
agreement to the value of £77m 
were approved ‘on the nod’. 
 
A few members made comments 
designed to improve the draft 
modern slavery statement, which 
the comments evidenced was 
not well written. 
 
A board member appointed by 
the local council commented on 
the development 
 
A board member who is a 
pensions specialist commented 
on the reduction of the pensions 
risk rating. 
8. Executive credibility. The practice of putting 
poorly drafted statements (Modern Slavery 
Statement) to the board potentially damages 
executive credibility. 
9. Papers presented to the board have the 
authority of the chief executive, (who should 
ensure that an adequate review of such takes 
place). 
10. The minimal impact of individual board member 
expertise and external position on the working of 
the board. Especially if these areas of expertise 
and knowledge are not shared by other 












7 Welfare Reform Update 
This was presented as a background paper 
because ”for the IDA it is necessary to 
demonstrate that we are aware” of the 
relevant legislative issues. The board had only 






The regulatory framework of the 
HCA in terms of IDA (in depth 
assessment) of boards is making 
organisations: a) produce 
documentation to evidence our 
knowledge and awareness – 
which we may or may not fully 
have; and b) use this as a vehicle 
for increasing individual 
knowledge in reality. 
 
11. Regulator driving compliance through their 
enforcement mechanisms – strengthening the 






8 Development Strategy Outturn 
One minute of board time spent on the outturn 
report on “Development [which] is a high risk 
activity … closely monitored by both senior 
management and board”, as stated in the risk 
 
The time spent by the board is 
not necessarily a good indicator 
of the importance that it gives to 
the item. 
12. Active monitoring role of the board  
13. “Monitor in Being” (as in the naval concept of 
fleet in being as a deterrent). The existence of 







management section of the paper. The board 
did not do other than pass over the paper. 
 
 
Does the board have to ask 
questions of a paper to 
demonstrate its monitoring and 
concern? 
to ensure that the executive monitor and control 
in detail. 





9 Financial Assumptions for New Builds 
One board member queried a point in the 
paper using his specific technical treasury 
knowledge which produced a useful response 
from the FD. This related to the fact that the 
paper was concerned with the criteria for 
ranking individual projects and did not provide 
any authority to proceed on any specific 
development. 
 
The board must approve 
technical proposals based on the 
board paper, executive support 
and member’s own skills and 
experience. 
15 Board member specific technical expertise 
producing challenge at the board meeting. 
16 Reliance of board members on the specific 
expertise of other members when querying 
technical papers. 









10 HCA Programme 2016-2021 
This paper concerned the process for bidding 
for development money from the HCA national 
capital programme 2016-2021. This bid to be 
prepared by a Task and Finish Group appointed 
by the board. The paper asked for membership 
of this group to be determined by the board.  
The bid will effective set the development 
programme and internal subsidy for each house 
to be built for the next 5 years. It is thus an 
important decision. 
 
The chair called for volunteers 
from board members and two 
new board members offered and 
were accepted by the chair. The 
chair then asked if some more 
established members would 
volunteer. I did but no one else. 
The Task and Finish will then 
meet twice and comprise 
Development Director, Finance 
Director and three board 
members. 
The board will ratify the decision 
of the task and finish group. 
18 Delegation of detailed board tasks to 
committees and ad hoc groups 
19 Effective (although not formal) delegation of 





11 Voluntary Right to Buy (VRTB) 
The report was an update – similar to the paper 
on Welfare Reform above 
Keeping the board informed of 
the political climate and 
legislation. 
20 Evidence for the regulator of our good 
governance 
OC 5 
12 Management Accounts The previously agreed format of 
showing last year comparatives 
21 Reliance by the board on board members with 




Standard management accounts paper, albeit 
for the final month of the year. 
There were no questions on this paper (see 





had not been applied in this set 
of accounts. 
 
The prior year comparatives are 
important data, which the FD 
previously resisted passively for a 
long time before implementing. 
No one picked up on it 
22 Low board challenge ( in face of apparently good 
financial results) 
23 Resistance of the executive to change requested 
by board members or the board. 
24 Professional pride of the executive causing 
resistance to change requested by board 










13/15 Regulatory Self-Assessment and Update 
And 
NHF Governance Standards Code Compliance 
This report had previously been considered at 
the Governance Committee. Its purpose is to 
provide assurance to the board that the 
organisation is fully compliant with the HCA’s 
regulations 
 





The report did not make an 
explicit summary statement 
which said that we (or do not) 
comply. Instead it was a detailed 
schedule discussed at 
committee, and slightly amended 
as a result. On questioning, we 
were assured that it meant that 
we were compliant. 
I asked that in future it should 
make an explicit statement 
 
25 Reliance on and trust in a board committee. 
 
26 Focus on the evidence of regulatory compliance 






16 Customer Involvement & Scrutiny – The Way 
Forward 
At 19 minutes, this item received the broadest 
attention and interaction of board members. 
Obtaining tenant engagement is a sector wide 
problem, and a previous strategy development 
session we agreed that as an organisation we 
needed to understand and empathise with our 
tenant; and continuing to attempt to do this 
through the traditional tenant participation 
processes was futile. 
Reflects to board’s focus on its 
social purpose and its tenants. 
 
The board paper stated that the 
purpose was “to strengthen 
compliance with the HCA 
regulation” However the board 
was unanimous in its view that 
we do it because we want to 
improve tenant involvement and 
27 Focus on social purpose 
28 Accountability of the board to the Regulator not 
to its tenants 
29 Tenant involvement  
30 Historical context of tenant democracy carried 
forward to the current housing sector orthodoxy. 
 
 
31 Board have emotional commitment to the 












The paper suggested a new structure for 
customer [tenant] involvement and 
participation. The general view was that we are 
happy to try it. . . . but remembering that 
participating tenants are not ‘tenant 
representatives’. They are there just to provide 








One board member specifically 
focuses on tenant engagement / 
tenant scrutiny of the board; 
acting as a tenant advocate. (He 
is not a tenant himself). 
17 In Depth Assessment (IDA) project Plan and 
Action Plan 
The paper was produced as the result of a 
discussion at the recent board away day on the 
“mock IDA” carried out by external consultants. 
The purpose is to be prepared for the IDA when 
the organisation receives notification of the 
inspection 
Detailed project timetable for 
the collation of documents and 
last minute preparation for the 
relevant board members. 
So, when the regulatory review 
comes round we can present the 
best picture of governance in the 
organisation. 
32 Board focus on the importance of perceived 
regulatory compliance enforced through 
inspection 
33 Preparation for regulatory inspection 
34 Importance of governance grades, and the 
threat of public downgrading 
 
35 Threat of publically published downgrades as a 
motivation for executive and board compliance 
action. 
36 Form of compliance (results of inspection) not 
necessarily linked to actual performance, ie 



















There was a good level of 
participation by board members; 
particularly on the topic of 
customer involvement. 
Generally, members all made a 
contribution, with the executives 
participating only to support 
their papers. 





Table 1 Open Codes 
 
Table 1 lists the open codes which were generated during data collection and analysis, as 
described in Sections 6.1 and 6.2. 
 
OC Open Codes  Number 
of Data 
Points 
1 Organisation norms of CEO attendance at Audit Committee 2 
2 Respect expected by the committee chairman expected of the executive 2 
3 Executive respect for the audit committee 2 
4 The Regulator and the regulatory regime 14 
5 Regulatory compliance 15 
6 Transmission of regulatory compliance by consultants and auditors and other 
outside bodies 
4 
7 Reliance on external expert member opinion and member critical judgement   3 
8 Politeness between board members and chief executives 1 
9 Committee engagement with reasonably detailed and familiar reports 1 
10 Existence of ‘ingroup’ and ‘outgroup’ in the board and SMT 4 
11 Pre-meeting management 2 
12 Executive succession plans 1 
13 Chief executive networks 1 
14 Reliance on and trust by board members in board committees 10 
15 Uninterest in recruitment of key board position by board members who are the 
sole shareholders. 
1 
16 Board oversight of chief executive 1 
17 Board approval of (important) technical documents 6 
18 Executive credibility 2 
19 Papers presented to the board have the authority of the chief executive 4 
20 The impact of individual board member expertise 3 
21 Regulator driving compliance through their enforcement mechanisms 
(including financial regimes) – strengthening the culture of ‘conformity’ 
10 
22 Active monitoring role of the board 3 
23 “Monitor in Being” (as in the naval concept of fleet in being as a deterrent). 1 
24 Reliance of board members on the specific expertise of other members when 
querying technical papers 
4 
25 Effectiveness of board input on technical matters 1 
26 Delegation of detailed board tasks to committees and ad hoc groups 7 
27 Effective (although not formal) delegation of power to sub-groups 3 
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28 Reliance by the board on board members with financial skills to query the 
accounts 
2 
29 Low board challenge ( in face of apparently good financial results) 3 
30 Resistance of the executive to change requested by board members or the 
board. 
2 
31 Professional pride of the executive causing resistance to change requested by 
board members / board 
1 
32 Focus on social purpose 16 
33 Accountability of the board to the term not to its tenants or clients 3 
34 Tenant involvement 2 
35 Current housing and education sectors orthodoxy 7 
36 Regulatory inspection (IDA) 7 
37 Importance of governance grades, and the threat of public downgrading 3 
38 Threat of publically published downgrades as a motivation for executive and 
board compliance action. 
4 
39 Form of compliance (results of inspection) not necessarily linked to actual 
performance, ie effectiveness of inspection in determining the true position 
1 
 
40 Importance of regulatory grades to executives and members 4 
41 Member to member socialising outside meetings 1 
42 Opportunity for staff achievements to be showcased and to receive board 
applause 
1 
43 Formal chair recruitment processes 3 
44 Board member lack of engagement in the process of chair recruitment 1 
45 Key role played by the Chief Executive (the only executive who is a full board 
member) in the chair recruitment process 
1 
46 Chairing skills 2 
47 Altruistic values driving actions of chair and non-executives 2 
48 Structure of the board affects executive behaviours (ie numbers of executives 
and non-executives) 
2 
49 Meanings and forms of ‘challenge’, including its formalises structure 12 
 
50 Senior management team decision making processes. 5 
51 Board expectations of the chief executive in allowing papers to come to the 
board 
5 
51a Expert input to the board by executives 2 
52 Nature of debate at the board 4 
53 Trust in executive colleagues and information. 5 
54 Understanding of important issues and ‘grip’ at board level of the organisation 3 
 
55 Responsibility of chair and board for organisational failure 1 
56 Personal interactions of board and executives 1 
57 Formal board decision making 5 
58 Ratification by the board 5 
59 Board level conflict (failure to obtain consensus) 4 
60 Board roles of directors dependent upon formal structure (number of non-
executives and executives) 
3 
61 Chair / non-executive roles: challenge and support 8 
62 Roles of the chairman 2 
63 Organisational values 2 
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64 Commitment to the receivers of the organisation’s services (eg housing, 
education, and charity this instance) – social purpose 
11 
65 Tension between ‘social purpose’ and ‘profit’ 3 
66 Antagonism of Social Housing sector professionals to private sector landlords 
specifically (private sector generally) 
4 
67 Core responsibilities of the board: compliance, risk management, framework of 
internal control. (Established in statute in the public sector) 
11 
68 Relationships between the board and its committees and subsidiaries 4 
69 Relationship between the board and CEO 1 
70 Appraisals of board members including chair, CEO and other members 4 
71 Good relations between the board and CEO necessary for good governance and 
delivery of results. 
1 
72 Relationship between governance and results 1 
73 Ambassadorial role of the chair 1 
74 Board cohesion 2 
75 Concept of [the chair and board] ‘critical friend’ of the executive 3 
76 Respectfulness and challenge 58 
77 Chair meeting with board colleagues (building personal relationships) 1 
78 Board meeting agenda management 3 
79 Leadership role of NED and the board 1 
80 Human factors in board processes 2 
81 Stakeholder relationships and engagement 3 
82 Staff engagement with the board 11 
83 Motivations of the executive in proposing the use of task and finish groups 3 
84 Task and finish groups as extensions of the senior executive group 2 
85 Meeting protocols 2 
86 Power of the chief executive over executive directors 2 
87 Creation and discussion of proposals at the SMT 4 
88 Social ties between group members 1 
89 Political (both world view and party) leanings of the housing sector affecting 
decisions. 
10 
90 The importance of social mission, which to the executive, means –in housing- 
giving a good product and service to existing and future tenants, and in 
education the children and charity the service users 
5 
91 Interpretation and emphasis of the social mission, which for non-executives 
means providing as much housing as possible to help alleviate the housing 
crisis, while giving reasonable (comparable to the private sector developer) 
quality to new tenants 
4 
92 Tension between sector orthodoxy for executives (brought up in the sector) 
contrasting with experience of other public sectors of the non-executives 
2 
93 Dynamic of executive – non-executive interaction at board, committees and 
groups. 
5 
94 Executives acting as a cohesive group at meetings 1 
95 Non-executives acting as (a less prepared / cohesive) group. 1 
96 Dominant position of the Head (CEO) in the meeting 1 
97 Meeting / organisation / sector culture 8 
98 Contribution and engagement of the governors at meetings 2 
99 Chair ‘recruitment’ (or election) and personal motivation of the chair 3 
100 Style of meeting minutes 4 
101 Governors responsibilities 1 
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102 Identification of the board with the organisation 1 
103 Meeting management by the chief executive 2 
104 Performance reporting in accordance with the regulatory regime: 
appropriateness, and use as ‘explaining away’ reported underperformance 
2 
105 Board challenge on poor results and executive resistance / response 2 
106 Low level of board member engagement 2 
107 Member time commitments 1 
108 Executive error and omission being forgiven / unchallenged 5 
109 Chair’s Meeting planning and management (and member fatigue) 2 
110 Board succession planning 1 
111 Defensiveness of members and chair under challenge by other members 2 
112 Auditors providing assurance to the non-executives on the executive in private 
session 
1 
113 The importance of the relationships between auditors and the executives, for 
both parties in particular the way in which this results in the assurances to 
members. 
1 
114 The non-executive questioning straying (a little) into operational matters and 
wider issues 
3 
115 Considerations of the wider political environment, as key driver for non-profit 
sector 
9 
116 Assurance provided by executives to committee members on detail factual 
basis 
3 
117 Board culture: acceptance by the executive team that ‘it is safe’ to present 
drafts to the committee for discussion and revision. 
1 
118 Acceptance by the committee that drafts can be presented for discussion and 
revision 
1 
119 Level of technical, regulatory and legal knowledge expected of members. Or at 
least evidence for the regulator that members have an appreciation of the 
regulatory environment 
7 
120 The main audience of the statutory accounts and strategy documents is the 
regulator 
3 
123 NHS Executives contributing to board discussion only in their own areas – 
question of whether they act as full board members 
1 
124 No executive to executive challenge 1 
125 Where executives attend the board there is no expectation that they will 
contribute other than through their papers 
1 
127 Power of the formally appointed board against the SMT 2 
128 Reasons for Board membership 2 
129 Professional skills and experience required of trustees, rather than as 
representatives of clientele 
1 
130 Board as a supportive community 3 
131 Non-executive selection not dependent on specific sector experience 1 
132 The confidential section of board meetings is a permanent feature, and its 
existence is accepted by the executives. 
1 
133 The non-executives appear to like the confidential section to allow them the 
opportunity to speak frankly about matters which would possibly ‘upset’ or 
concern the executive. 
1 
134 The chief executive seeks always to ‘protect’ those areas of executive 
responsibility from ‘interference’ by the board. 
1 
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135 The definition of operational (ie that which is the direct responsibility of the 
chief executive), and governance (ie the areas of legitimate board authority) is 
not always clear; and can be a potential source of friction between the 
executive and the board. 
2 
136 Establishing a rapport with merging parties at board level 1 
137 The process of transmission of authority to a new chair 1 
138 Executives passing on good news, (in the sense of mitigating previous bad 
news), to publicise their achievements to seek favour from the board 
1 
139 Members do not always review minutes closely to ensure that the executive 
record decisions and debate completely and accurately. 
1 
140 The purpose and role of minutes from the member’s point of view 1 
141 The great importance of the political environment for the quasi-public sector 8 
142 The board places great importance on setting the organisation’s risk appetite. 
This will set the tone for all strategy and operations in the organisation 
4 
143 The background and expertise of the board members affect their attitude to 
risk appetite. The organisation’s risk appetite is thus influenced by the board 
members and the composition of the board 
3 
144 Tension between a commercial subsidiary the holding company, which is a non 
profit 
2 
145 Management of board processes to sound out opinion of the board, without 
putting up a proposal which may be rejected 
2 
146 Decision making is a process which cycles round the board and SMT using 
various rationales 
5 
147 Management of the board by the executive through engagement with the 
decision making process which is led at each stage by the executive 
2 
148 The board requests the use of external consultants and experts for information 
for decision making 
1 
149 Government policy drives the housing product to be offered by housing 
associations 
3 
150 Tension between the orthodoxy and ethos of the housing associations and the 
school sector and the political direction of government policy. 
8 
151 Standard annual monitoring reports produced for the board by the executive 
for its formal approval of the ‘Annual Equality Statement’. Passive monitoring 
2 
152 The meeting was structured around formal papers prepared by the executive 
director 
3 
153 Full information was not provided beforehand to members on the decision to 
be taken. This was acknowledged to be a shortcoming 
1 
154 Task & Finish groups reflect the formal power structure of the authority of non-
executive board members and the power of the executive by virtue of their 
knowledge and cohesiveness 
3 
155 The chief executive, although a board member acted as an executive rather 
than as a board member on Task & Finish group 
2 
156 The National Housing Federation is an example of regulated organisations 
having their ‘trade bodies’ which have the functions such as: representing their 
collective views to the regulator and government; and setting and propagating 
good practice and information through the sector 
5 
157 The regulator is seeking to create a quasi-market for funds, where each bidder 
is independent of each other. However Regulated organisations seek to 
5 
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circumvent this underlying assumption by obtaining information (informally) 
from each other when bidding in national programmes. 
158 Bids for capital funds for development are based principally its social purpose, 
they are grounded on a knowledge of finances and risk 
2 
159 Organisations form consortia to reduce the administrative interface burden 
with the HCA 
1 
160 Organisations form consortia to reduce the administrative interface burden 
with the HCA as funder 
1 
161 Non-executive challenge forcing the executive to provide evidence for their 
views 
2 
162 Decisions based on financial projections recognise the underlying assumptions 
and future uncertainties. The main issues are however concerned with how to 
manage that risk in the pursuit of social purpose. 
4 
 
163 Government policy is the key driver in the sector. This means that 
organisational risk is greater in a regulated sector because of the effect of 
major and/or policy changes driven by ‘ideology’ not directly by economics. 
10 
164 The executive appears to view the Task and Finish group as a means of 
obtaining board approval of the executive’s proposals 
2 
165 Government sets its policies based on its ideological stance and mandate which 
has been obtained through the democratic process 
2 
166 The educational establishment has different political views generally to a 
centre right government, but has to implement policies which it disagrees with 
5 
167 The government must deliver its policies through professional groups which do 
not agree with it. 
2 
168 Professional groups are law abiding and will implement the law 2 
169 Funding mechanisms are a means of driving the implementation of policy 1 
170 Government policy implementation promoted through ‘marketing’ its policy 
ideas to those who must implement them 
3 
171 Depoliticising the academisation decision by showing that it has cross party 
support 
1 
172 Forcing acceptance by dismantling the alterative policy an process support 
structures 
1 
173 Seeking positive support for the policy from those who will implement it, by 
demonstrating its strengths on a professional basis 
3 
174 Governance improved by creating a larger ‘mass’ for governors. That is 
effective governance requires a critical organisational or group mass in order to 
be effective 
1 
175 Focus on the challenge role of governors through consistently following up on 
priorities and promises of the executive 
1 
176 Transparency and openness in discussing significant issues, the quality of 
engagement and responding to feedback 
2 
177 Essential to empower (subsidiary) heads to help in shaping (group) strategic 
priorities 
1 
178 Sector guidance on governance produced by independent organisation with 
the aim of improving the effectiveness of governance to the benefit of the 
social purpose 
3 
179 The National Governors Association (NGA) and department of Education 
guidance and training based on these and similar set the culture and values for 
governance in the state education sector 
3 
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180 The culture of corporate governance in the non-profit sector (education and 
housing) provides a means of ensuring the delivery of government policy (mind 
regulation) and compliance. 
5 
181 The structure of governing bodies is set out in statute / regulation. It is 
therefore determined politically, for the purpose of directing effective 
behaviour 
2 
182 The motivations to become a governor are varied, and could be related to the 
type of governor 
1 
183 Where is no remuneration, motivation to be a non-executive is probably 
intrinsic, although the precise nature of this motivation is an open question. 
4 
184 The government department uses accepted corporate governance best 
practice and applies that to the sector 
2 
185 Checking compliance to departmental guidance, in the education public sector, 
is part of the regulatory regime (OFSTED) 
1 
186 Challenging is regarded by governors as a challenging task 1 
187 Pluralistic ignorance is recognised as something which can both diminish 
challenge and affect board creativity 
1 
188 Mix of personalities on a board affects its dynamic 1 
189 Guidance on corporate governance is based on principally on agency theory 1 
190 Accountability and transparency are important in the public sector 1 
191 The purpose of the board is set out in easy to understand terms, however 
achieving them requires skill and experience, which many governors feel ill 
equipped for. 
2 
192 Government advice on the style of challenge to be applied by governors 1 
193 Mutual respect, trust, openness and honesty set as the preferred culture 3 
194 Support for the executive is viewed as being very important. 
Using the non-execs skills and experience, when this is lacking in the exec 
director 
3 
195 Governors of schools may not be experienced in holding effective meetings and 
need to be advised in guidance how to do so 
1 
196 Orthodoxy of ‘tenant involvement’, which the social housing sector generally 
accepts as problematic in practice 
1 
197 Antipathy of those who work in the social housing sector towards the private 
rented sector (PRS) 
1 
198 Independent appraisal required for the chairman – consultants retained since 
there are no other externals to carry out that process 
1 
199 Formulaic presentations of papers and this presentation accepted as a ‘ritual’ 
by the board 
1 
200 Systematic cyclical review of governance documents is carried out by the 
company secretary, as best practice and for regulatory evidence 
2 
201 The company secretary should ask the audit and risk committee to review its 
own tor (which it has done previously) 
1 
202 Non-executive would like the governance documents to refer to customers (ie 
indirectly to the social purpose of the organisation) 
1 
203 Non-executive detailed review of documents – expected to be carried out 
before the meeting 
1 
204 Nonprofits are sensitive to the attention of stakeholders (Pres and public) in 
awarding its members pay increases. 
1 
205 Pay awards linked to those of the staff means that ‘we as board members do 
not seek any advantage for ourselves’ compared to the staff. 
1 
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206 (Non-executive) Board members serve on boards for reasons not associated 
with direct remuneration 
2 
207 All directors are equally responsible for the organisation regardless of their 
appointment route, which is sometimes not always clear to members 
1 
208 The board acts to maintain the skills of its members in support of its role as an 
effective board. This is also evidence of good governance for the regulator. 
4 
209 Strategic plan can be substantially created by the executive, with board 
ratification 
3 
210 Regulatory requirements driving boards and organisations to implement 
‘accepted good practice’ 
1 
211 Rationalisation of (minor) failures to achieve strategic ambitions by those who 
created or ratified the strategy 
1 
212 Difficulties for nonprofits in moving into commercial areas because differences 
in sector cultures 
1 
213 There is a significant ‘cross fertilisation’ of non-executives between NHS, and 
Housing who bring with them, knowledge of the connections between them 
and a desire to connect them. The practicalities of funding, policy and 
regulation make this too difficult in practice to implement 
1 
214 Support services are provided as part of the ‘wider social purpose’ of the 
organisation, which is a point of view agreed by the board members and the 
executive. 
5 
215 Executive engagement with the board horizon scanning, intended to cement 
the board’s view on the social purpose of support services. 
2 
216 Strategic decisions are made on the basis of wider social purpose 5 
217 The board recruits its own members who are either in agreement with, or 
become socialised to, this general ‘wider social purpose’. There must also be a 
fit between personalities. 
3 
218 Use of internal audit to provide assurance to the audit committee and then the 
board on legal compliance 
1 
219 Meeting disciplines ensure focus on important items (especially when time is 
limited). 
1 
220 Business concluded quickly questions why meetings do not always do this. 
People like to demonstrate their engagement by speaking – although not 
necessarily adding value 
1 
221 The ethical concept of moral obligation [to provide decent housing] stated by 
the minister, which resonated to meeting of senior housing professionals; and 
moral obligation in education similarly resonated with school governors and 
the charity sector 
5 
222 Ethical concepts of Concepts of ‘right and just’ used by the housing minister 
which resonated to meeting of senior social housing professionals, although it 
is not their responsibility 
1 
223 Executives may seek to reserve decisions for themselves at the critical time so 
presenting the board with a fait accomplice when the formal decision has to be 
made. 
1 
224 ‘Regulatory capture’ is a possible interpretation of the HCA closeness to the 
housing sector. Although it could be seen as just a way to obtain an emotional 
closeness to the regulator 
1 
225 The regulator acts to implement government policy 1 
226 Government wants the social housing sector to be more efficient and 
introduces various mechanisms to promote this. 
2 
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227 Dilemma of the quasi-market: desire to control more directly against structural 
mechanisms against this 
1 
228 Boards with greater autonomy and professionalism lessen government ability 
to directly control. Professionalisation of boards is an attempt to exert indirect 
(cultural) control. This is lessened by the felt ‘moral obligation’ of those 
professionals to sector ‘clients’ 
3 
229 Collaboration as a core belief (orthodoxy) opposing neoliberalism 1 




231 Voluntarism cherished as a principle and embedded in the sector culture 1 
232 Ubuntu concept combines the collective and the social purpose views 1 
233 Educational professionals feel ‘accountable’ to their colleagues for the quality 
of their performance 
1 
234 The executive research and propose, and must do so with sufficient clarity to 
obtain agreement from the board committee. 
1 
235 The pay decision parameters have been put as policy which makes decisions 
relatively easy 
1 
236 Reliance by non-executives on the integrity of executives 1 
237 Reliance by non-executives on the integrity of executives 1 
238 The principle of fairness to staff 1 
239 The Board wishes to improve its own administrative efficiency 1 
240 Recognition of the non-executives experience, skill and particularly effort 
seems to be an important motivating factor 
1 
241 Link between executives serving in the non-profit sectors and their motivations 
and beliefs 
1 
242 The role of senior independent director is accepted practice in the private 
sector but not implemented widely in the non-profit board. 
1 
243 Professional views of ‘Company Secretary’ can provide an external, 
organisationally and psychologically based view of the workings of a voluntary 
management committee and its effect on an organisation 
1 
244 Culture of a board changes over time 1 
245 The culture of a board can be immediately obvious to the outside. This will 
affect the outsider’s attitude to the board 
1 
246 The culture and its change appear to have little effect on the performance of 
the organisation 
1 
247 Stereotyping of members as ‘nice people’ rather than by their views. 1 
248 Adverse effect that intergroup rivalries have on the enthusiasm and 
effectiveness of organisations 
1 
249 Self-perpetuating nature of board culture 1 
250 The ingroup erects barriers to entry to those who do not conform to their 
culture 
1 
251 The ingroup erects barriers to entry to those who do not conform to their 
culture 
1 
252 Strength through having a diversity membership and an ‘open culture’ 1 
253 The importance of collective memory 1 
254 Self-interest in terms of power and prestige is an important factor in erecting 
barriers to new ideas and people 
1 




256 SMT members generate board reports which will go to the board, committees 
and working groups, and these are ‘tested’ at SMT. The chief executive has the 
last say in all these. 
1 
257 The role and influence of the SMT in the process by which the board decides 
upon strategy and policy 
1 
258 The personal ethos of non-executives and executives centred upon a sense of 
moral duty to provide the best possible service to all the people with the 
medical condition served by the charity and those for whom the organisation 
exists 
1 
259 The charity is a contractor, providing services commissioned by (local) 
government in discharge of their statutory duties. That it is the duty of the 
government to provide certain services 
1 
260 Politically and budgetary driven changes to Government funding rules and 
amounts present key issue for providers 
1 
261 Provider organisation driven by social purpose and by moral duty to provide a 
good service to recipients 
3 
262 Financial pressures driving growth increase the risks to the organisation 1 
263 Board operates on the basis of trust and reliance on the executives 1 
264 Non-executive challenge moderated by ‘charitability’ to executives 1 
265 Boards rely on a number of sources for their assurance on the finances: audit; 
reports coming out of the department, and the credibility of the Finance 
Director and Chief executive 
1 
266 Board committee understanding of issues dependent on information from the 
executive in the first instance, interpreted by the professional background of it 
its members. 
1 
267 The regulator sets the intellectual framework for governance (based on 
accepted good practice 
1 
268 The political environment affects the way that the social purpose is delivered, 
but not the social purpose itself 
2 
269 External perceptions of the sector affect or at least influence the political 
environment 
1 
270 External political emphasis on ‘efficiency’ is a key driver to activity but does not 
override social purpose 
1 
271 External political emphasis on ‘efficiency’ is a key driver to activity but does not 
override social purpose 
1 
272 Quasi-public sector board meetings held in private as in the forprofit sector, or 
held in public as in the public sector 
1 
273 Board members and the executive are personally concerned with helping the 
homeless and other disadvantaged groups 
1 
274 Building and maintaining relationships with external stakeholders in order to 
deliver social purpose 
1 
275 Board focus on potential future challenges 1 
276 Board members not expected to know operational detail 1 
277 Non-executive training and education and socialisation 1 
278 Attempt to ‘quantify’ social impact in rational choice theory terms is impractical 1 
279 Wider social purpose encompasses clashing social purposes (differing interests 
of client groups) 
1 




281 Path dependency: a new organisation evolving out the current state under the 
impetus of legislation and the specific combination of existing structures and 
founding personalities. 
1 
282 Background of trustees influences the way that they govern 1 
283 The provision of housing is viewed by certain academics and activists the sector 
as a duty of government and as a right of eligible recipients 
1 
284 Emotion as a part of board process 5 
285 Levels of involvement of board members at board, board committee, ad-hoc 







Table 2 Concepts and Categories 
 
Table 2 summarises and groups together the concepts which have been developed through open 
coding from the data. The concepts are grouped under their respective headings as discussed 
in Section 6.3. The number of separate open codes supporting each concept is shown under the 
heading ‘Number of Open Codes’. The relationship between each concept and sub-category is 
shown in the third column, headed: ‘Open category / sub-category reference’. Each sub-
category referred to is discussed in Section 6.4 above.  
 
Concept Grouping / Concept Number  
of open 
codes 
Open category / 
sub-category 
reference 
6.3.1 Environment   
(i) Political and Regularity Issues   
1. Political environment, government funding regimes, 
political legitimacy and government policy 
The general political environment is a key driver for the 
sector. 
However, it affects the way that the social purpose is 
delivered, but not the social purpose itself 
Political focus on efficiency 
27 1 (i), 1 (ii), 5 (i) 
2. The regulatory environment, regulation, ensuring 
regulatory compliance and the responses of the regulated. 
(Differing regimes in different sectors). 
The regulatory and wider value regime builds a cultural 
acceptance of good corporate governance practice 
(ultimately from the private sector) 
Regulatory environment ultimately built on public view of 
the non-profit ethos and values. 
36 1 (i), 1 (ii) 
 
3. World view / public sector ethos / public sector 
orthodoxy 
13 1 (i), 1 (ii), 1 
(iv), 2 (i) 
4. Nonprofits which are essentially providers commissioned 
directly or indirectly by government to deliver the latter’s 
statutory duties and policies 
6 1 (i), 5 (i) 
5. External perceptions and expectations of the non-profit 
sector affect the political environment. The sector also seeks 
to influence government and public to change these 
perceptions 
3 1 (i), 5 (i) 
(ii) Social Purpose, Values and Moral Duty   
6. Social Purpose (and wider social purpose) of the 
organisation. However wider social purpose encompasses 
clashing social purposes (differing interests of client groups) 
23 1(i), 1 (ii), 1 (iii), 
1 (iv), 2 (ii), 2 
(v), 4 (ii), 5 (i) 
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7. Values and culture (including antipathy towards 
neoliberalism, the private sector, mutual support and 
charitableness): the sector, the organisation, and the board. 
This includes positively valuing the concept of voluntarism. 
Self- perpetuating – but there are changes in culture over 
time. Sector norms for organisational, SMT and board 
norms 
39 1 (i), 1(iii), 1 
(iv), 2 (ii), 5 (iii) 
(iii) Interactions Between the Political / Regularity 
Regimes and Nonprofit Sector 
  
8. Quasi markets and real markets 6 1(i), 5 (i) 
9. Risk: attitudes of providers and high risk associated with 
reliance of government policy and the requirement to 
demonstrate ‘value for money’ 
13 4 (iii), 5 (i) 
10. Nonprofit rationality is different to rational choice 
theory 
6 1 (iii) 
11. Path dependency is a key consideration in the creation 
and operation of the boards of organisations 
3 1 (i), 3 (i), 4 (i) 
12. Introduction of ‘for-profit sector’ views and processes 2 1 (ii), 2 (v) 
13. Guidance on governance and Independent sector bodies: 
‘trade bodies’ and those providing guidance and support 
8 1 (i), 1 (ii), 1 (iii) 
14. Implementation of policy by professional groups, 
members of the professions and the SMT in accordance 
with sector norms and tradition 
7 1 (i), 2 (ii) 
   
6.3.2 Board Structures and Processes   
(i) Structure and Action   
1. Board structure affects board behaviours 5 4 (i), 5 (ii) 
2. Chairman roles and responsibilities 8 3 (i), 4 (i), 5 (ii) 
3. The formal board, committees and task and finish groups: 
and responsibilities. The de facto dual board. 
Structure set by regulation or statute 
Board committees chaired by non-executives 
26 3 (i), 3 (ii), 4 (i), 
4 (ii), 5 (ii) 
(ii) Trust   
4. Meetings: protocols, formality, rituals, management and 
conduct (symbolic leadership) 
Board meetings mirror the intended sector culture. Board 
meetings in quasi-public sector are private as in the private 
sector which it mirrors; and as theatre as in the public for 
public legitimacy 
32 2 (iv), 4 (i) 
5. Boards operate on the basis of formal papers presented to 
it by the executive: Executive control of information and 
recommendations. Recommendations discussed and then 
usually accepted 
17 2 (iv), 4 (i), 4 
(ii), 4 (iii), 5 (ii), 
5 (iii) 
(iii) Decisions   
6. Decision making (strategic and operational) on the basis 
of formal papers and the political context. Understanding 
and ‘grip’ at board level. Boards operating by consensus 
33 1 (i), 1 (ii), 1 
(iii), 3 (i), 4 (i), 5 
(i), 5 (ii), 5 (iii) 
7. Board succession planning 2 2 (ii) 
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8. Board responsibility for the definition and delivery of 
social purpose. 
Accountability and legitimacy including moral 
accountability 
16 1 (i), 1 (iii), 3 (i), 
5 (i) 
9. Leadership 5 3(i) 
(iv) The SMT as a Sector Norm   
10. SMT, whose membership is decided by the CEO, acting 
as a cohesive group, and executive input to the board. 
Individual SMT / board member interaction. 
29 3 (ii), 5 (ii), 5 
(iii) 
11. Operation of the SMT and its membership and its 
relationship to the rest of the management team 
10 3 (ii), 4 (i), 4 (ii), 
4 (iii), 5 (iii) 
12. Chief executive acting in the dual (and potentially 
conflicting) roles of board member and leader of the SMT 
4 5 (iii) 
   
6.3.3 Challenge, Oversight and Assurance   
1. Challenge and oversight (actual and potential).  
Challenge by committees. Review of overall performance 
by the remuneration committee. Forgiving attitude by non-
executives. Passive monitoring. Accepting a lower level of 
performance through charitableness. 
38 1(i), 4 (ii), 5 (ii) 
2. Executive resistance – valid resistance to board challenge 
and ‘invalid’ and acquiescence 
10 4 (ii), 5 (ii), 5 
(iii) 
3. Non-executive support for the executive 7 2 (iii), 3 (i), 4 (i) 
4. Chair as the dominant board member: board support / 
challenge to the chair 
2 3 (i), 4 (ii) 
5. Auditors and other sources of assurance to the board 16 4 (iii) 
6. Skills, knowledge and Roles of the non-executive 
director: including bringing the out-of-sector ‘independent’ 
viewpoint. Including ‘cross fertilisation’ from different 
nonprofit sectors 
8 1 (ii), 1 (iv), 2 
(v), 4 (ii) 
7. Ensuring board member / executive competency and 
commitment. Ensuring executive directors act as full board 
members, when they are 
3 2 (iv), 3 (i), 3 
(ii), 5 (iii) 
   
6.3.4 Relationships   
1. Ingroups and outgroups, (both within and external to the 
organisation) interpersonal interactions, board cohesion and 
human factors. Board as a supportive community. Non-
executives act as a less prepared / cohesive group than the 
SMT. However SMT is not necessary a fully cohesive 
group – depending on personalities. 
32 1 (iii), 2 (v), 4 (i) 
2. Respect expected for board members and the board 2 2 (iii), 2 (iv) 
3. The relationships between the Chief executive and 
executive directors and board members. Including the chief 
executive protecting own staff. 
17 2 (iv), 3 (ii), 4 
(i), 4 (ii), 5 (ii), 5 
(iii) 
4. Trust 15 1 (i), 1 (ii), 2. 
(iv), 5 (ii) 
5. Relationship between the board and the CEO including 
the SMT 
21 5 (ii), 5 (iii) 
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6. (Executive) credibility and integrity 21 2 (iii), 2 (iv) 
7. Personal friendships 2 2 (iii), 4 (i) 
8. (Recruitment): Entry into and socialisation in the 
nonprofit sector organisation. Includes both executive and 
non-executives. 
20 1 (iv), 2 (v) 
9. Executive involvement and engagement with the board 
members and at board and committee meetings 
3 1 (ii), 5 (i), 5 (iii) 
10. Stakeholders and stakeholder relationships 13 1 (i), 1 (iv), 2 (i), 
2 (iii) 
   
6.3.5 Motivations   
1. Motivations of the chair and non-executive directors 
including: moral duty, personal interest eg help own 
children, self-satisfaction, self-esteem, career advancement 
and making a difference 
33 2 (i) 
2. Power and self-interest motivations and power structures 
(eg non-executive chairing committees). Chief executive 
power and influence 
25 2 (iii), 4 (i), 5 (i), 
5 (ii), 5 (iii) 
3. Motivations of the executive, including the sense of 
moral duty 
16 2 (i), 2 (ii), 4 (i), 
4 (ii) 
4. Board and board member identification (with the 
organisation and/or the sector) 
8 1 (iv), 4 (ii) 
5. Motivations of the executive, including the sense of 
moral duty 
16 2 (i), 2 (ii), 4 (ii) 




Table 3 Categories 
Table 3 summarises the concepts which support each category; and shows the number of open 
codes supporting each concept and category; and therefore, represents the ‘inverse’ of Table 2.  















































































1 Political, regulatory, and ethical 
environments 
      
1 (i) The regulatory and political 
environments 
171 49 38 28  286 
1 (ii) Values and culture of the nonprofit 
sector 
96 33 8 18  195 
1 (iii) Social purpose of the organisation 76 49  32  157 
I (iv) Identification with the client not the 
‘owner’ or regulator 
75  8 20 8 111 
1 (v) Nonprofit sector collective bodies    13  13 
2 The individual director       
2 (i) Motivations of the individual to 
become a board member 
   13 66 79 
2 (ii) Motivations for the board to recruit 
an individual non-executive as a 
member 
30 2   33 65 
2 (iii) Personal credibility and integrity   7 38 25 70 
2 (iv) Prestige, ritual, formality and 
respect 
 49 3 53  105 
2 (v) Socialisation 25  8 54   
3 Nonprofit board structures       
3 (i) The formally appointed Board 3 88 12   103 
3 (ii) The SMT.  64 3 17  84 
4 Actions of the Board       
4 (i) Social groups and the conduct of 
business 
3 131 7 51 41 234 
4 (ii) Challenge 23 53 58 17 40 191 
4 (iii) The SMT and the de facto dual 
board 
13 30   16 59 
5 Power and influence       
5 (i) Power of the political and regularity 
environment 
78 49  3 25 155 
5 (ii) Power of, and within, the board  118 48 53 25 244 
5 (iii) The SMT and the de facto dual 
board 
 93 13 41 25 172 
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